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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between auto/biographical art-writing and 
subjectivity by analysing the work of contemporary writers and poets. I frame art-
writing as a psychophysical process that generates an erotic response to artwork. 
Through this framing, I develop an ethics of auto/biographical art-writing drawing 
from models of subjectivity that follow a relational ontology. I turn to feminist 
theories of affect and psychoanalysis as critical methodologies to invent an 
exploration of subjectivity catalyzed by the process of auto/biographical art-
writing. For affect theory, I am mainly informed by philosopher and social-
political theorist Teresa Brennan’s conceptualisation of affect as the physical 
transmission of energy between individuals and groups. The main psychoanalytic 
framework I employ draws from psychoanalyst, artist and theorist Bracha L. 
Ettinger’s conceptualisation of a Matrixial psychoanalysis that highlights the 
‘nonconscious’ dimension of affect and aesthetics, amongst other important 
psychoanalytic developments. For the term ‘auto/biography’ I turn to feminist 
philosopher Adriana Cavarero, who proposes that the individual is essentially 
relational, co-affected and achieves temporary unity through hearing their life-
story narrated by an other person. For the purposes of this research, 
auto/biographical narratives illustrate the singularity and uniqueness of the 
encounter between the artwork and the storyteller. I argue that personal memory 
and nonconscious activity create the conditions for an erotic response to an 
artwork’s ethical demand for what Teresa Brennan calls ‘living attention.’ That is, 
the dynamic exchange of affects and energy whose economy is primarily 
nonconscious, life-driven (Eros), and imprints subjectivity at the start of psychic 
life (pre-natal). By combining the theoretical advances of these three authors, I 
formulate a distinct model of relating to aesthetic experience and ensuing 
auto/biographical art-writing which I term erotic responsiveness. Following an 
analysis of writing by authors who employ auto/biographical methodologies to 
convey their aesthetic experiences, this research develops a broader framework for 
contemporary critical thinking about personal narratives, their uses in art-writing, 
and how they inform subjectivity.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
As critics, what are our responsibilities toward work that quite literally takes 
us out of our comfort zone, and toward the audiences who seek out these 
experiences?  
– Jennifer Doyle1  
 
To access a tattoo parlor in East London, we walked through a narrow corridor by an 
organic store. Predrag whizzed out of a corner, a foot taller than the first time I met 
him, teetering aristocratically on unearthly stilettos. His makeup and suit impeccable 
and at odds with the ungovernable glass of wine in his hand that greeted you with a 
cataclysmic joy. “You’re going to love this...” he purred into my ear whilst ushering 
the audience into the hot and crowded rooms. 
                                                      
1 Jennifer Doyle, Hold it Against Me: Difficulty and Emotion in Contemporary Art (Durham and 
London: Duke University Press, 2013), 5. 
 
Fig. 1 Nicola Hunter in the book Beneath the Shadows the Soul Walks (2012). 
Photo by Predrag Pajdic. 
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I met Predrag Pajdic a few months ago at a day conference at the Freud 
museum. We discussed trauma, pain, self-harm, psychoanalysis and spirituality in 
relation to art more broadly and how it figures in performance art more specifically. 
Based on our very brief but dense exchange, Predrag insisted that I attend his 
forthcoming book launch. He was confident that it would elaborate on the two points 
that we agreed on: firstly, that there is a lack of spirituality being discussed 
theoretically and that this is a fundamental loss for ritualistic performances that 
Fig. 2 Johannes Vermeer, Girl with a Pearl Earring (1665). 
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explore trauma and self-harm; secondly, that psychoanalysis is a stale framework for 
exploring the sexualities and genders of our immediate milieu and is in need of an 
urgent reconfiguration. Talking to such a loquacious and animated conversationalist 
makes it difficult to discern whether our thoughts were actually in sync, or if we 
were drawn to each other in that all too strange yet familiar way of finding yourself 
face to face with the only other queer child in a room full of “serious” folk. 
Difference in affective solidarity. That was how I logically understood the concept of 
queer. 
At the tattoo parlour I spotted the table with copies of his new book. A 
collection of portrait photographs taken at the break of dawn were accompanied by 
the poetry of JL Nash. The images were vibrant, too vivid to be real, too saturated for 
dawn. There were prosthetic wings, extravagant props, butterflies, furs, tattooed 
figures posing as erotic, mythological creatures garnished in flowers. “Too 
fashionable,” I thought to myself. I was resentful in my queer solidarity for I didn’t 
feel that this oeuvre fulfilled the promise of our spiritual and psychoanalytic 
campaign. I had to accept that this is not what Predrag was doing in his book and I 
Fig. 3 Johannes Evers, Male Gaze (2011). Image still from performance from video. 
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wondered whether his claim was simply my own projected desire. A desire to flip 
book pages that would conjure what Kathy O’Dell terms the “contracted partner”. 
O’Dell contends that documentation of performance art offers the possibility of both 
a visual and haptic engagement because ‘encountering the shared ontology of the 
body makes the viewer mindful of his or her own physical presence as witness to the 
pictured event.’2 Yet, our haptic experience is selective and often adventitious. Some 
images will affect more than others. Flipping the pages of Beneath the Shadows the 
Soul Walks I was arrested by the penetrating gaze of Nicola Hunter [fig. 1].3 Even 
though I had never come across her work, there was something familiar about this 
image that compelled me to pause and engage. Her nude back straight, yet 
uncomfortably twisted to stare at you with the type of look that authorises a 
transaction, a gaze that implores your haptic senses. I am familiar with this pose. 
From Johannes Vermeer’s painting Girl with a Pearl Earring (1665) [fig. 2] to the 
video Male Gaze (2011) [fig. 3] by Johannes Evers. A pose loaded with an illicit 
provocation while dangerously eliciting intimacy. Hunter’s portrait was accompanied 
by a cautionary riddle crafted by the poet J.L. Nash that spoke volumes of broken 
promises: 
How easy it was to forgive every human 
Failing except yours and in the aftermath 
Of all that I feared I found 
Your mask upon the counterpane 
 
You were reluctant to wear it in bed4 
                                                      
2 O’Dell addresses how photographic documentation of masochistic and ephemeral practices such as 
performance art may create a relationship of identification through a visual-haptic engagement. The 
viewer/reader, of either the live work or the documentation, becomes a partner in a “contract” with 
predetermined terms. O’Dell argues that in the case of performance art, the contract of engagement, 
entails a psychodynamic return to ‘the domestic site, the home, where identities are first formulated.’ 
See Kathy O’Dell, Contract with the Skin: Masochism, Performance Art, and the 1970s (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 13-16. 
3 Nicola Hunter was formerly known as Nicola Canavan.  
4 Predrag Pajdic and JL Nash, eds. Beneath the Shadows the Soul Walks (UK & Australia: The 
Pandorian, 2012).  
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“I hope you’re standing comfortably!” Predrag exclaimed while cautioning 
the eclectic crowd to open up and make room for the next act. The stuffy, sweaty 
room unfolded like a wallpaper of bodies pressed against each other and pasted onto 
the walls. Nicola Hunter appeared wearing a pearl-coloured bridal gown and white 
lilies on her head [fig. 4]. Her every step a graceful calculation of those who have 
learnt to walk on water after having walked on eggshells. Silent, agile and disarming: 
a fox in a chicken coop. Despite my reservations, I was struggling to remain 
unaffected by the work. I felt seduced – drawn to her and her every gesture – an 
attraction that felt familiar. I recognized her footsteps. I have a memory of the barely 
audible click of the ankle, toes that spread into a sturdy lightness as if caressing the 
marble floor. I could almost hear her heels releasing a soothing maternal “shhh...” at 
every gentle squeeze. Now I recall, the thief that broke into my heart walked this 
way: with a lullaby at her soles and a passionate lily-scented heart. She was reluctant 
to wear it in bed… 
I felt the need to protect myself. Unable to move in the crowded room, my 
only defense came in the form of critical, fierce, icepick irises contracting. As much 
as I wanted to remain indifferent, so much more I felt the urge to caress the 
protrusions of the hexagonal lily-hearts gracing her head. She then raised her right 
arm, majestically, towards her head. Fingers like snake-shaped pearls made an 
incestuous entry into the heart of a lily in/on her head. With a stoic execution that 
resembled an orchestra conductor she released the first flower. Then a few subtle 
flicks of the wrist and the headband of lilies descended into a pizzicato of bloody 
strings embellishing her face, dripping into a velvety baroque pattern on her heaving 
breast. 
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“I’m not feeling well,” I whispered to my partner as I watched the body-
plastered walls fade to black.  I don’t recall how I was escorted out. I found myself in 
the organic store, sipping chocolate soya, eyes protracted, absorbing the slowly 
diminishing black spots in my vision that were starting to reveal a marble floor. 
“You’re so pale, we need to get you something to eat. What would you like?” 
my partner asked. 
“Steak,” I replied. “Rare, raw, blue.” 
Fig. 4 Nicola Hunter, Beneath the Shadows the Soul Walks (2012). Photo Marco Berardi. 
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Methodology 
 
 
My experience of Hunter’s performance struck a very personal chord. There was 
something unbearable for me to sustain. To such an extent, that my body gave up 
during the experience. Almost as a way to protect me from the insufferable sight and 
what it infolded on a nonconscious level. The term ‘nonconscious’ is distinct from 
the general understanding of the ‘unconscious’. The differentiation is, broadly 
speaking, the idea that there is a psychic stratification which is not exactly the result 
of repression.5 Prior to cognition and symbolization, the artist and psychoanalyst-
theorist Bracha L. Ettinger theorizes nonconscious affects as non-representational 
aesthetic registers that arouse our primordial psychophysical and affective 
experience.6 
This nonconscious affective experience foregrounds the theoretical approach 
to this project prior to any engagement with the socio-political issues and formal 
characteristics of the artwork and art-writing. Throughout the thesis, I use the term 
‘art-writing’ or the phrase ‘writing with art’ interchangeably, and I set these terms as 
distinct from the general field of writing about art. I explore how writers who 
respond to artwork through auto/biographical art-writing are engaging in a creative 
practice that involves an erotic response to an artwork’s ethical demand for living 
attention: a physical, psychic and mental response to an encounter. The term ‘living 
attention’ belongs to the feminist philosopher and social-political theorist Teresa 
                                                      
5 I am indebted to Dr. Tina Kinsella for conversations with Ettinger’s theories and the ‘nonconscious’ 
that ran well into the night in Utrecht and Dublin and through email correspondence. Kinsella notes 
that in Ettinger’s theoretical work the nonconscious refers to affects that are aesthetic and may be 
brought into symbolisation in non-representational ways and not solely through metonymy following 
repression. Tina Kinsella, email to Diana Georgiou, 23 January 2015. 
6 Ettinger explicates how ‘matrixial co-affection is a transgression of affect’ in that it is the process by 
which aesthetic affects can awaken archaic affects. See Bracha L. Ettinger, “The Heimlich (1997),” in 
The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 
159. 
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Brennan who conceptualizes affect as the physical and energetic transmission of 
psychic states between individuals.7 Brennan’s conceptualization facilitates an 
understanding of subjectivity as relational and co-affected by external agents. For 
Brennan, the physical experience of affects is foregrounded as a significant factor of 
the subject’s sense of self through an understanding of how affects require a 
deployment of psychophysical energy.8  
This research on art-writing will address why critical engagement with 
aesthetics necessitates a conceptual framework that considers how such 
psychophysical responses make their way into auto/biographical narratives. By 
stressing how art-writing reveals a corresponding embodiment, I argue that an 
auto/biographical response to an artwork simultaneously conveys and informs the 
life experience of the writer as well as the story of the work. The neologism 
auto/biography has a specific meaning in this context. It is meant to convey both 
biography and autobiography in a single word. But it is also a conceptual framework 
defined by the feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero as the desire rooted in each 
individual to hear their life story, the uniqueness of ‘who’ they are, narrated back to 
them in life. By exposing narratives where this desire is disclosed, Cavarero argues 
that identity is relationally generated through an everyday exchange of stories 
between the self and other.9 Therefore, the auto/biographical act is not simply the 
desire to narrate our life, or other people’s lives, in chronological fashion. The 
auto/biographical act arises from an ontology of relation which inevitably holds 
                                                      
7 Teresa Brennan, The Interpretation of the Flesh: Freud & Femininity (Taylor & Francis e-library, 
2003. PDF e-book), 170-171. 
8 Brennan’s aim is to develop a language that can be used to describe ‘the physicality of ideas’ as well 
as the exchange of psychical energies. For Brennan, the term psychophysical is a way to ‘evoke the 
conceptual unity of mental and physical processes.’ See Brennan, Interpretation, 5. 
9 Adriana Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, trans. Paul A. Kottman (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 72-73. 
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ethical implications for the relationship between the self and other. To this end, 
auto/biographical art-writing borrows Cavarero’s narrative modality, and ontological 
framework of desire, to explore ‘who’ appears in art-writing and what critical and 
political analyses these narratives unfold. By employing Cavarero’s idea that the 
exposition of a personal narrative informs both the self and the other, while it unfolds 
the unique story of ‘who’ is being narrated, the relationship between the subject and 
the artwork is thus framed as a unique encounter. For this reason, the narratives that 
ensue preclude universal viewpoints and discourses, or claims of a collective 
authenticity.10 
Cavarero’s work provides a method to consider storytelling under the rubric 
of a relational ontology and as a practice that gains political force even when 
conducted in the private sphere. This concept is of vital significance to how I 
examine the practice of auto/biographical art-writing in order to propose that art-
writing need not follow traditional ways of writing about art which are, for the most 
part, directed at the public sphere. My central aim is to expose why auto/biographical 
art-writing should be perceived as an activity that has political value and affective 
resonance even when conducted in private. The relation between the artwork and the 
writer is of primary significance to the process of auto/biographical art-writing 
regardless of whether the writing has an audience. In other words, the writing is 
collateral to the psychophysical impact that the work has produced on the writer.  
                                                      
10 Cavarero holds that identity is shaped through specific interactions and relations with others. 
Because of this specificity and the unique encounters we are exposed to, it is impossible to construct a 
an ethics or politics that would be universally applicable to all humans. Neither is it possible to claim 
that there exists an authentic collective identity which defines groups. For instance, in her analysis of 
how narrative was employed by the Italian feminist movements of the 70s, Cavarero notes that 
consciousness-raising put into practice a mode of self-narration that took place in a shared and 
interactive space. This private space provided an occasion for the narrator to exhibit her uniqueness in 
differentiation to other women and not through the expression of a collective idea of woman. See 
Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 88. In the same vein, I transpose Cavarero’s argument unto the 
experience of an artwork to argue that as each encounter with an artwork is equally unique, it 
generates a narrative that rules out universal applicability. 
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While Cavarero’s ethical and narrative propositions are restricted to relations 
between humans, my thesis transposes these propositions unto the ontological 
relation between an artwork and a subject. As a consequence, it was necessary to 
draw from a framework that reconfigures the hierarchical relationship between 
subject and object, to an intimate relation that can be described as an encounter 
between two active participants. For this reason, I have selected Ettinger’s 
configuration of aesthetic encounters theorized as a shift towards an ‘ethical human 
contract,’ in order to elucidate how the subject is affected by an encounter with art.11 
Furthermore, as each unique narrator is inevitably situated in a larger web of 
connections, Ettinger’s model of analysis provides the means to explore the psychic 
effects of experiencing art and how such a unique experience can inform both the 
self and their relationship to wider socio-political issues. Ettinger’s proposition is 
grounded in a primordial ethicality which requires measures of both vulnerability 
and resistance in adult life. Ettinger contends that ethicality precedes the social, 
political and symbolic economy but may transform our interactions in these spheres 
when traces of our proto-ethical experience reach consciousness.12 For Ettinger, the 
subject of ethics manifests during the negotiation/activation of two psychic faculties: 
                                                      
11 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” Studies in the Maternal 1, no. 2 (2009): 3, 
https://doi.org/10.16995/sim.141. 
12 Ettinger, “Fragilization,” 9 & 14. For a more thorough analysis of Ettinger’s theorizations of a 
‘proto-ethical’ formulation of subjectivity see Bracha L. Ettinger, “From Proto-ethical Compassion to 
Responsibility: Besidedness, and the three Primal Mother-Phantasies of Not-enoughness, Devouring 
and Abandonment,” in Philosophical Studies 2 (2006): 100-135. What is most useful to a discussion 
on art-writing, is how Ettinger’s proto-ethical formulations meet the aesthetic sphere and the concept 
of the nonconscious. For Ettinger, proto-ethics precede ethicality and are not of a conscious register. 
Whereas ethics are a conscious negotiation of our engagement with an other, it is in the proto-ethical 
stage that ethics find a primordial collective commonality. This significant proposition shifts the 
moral focus of human ethics towards an understanding of the subject as responsive to an environment 
of co-affectivity and interaction without predetermined obligation and responsibility. In this sense, it 
allows us to think of ethical action not as a universal configuration or a rational execution of 
preordained acts of morality. Rather, ethics are here framed as a negotiation between self and other in 
spite of moral imperatives. As proto-ethics precede the subject, the ethical also necessitates a non-
unitary idea of the subject. Furthermore, proto-ethical traces can be found in non-representational 
form during aesthetic encounters and can therefore impact (and potentially transform) the subject. 
11 
 
 
 
fragilization and resistance. Ethicality, in the psychic sphere, requires a measure of 
self-fragilization when encountering an other, as well as a non-unitary notion of 
subjectivity that effectuates various modes of resistance. To sum up her key points, 
in order for the proto-ethical imprint to meet the ethical sphere of our everyday 
interactions, these specific psychic modalities are activated in the subject: a 
resistance to the narcissistic-paranoid self which resorts to splitting the ego and 
enacts fantasies of abandonment; an unblocking of the passages that bar 
‘transconnectedness’ and ‘the impossibility of not-sharing’; a withdrawal from 
sociocultural imperatives that follow the phallic symbolic order, which can lead to 
the objectification of the other.13 One of the ways by which these mechanisms are 
more predisposed to activation is through interactions with the aesthetic sphere. 
During an encounter with art, the processes of fragilization and resistance are set in 
motion because aesthetics can challenge the preconceptions of our rational minds 
and awaken what can no longer be remembered.14 Ettinger terms this aesthetic affect 
‘fascinance’ and states that it is more prone to enabling psychic transformation 
because it can bypass ‘linear time and continual space’ as well as our conscious 
defences.15 Borrowing from Ettinger’s theoretical model, I argue that 
auto/biographical art-writing is generated from a psychic mode of relating to an other 
(artwork, object, subject, non-human) whereby the other’s vital differences in that 
relationality are respected and recognized – not opposed, antagonized, renounced or 
                                                      
13 Ettinger, “Fragilization,” 9-12. ‘Transconnectedness’ and ‘the impossibility-of-not-sharing’ are 
concepts that Ettinger returns to in a number of her theoretical texts. Both terms are to be thought of 
as psychic modalities that are formulated in the proto-ethical stage which later underscore our ethical 
and aesthetic experience, but not always on a conscious level. 
14 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Matrixial Gaze (1998),” in The Matrixial 
Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 146. Ettinger 
argues that ‘if a work of art can only be born in and out of amnesia, the work of the artist is the 
working-through and bringing-into-being of that which cannot be remembered. An Event 
unremembered – yet that cannot be forgotten – is located in a transsubjective borderspace.’  
15 Ettinger, “Fragilization,” 3.  
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objectified – through such a process of self-fragilization. This is not a way to figure 
the relation between the subject and artwork as an always harmonious exchange. On 
the contrary, Ettinger describes the process of self-fragilizing as ‘risky,’ ‘painful,’ 
and ‘hard to tolerate,’ precisely because it opposes how we are socially acculturated 
to seek out ‘mental security’ through self-containment and by returning to our 
habitual guarded modes of relating.16 
Ettinger’s work provides a robust understanding of the psychic mechanisms 
put into play during an aesthetic encounter. However, in my attempt to articulate the 
effects of aesthetic encounters that entail the meeting of bodies in space, it was 
necessary to turn to Brennan’s more physical account of both affects and their impact 
on the psyche. For instance, how does aesthetic affect bypass our conscious 
defenses? Can we not propose that for a transformation to occur in the psyche it will 
simultaneously (if not primarily) have to undergo a physical charge on a sensorial 
level? It is not enough to suggest that something happens on the level of drives 
without at least a more physical understanding of how our flesh and hormones, our 
mind and unconscious desires, and external factors such as the social as well as the 
singular encounter, are all part of a larger synergetic “moment” – an action, a 
prompt, a cue, a click – that is corporeally experienced. In the case of erotic 
responsiveness, it is a moment where a transformation has occurred for the subject 
that leads to a response in the form of a story. I propose that such a response is an 
intensely psychophysical form of loving and living attention towards an artwork.   
By employing Brennan’s work on affect as energetic attention, I argue that in 
the case of art-writing, an encounter with artwork firstly impacts the physical and 
psychic registers of an individual. To this effect, I draw further distinctions between 
                                                      
16 Ettinger, “Fragilization,” 9. 
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the practice of writing about art and art-writing. Writing about art is framed as the 
conventional approach of an author structuring their thoughts about and upon an 
object external to the self, drawing from a number of theoretical and historical, 
linguistic and visual sources to consolidate these thoughts. On the other hand, the 
latter form is in a sense a mode of writing with art. That is, permitting the work to 
primarily induce a sensorial experience that leads to a psychophysical response that 
takes shape in the form of art-writing (or other creative forms).  
I contend that in the case of auto/biographical art-writing, a work of art is 
experienced as an encounter rather than an object to be written about by a subject. To 
this end, I figure these responses as auto/biographical forms of art-writing for the 
way they narrate a story through self-reflection, recourse to memory and emotion, as 
well as embodied responses to the lived experience of a unique aesthetic encounter. I 
argue that this dual affective movement between the work impacting the subject, and 
the subject producing a story that arises from an encounter with the work, is an erotic 
response.  
I propose the term erotic responsiveness as the modality produced from these 
interwoven ideas of affective relationality that arise from a distinct model of psychic 
activity. I claim that a response in the form of auto/biographical art-writing is an 
erotic response in that it goes by way of the libido and it is sourced from the life 
drive. This proposition draws from Ettinger’s and Brennan’s psychoanalytic accounts 
of the relationship between subjectivity and creativity.17 Both authors maintain that a 
relational model of subjectivity has a closer relationship to the psychic mechanisms 
of the life drive (Eros). For Teresa Brennan, as relational beings, we are principally 
                                                      
17 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen (1996),” in The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 93 and Teresa Brennan, Exhausting 
Modernity: Grounds for a new Economy, (Taylor & Francis e-library, 2003. PDF e-book), 23. 
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informed by profoundly material and embodied affective and transmitted intensities 
that illustrate that ‘we are not self-contained in terms of our energies.’18 The living 
attention we receive (an energetic attention) is one way to activate the life drive 
towards an enhancement of psychic flourishing. Accordingly, Ettinger’s theorisations 
also draw from a relational model of subjectivity where co-affectivity and co-
emergence are the conditions that found our coming into the world. Furthermore, in 
Matrixial theory, not only are affects transmitted between individuals, but affects can 
be carried by artwork and exposed to perceptive witnesses.19  
Most significantly, the authors’ respective propositions diverge from the 
conventional conceptualisation of desire as the force of the death drive towards an 
unattainable object (as for Jacques Lacan), to produce an alternative psychic 
development that focuses on the process of co-affective experience.20 Through these 
                                                      
18 Teresa Brennan, The Transmission of Affect, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 6. Brennan’s 
elaborations of a ‘self-contained’ subject and Ettinger’s ‘paranoid tendencies of the self’ are 
theoretically aligned in their description of a subjectivity that follows phallic-symbolic structures 
premised on Oedipal constructs. 
19 The convergence of Ettinger’s and Brennan’s work is examined further in Chapter Two. On the 
possibility of affect being transported through art Ettinger states: ‘I submit that a crypt – with its 
buried unthought of knowledge […] and with the affect that had accompanied it – can be transmitted 
from one subject to another by metramorphosis, because a capacity and an occasion for this kind of 
transmission, co-affectivity, co-acting, and co-making already occurred in the archaic relations 
between each becoming-subject and the m/Other. Metramorphosis turns the subject’s boundaries into 
thresholds, and co-affectivity turns the borderlines between subjects in distance-in-proximity and 
between subject and object, into a shareable borderspace. In this space, they become partial, riding on 
the same mental strings.’ See Bracha L. Ettinger, “Transcryptum: Memory Tracing In/For/With the 
Other (1999),” The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2006), 166. 
20 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: Encore, On Feminine Sexuality, the 
Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company 1998), 177 & 257. Also, Jacques Lacan, “Position of the Unconscious,” in 
Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink, Heloise Fink and Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
2006), 719. The argument that Lacan’s thesis on desire leads to the objectification or erasure of 
women has been addressed by a number of feminist writers. Most notably, feminist philosopher Luce 
Irigaray, once a member of Lacan’s institution École Freudienne de Paris, was expelled because of 
her view that Lacanian and Freudian psychoanalysis is phallocentric. See Luce Irigaray, Speculum of 
the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. First 
published 1974). Elizabeth Grosz echoes Irigaray’s critique by also highlighting the phallogocentric 
nature of Lacan’s work, proposing that ‘like demand, desire is in principle insatiable. It is always an 
effect of the Other, an ‘other’ with whom it cannot engage, in so far as the Other is not a person but a 
place, the locus of law, language, and the symbolic.’ See Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist 
Introduction (London, New York: Routledge, 1990), 67. 
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psychoanalytic developments, I argue that affect plays a pivotal, if not primary, role 
in the construction of subjectivity. It is especially during aesthetic encounters that the 
affect of love provides the living attention required to generate responses to artwork 
in the form of auto/biographical art-writing. On a psychic level, I argue that the 
motivation to do so stems from a relational desire activated in the life drive, rather 
than a desire propelled by the death drive towards the possession, control or analysis 
of an object. 
The process of auto/biographical art-writing is subjective, not always 
conscious and may potentially infold and unfold trauma. To reiterate, art-writing is 
the practice of writing with art – a creative practice of narrating an affective 
experience with artwork through writing. Art-writing might produce art criticism and 
aesthetic description and interpretation, yet, art-writing is distinct from art 
criticism.21 I frame auto/biographical art-writing as an exigency to respond to an 
aesthetic encounter that has engaged our living attention. The study of 
auto/biographical art-writing offers another way to question and critically examine 
the relationship between the self and other and it can provide analytic tools and 
methodologies to examine both aesthetics and subjectivity. Due to a lack of 
resources addressing the specific relationship between auto/biographical art-writing 
and subjectivity, I have drawn instead on theoretical propositions from 
                                                      
21 An equivalent perspective on responses to artwork can be found in the art-writing of Hélène Cixous 
who declares that both the writer and the painter are poets. Cixous’ texts on art have been described as 
an alternative form of writing which is not exactly ‘art criticism, nor simply regarded as critical 
essays, because Cixous responds to the artworks as a poet, reading them as if they were poems.’ See 
Hélène Cixous, Poetry in Painting: Writings on Contemporary Arts and Aesthetics, eds. Marta 
Segarra and Joana Masó (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 2. Similarly, describing the 
experience of an encounter with a work of art, Kate Love develops the idea of writing with experience 
to inform both the writing as well as the experience of art. Love proposes that instead of creating a 
binary between practice and theory, ‘an auxiliary intention was to posit the idea that we don’t have to 
bring words to art but rather that we can use the experience of art as a form of criticism itself.’ See 
Kate Love, “The Experience of Art as a Living Through of Language,” in After Criticism: New 
Responses to Art and Performance, ed. Gavin Butt (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 157. 
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psychoanalysis as well as literary criticism and poetics to examine the erotics of art-
writing. 
The three authors I have chosen as primary co-ordinates have allowed me to 
conjure in words what I experience when I am moved by aesthetic experience. 
Ettinger’s proto-ethical model of subjectivity, which advances an innovative 
conceptualization of the role of desire in the relationship between aesthetics and 
subjectivity, provides new grounds to think aesthetic experience as a profoundly 
destabilising psychic instance. In Ettinger’s account, affect and desire are more 
closely linked and work in tandem to create the conditions for a process of reciprocal 
communication between art-writing, the artwork, the artist and an extended but not 
endless connectivity. 
Drawing from Brennan’s theory of affect as transmission and Ettinger’s 
psychoanalytic propositions, I highlight valuable critiques and methodologies as a 
way to challenge the fixity of certain psychoanalytic configurations. I mainly borrow 
from Ettinger and Brennan alternative interpretations on the following: the life drive 
and its relationship to creativity; subject-object relations and embodiment; artwork as 
affective encounter. As a result, I make extensive references to psychoanalytic terms 
for which I will not always provide accounts of the background.22 I unpack less 
familiar terms in order to facilitate argumentation, but I am presuming a certain 
knowledge of psychoanalytic theories by the reader. Lastly, Cavarero’s analysis of 
the ‘narratable self’, the self as ontologically relational in its exposition, provides the 
means to examine art-writing under the lens of the ethics and politics of storytelling 
in order to differentiate it from other forms of discourse or literary practice.  
                                                      
22 For the purpose of brevity, I will avoid elaborating on the historical and theoretical basis of 
Freudian and Lacanian concepts unless I address specific criticisms to their theories. I will however 
provide sources for further reading.  
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This thesis is an attempt to describe, perhaps invent, a way to talk and write 
with art as an extension of subjectivity. It is a mode of relating to aesthetics whereby 
the boundaries between subject/object, exteriority/interiority and self/other are 
synthesised or overlapping. Moreover, writing with art reveals the interconnections 
between ontological and ethical strategies, specifically in the way that narrative 
modalities can undermine the centrality of the self-contained subject as the starting 
point of ontology. With this proposition, my aim is to forge a link between art-
writing and artwork through an ontology of relation that informs subjectivity, 
namely, the subjectivity of the writer, and how they relate to aesthetics.  
Several interrelated points were necessary to sustain the idea that erotic 
responsiveness is a life-driven, ethico-aesthetic activity that is sculpted in the form of 
art-writing. The combinations of some of these points might seem more convincing 
than others. Since erotic responsiveness is framed as a primarily nonconscious 
affective experience, it requires a process of working-through that reverberates both 
conscious and nonconscious communication and memory in asynchronical and non-
linear fashion. Thus, the logic of representation, knowledge and truth in 
auto/biographical art-writing, both in visual and textual form, will inevitably be 
liable to omissions, gaps, slips, repetitions, fantasies, excesses, haptic and affective 
accounts and processes. This inevitable (dis)junction between trauma and its belated 
aesthetic negotiation has been at the core of visual and cultural theorist Griselda 
Pollock’s work in After-affects | After-images: Trauma and aesthetic transformation 
in the virtual feminist museum, 2013.23 Elaborating on the effects of artworking on 
                                                      
23 Pollock refers to the Freudian concept Nachträglichkeit (a delayed traumatic reaction to an event 
that took place in the past which could be triggered by a seemingly unrelated event occurring in the 
present time) as a useful tool for cultural and aesthetic analysis. See Griselda Pollock, After-affects | 
After-images: Trauma and aesthetic transformation in the virtual feminist museum (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2013), xxviii. 
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the psyche, Pollock notes that psychic time does ‘not follow the logic of linear 
development,’ rather, that the chronology between affect and its impact on the 
subject could be understood more precisely as a time that occurs ‘not only in 
repetition, but in return and retroaction.’24 To this effect, I will argue that (f)actual 
experience is always distorted both in representation and writing.25 What matters in 
the transaction between the aesthetic encounter and the writer is not the ability to 
disclose auto/biographical truths, nor critical and theoretical inflections. Rather, it is 
the ability to respond with a unique narrative as it co-affectively unfolds for the 
subject in the midst of a specific encounter. In turn, to convey or depict in language 
the psychophysical impact that such an encounter has had on the writer, which in 
turn communicates that the encounter is in itself a condition of relation that bears 
transformational effects on the level of subjectivity.  
This thesis aims to provide a framework for how aesthetics impact the 
inextricably linked psychic and physical registers of an individual to enable the 
resulting auto/biographical art-writing. Furthermore, I maintain that erotic 
responsiveness can serve as a critical tool for engaging with the distinct meanings 
that an artwork can convey and how they are further negotiated by the writer. To my 
knowledge, there is no singular framework of subjectivity that adequately accounts 
                                                      
24 Pollock, After-affects, 5. 
25 Writing on the problematic relationship between experience and knowledge, the historian Joan W. 
Scott argues that while personal experience has provided the means to produce historical evidence 
from the perspective of minority subjects, it can simultaneously turn ‘experience’ into the ‘bedrock of 
evidence on which explanation is built,’ leaving aside the geopolitical specificity and the power 
structures that construct one’s viewpoint. In this way, ‘the evidence of experience then becomes 
evidence for the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it 
operates, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world.’ See Joan W. 
Scott, “The Evidence of Experience,” in Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (Summer, 1991): 773-797. In 
keeping with Scott’s vigilant stance on the historical construction of knowledge and difference, I 
propose that experience in the context of art-writing is not an explanatory model for the reading of 
artwork, but a creative response prompted by an aesthetic experience. While such writing can 
contribute to knowledge production and can produce texts that clearly narrate stories of “difference” 
(to use Scott’s terminology), the aim of auto/biographical art-writing is not necessarily premised on 
historical fact or epistemological claims, rather, it relies on capturing the psychophysical experience of 
the encounter with the artwork.  
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for the psychic and physical impact of aesthetics through the examination of 
auto/biographical art-writing.26 As this research unfolded, I arrived at the conclusion 
that there should not be a singular framework of analysis.  
I am aware that this thesis can run the risk of inhabiting a contradiction. By 
trying to weave together theories in order to better understand the complexity of 
auto/biographical art-writing, the multiplicity of interpretations and intricacies of 
such writing may unintentionally be swept under the weave. This would contradict 
what this project calls for: unique psychophysical responses to aesthetic encounters 
rather than theoretical fixed points to frame art-writing. For this reason, using 
specific examples of art-writing to illustrate my case for erotic responsiveness has 
been a strenuous exercise, nevertheless, an exercise that convinces me of the 
irreconcilable differences between auto/biographical art-writing and other forms of 
writing.  
It is my hope that this research will produce a framework for reading art-
writing which can examine instances of universality, ways to critically reflect on 
subject-object dynamics and, in its more ambitious scope, whittle down the role of 
criticism and theory in the reproduction of cultural capital, to make room for more 
varied responses to artworks.  
 
 
                                                      
26 Bracha L. Ettinger’s theories of subjectivity have been extremely useful for analysing how artwork 
affects the psychic registers of the subject. However, Ettinger does not focus on art-writing as one of 
the possibilities that result from an affective encounter. The journal The Happy Hypocrite contains 
excellent examples of contemporary art-writing that shifts away from traditional art theory or art 
criticism. While this unique resource consists of innovative creative textual responses to art, it 
encompasses the genre of experimental writing rather than methodologies for understanding and 
analysing the impact of artwork on subjectivity and the art-writing that ensues. See Maria Fusco, ed. 
The Happy Hypocrite, Issue 1 (2008). See also the work of writer and cultural critic Lynne Tillman 
who writes stories that are inspired by, in tension with, or simply accompany images of artwork: 
Lynne Tillman, This Is Not It: Stories (New York: Distributed Art Publishers, 2002). 
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Overview 
 
 
This thesis explores auto/biographical art-writing in three parts. Part one, Art-
Writing, Psychoanalysis and Subjectivity, provides an overview of the theoretical 
models that structured the thinking underlying this thesis. In Chapter One, 
Interweaving Concepts: Preliminary structures for an analysis of art-writing and 
subjectivity, I present theories by Brennan and Cavarero in order to familiarise the 
reader with the major recurring concepts and terms that will be deployed in the 
thesis: ‘living attention’ and ‘auto/biographical’. I examine how these terms can be 
activated in relation to encounters with art. I conclude by proposing a distinction 
between auto/biographical art-writing and other narrative responses such as art 
criticism and art theory. Holding this distinction in mind, I propose that an analysis 
of auto/biographical art-writing requires an alternative conception of the subject 
producing the writing.  
In chapter two, Incestuous Mothers: Subjectivity and Desire through the 
Maternal Relation, I bring the above-mentioned key terms into relation with 
Ettinger’s concepts. I proceed by outlining innovations produced by the 
psychoanalytic theorisations of Ettinger and Brennan as to the role of desire in 
psychic development and its impact on creativity. I examine significant similarities 
in the work of all three thinkers (Cavarero, Brennan, Ettinger), especially in terms of 
how the maternal relation provides the basis for re-thinking the ethics 
(psychoanalytically and philosophically) between the self and other and between 
subject and object dynamics. In chapter three, it is my aim to flesh out how these 
theories relate to questions of embodiment, especially in relation to the practice of 
auto/biographical art-writing. I conclude with my hypothesis that, based on these 
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intertwined propositions on subjectivity, a new model for examining art-writing 
emerges which I preliminarily term: erotic responsiveness. 
In Part two, Writing with Art, I proceed by investigating the relationship 
between subjectivity and encounter as a way to re-situate the author – their embodied 
and unique voice – within narrative practices. Furthermore, I examine the notion of 
becoming as a facilitating tool for thinking through a non-unitary notion of 
subjectivity and what questions this form of subjectivity raises in relation to ideas of 
authorship and the construction of identity. I move to laying out the ground for the 
“problem” with criticism (and hence authorship and identity) especially as it was 
flagged throughout the 70s and 80s by various feminist literary critics. By doing so, 
it is my aim to re-problematise the role of theory and criticism especially as to how it 
relates to or contradicts art-writing practices that have recourse to emotions, 
memory, embodiment and auto/biography. The first case study I examine is Barbara 
Christian’s influential essay “The Race for Theory” (1987), which accentuates the 
sensuality of language as well as the political impetus that drives literary criticism. 
Christian’s essay highlights how people of colour have always theorized through 
narrative forms that are beyond the remit of conventional theory or literature. From 
this analysis, I lead to Cavarero’s principle of storytelling as a political act, to 
illustrate some of the tensions and resolutions that oral and written narratives have 
created within the Italian feminist movement. I focus on the case of radical feminist 
thinker Carla Lonzi, who moved through the writing processes of art criticism, to 
feminist political texts and, of direct relevance to this research, the diary-writing 
process.  
The third part, Reading Auto/biographical Art-Writing, is broken down into 
three case studies that consist of responses to artworks. I begin with an example of 
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conventional uses of autobiography in writing about art through the case study of 
artist Louise Bourgeois. My aim is to highlight some of the contradictions in the 
traditional deployment of auto/biographical narratives and to differentiate the process 
of writing about art with the process of how an author’s unique experience of an 
artwork generates an erotic response in textual form.  
In the second case study I examine the work of American poet Anne Sexton 
with particular attention to her poem “The Starry Night” which I argue offers an 
erotic response to Van Gogh’s painting of the same title. Aside from exemplifying 
Sexton’s poetry as a form of auto/biographical art-writing, my aim in this study is to 
implement a reading that foregrounds the life drive as the psychic force that propels 
creativity, self-discovery and the process of working through traumatic experience.  
For the final case study, I provide an auto/biographical account of my 
experience of artist Tracey Emin’s retrospective show Love is What You Want at the 
Hayward Gallery. I follow a non-linear style, beginning the narrative in medias res, 
from a scene where I examine the work two years after the show in catalogue format. 
I return to reminiscing about my initial encounter with the work to unfold how 
interpretation can transform over time and with each new encounter with the work. 
Focusing on Emin’s artwork Why be Afraid (2009), I weave an analysis of Hélène 
Cixous short story “Love of the Wolf” into the reading in order to elaborate on the 
relationship between corporeality and the emotions of love and fear. I conclude by 
illustrating how auto/biographical art-writing counteracts universal interpretations of 
artworks by responding to an aesthetic encounter with a narrative that foregrounds 
the unique and embodied interrelations between the work and the writer. 
 
 
 23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART ONE 
 
 
 
Psychoanalysis, Subjectivity & Auto/Biographical 
Art-Writing 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
Interweaving Concepts: Preliminary structures for an analysis of 
auto/biographical art-writing and subjectivity 
 
 
 
How can the experience of a sound, a color, a gesture, of the feelings of 
arousal, anxiety, nausea, or bereavement that they provoke, be 
communicated in words? They have to be translated. 
– Laura U. Marks27 
 
 
In an effort to describe aesthetic experiences that can profoundly unsettle one’s 
subjectivity and perception, both a language for narration and a theory of the psyche 
are necessary to translate such experience. Auto/biographical art-writing is a 
response to an experience with art in which we can find traces of the singular 
affective moment where a psychophysical transformation has occurred for the 
storyteller. This form of narrative practice borrows philosopher Adriana Cavarero’s 
principle of communication whereby two unique existents appear to each other in 
ways that can be intensely fragilizing, as well as political, and from which the story 
of the encounter unfolds through the narrator. The aspect of fragility is borrowed 
from Bracha L. Ettinger’s psychoanalytic and ethico-aesthetic stipulations that I 
transpose unto the storyteller encountering the artwork. The psychophysical and 
affective dynamic at play, which is axiomatically erotic in creative practice, is 
adopted from Teresa Brennan’s work on subjectivity and viewed through the lens of 
Ettinger’s aesthetic encounters.  
                                                 
27 Laura U. Marks, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2002), ix. 
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Even though there are significant similarities between Brennan’s and 
Ettinger’s analytic frameworks, to my knowledge, these two thinkers have not been 
brought into dialogue. The concept of erotic responsiveness relies on the productive 
juxtaposition of their theoretical advances and how they individually formulate 
distinct yet interrelated ideas of affect, desire and the life drive. The convergence of 
their work provides innovative methods to discuss aesthetics and ethics particularly 
in their development of the co-affective and physical dimension and how it inscribes 
subjectivity with primordial registers of reciprocity, communication and 
commonality.  
All three authors provide unique ways to examine human experience through 
the dual movement of how the “inside-out” works in tandem with the “outside-in.” 
This form of theorizing can be described as a relational approach, in that accounts of 
subjectivity necessitate a clear attribution of agency to the humans, animals and 
(im)material forces that are always – even before we are born – of direct influence to 
our various becomings. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the respective authors’ propositions provide 
new tools for exploring subjectivity and, more specifically, the effects of aesthetic 
and other encounters on the psyche. These effects are examined for how they 
interlace words with affects, the sensual and psychophysical as it materialises for the 
subject and in writing, and how writing can be thought of as an embodied practice. 
An embodied practice not only indicates that there is a unique body marked by 
gender, race, ability and so on, that weaves a text together, but that such a body 
experiences the world on a psychophysical level and in relation to others. The 
psychophysical aspect is essential to understanding how affects arrive from without 
and can shape our experience in ways that can be profoundly traumatic. 
 26 
This chapter elucidates the key theoretical terms that I theorize through and 
how they are being used to support my propositions that there is a form of art-writing 
whose logic figures as a writing with art; that the auto/biographical is the narrative 
practice of narrating both the self and the other’s story; that the psychophysical 
experience of artwork is erotic and, in their combination, these processes reveal an 
ethics of storytelling that can only be theorized through an ontology of relation. 
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Auto/biography 
 
 
 
In the biography given by the other, both the written and the oral put into 
words above all the uniqueness of an identity which, only in relation, is 
bios instead of zoe. 
– Adriana Cavarero28 
 
To will freedom and to will to disclose being are one and the same choice. 
– Simone de Beauvoir29 
 
 
In Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood feminist philosopher Adriana 
Cavarero uses the neologism “auto/biography” to mean both biography and 
autobiography.30 I take the term auto/biographical directly from Adriana Cavarero to 
express the compound biography and autobiography, but also to communicate 
Cavarero’s theoretical principle that the subject desires above all to hear their life-
story told by an other in life.31 This desire, rooted in each and every one of us, 
differentiates each individual from the plurality of others, by exposing the 
uniqueness of ‘who’ one is rather than ‘what’ one is. Thus, when I make use of the 
term auto/biographical, I am always alluding to Cavarero’s proposition that the 
                                                 
28 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 85. 
29 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Carol 
Communications, 1976), 78. 
30 Cavarero credits this neologism to Liz Stanley found in the book The Auto/biographical I: The 
Theory and Practice of Feminist Auto/biography (Manchester, New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1992). See, Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 77. 
31 Cavarero argues that as our autobiographical memory cannot capture our early experience, our 
personal story remains incomplete and requires its narration by others. It is precisely because ‘the 
reality of the self is necessarily intermittent and fragmentary’ that it is also a ‘narratable self’ whose 
‘story only others can recount.’ She proposes that our desire to hear our story told by an other in life is 
driven by this gap between birth and our ability to recall and therefore narrate our own life story from 
beginning to end. However, this gap can only be filled by someone who can tell our story, one who 
can narrate our uniqueness back to us. See Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 33-39. 
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desire to expose our ‘narratable self,’ to hear ‘who’ one is as told by an other, is a 
desire rooted in our yearning for temporary unity.32  
Cavarero’s exegesis presents subjectivity as narratable, unique, singular and 
unrepeatable through an emphasis on an anti-identitarian quality in her particular 
ethics of relating.33 The act of narrating an other’s story – an act that relies on the 
interaction between unique existents – reveals that reciprocal communication can 
expose both the story of ‘who’ is being narrated as well as the story, or at least the 
desire for the life-story, of the storyteller. Exaggerating Cavarero’s principle, I 
amplify how this proposition also unfolds the desire, and potentially the story, of the 
narrator’s uniqueness. In other words, as a condition of relation entails at least two 
unique participants, then two unique stories could emerge from an encounter. 
However, this would miss the point of Cavarero’s thesis, which holds that it is less 
about the story than it is about how reciprocal communication is the condition by 
which we come to appear as unique existents to one another. Furthermore, Cavarero 
argues that a political horizon unfolds in the process of reciprocal communication as 
‘actively revealing oneself to others, with words and deeds, grants a plural space and 
therefore a political space to identity – confirming its exhibitive, relational and 
contextual nature.’34  
In keeping with this theoretical principle, stories will figure in this thesis as a 
way to illustrate the condition rather than the result. In other words, an encounter 
with a work of art is the occasion (condition) by which the artwork and the writer 
                                                 
32 Cavarero is careful to note that the unity experienced by the narration of our story is a temporary 
and fleeting experience of the story of one’s life and should not be interpreted as a proposition for a 
coherent or authentic identity. See, Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 63. 
33 The terms ‘unique’ and ‘singular’ are used interchangeably in Cavarero’s work. While Cavarero 
borrows the term ‘uniqueness’ from the political theorist Hannah Arendt, the broader understanding of 
the terms ‘uniqueness’, ‘singularity’ and ‘unrepeatability’ is that all terms appeal to a relational 
ontology and monistic philosophy of the subject. 
34 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 22. 
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appear to each other in a unique reciprocal exchange. I propose that an artwork holds 
affective potential that can instigate the viewer to narrate the story of the encounter. 
While the narrator’s story discloses the aesthetic encounter, the artwork can also, 
sooner or later, come to narrate the narrator. In other words, as artwork carries 
affective agency, an aesthetic encounter can potentially destabilize perception by 
affectively impacting the subject on a psychic level. Such a psychic impression can 
make its way into the story told, leaving traces of the unique encounter between the 
viewer and the work.35   
I stress the role of the narrator as a way to contextualise art-writing within 
narrative discourses but most significantly to highlight the political significance of 
this particular form of storytelling, especially when it is not directed towards explicit 
political ends. Obviously not all acts of narration are political and can be less so even 
when they are produced with political intent, for example, when narratives are 
employed to strengthen political ideologies that can lead to propaganda. In 
Cavarero’s work, politics and the political are thus terms that she addresses from a 
distinctly Arendtian angle where politics necessitate self-exposure in a ‘plural – and 
therefore political – space of interaction.’36 This space is not restricted to the public 
arena of politics such as the town hall, the parliament, the streets or other spaces of 
assembly. Even though Hannah Arendt marked the polis as the necessary and 
ultimate political space of action, Cavarero notes that ‘the polis, according to Arendt, 
                                                 
35 My proposition is here drawing from Cavarero’s framing of the auto/biographical impulse that 
arises from a “narratable self,” however, in the context of aesthetic experience I am also incited by 
Ettinger’s concept of ‘wit(h)nessing’ described as an encounter with an artwork which can potentially 
revive archaic psychic knowledge. Ettinger argues that ‘painting captures in producing, or produces in 
capturing knowledge of the wit(h)ness-Thing. A possibility of ethically acknowledging the Real 
emerges in transferential with(h)nessing, when someone else apprehends in place of the subject the 
subject’s own non-conscious matrixial sites. Suddenly, in metramorphosing with the artwork, you 
might find yourself in proximity to a possible trauma, as if you have always been potentially sliding 
on its margin.’ See, Bracha L. Ettinger, “Traumatic Wit(h)ness-Thing and Matrixial Co/in-
habit(u)ating,” Parallax 5, no. 1 (1999): 92. 
36 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 58. 
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is not situated in a physical territory. Rather, it is a space of interaction that is 
produced by the reciprocal communication of those present through words and 
deeds.’37 For Cavarero, it is the action of self-exposure that reveals the uniqueness of 
‘who’ one is, and while this can be a public space with ‘a plurality of spectators,’ it 
can just as well be a space embodied by a single person – what she calls the 
‘necessary other’ – who can narrate our story back to us.38  
Storytelling, as distinct from discourse, manifests a political dimension 
precisely because it emerges from a condition of relation between a specific you and 
I. After all, the title of Cavarero’s book in Italian is Tu che mi guardi, tu che mi 
racconti which in its literal sense translates as You who sees me, you who narrates 
me. Discussing the rhetorical power of language, the literary critic Barbara Johnson 
refers to the structural linguist and semiotician Émile Benveniste who argued that 
modes of address such as the common use of personal pronouns (I, you, he) 
‘destroy[s] the notion of “person.” “Person” belongs only to I/you and is lacking in 
he.’39 Johnson explicates,  
 
the notion of “person” has something to do with presence at the scene of 
speech and seems to inhere in the notion of address. “I” and “you” are 
persons because they can either address or be addressed, while “he” can only 
be talked about. A person who neither addresses nor is addressed is 
functioning as a thing in the same way that being an object of discussion 
rather than a subject of discussion transforms everything into a thing.40 
                                                 
37 Cavarero argues that Arendt’s work can ‘overturn that crucial movement, from the outside to the 
inside, which characterizes the modern conception of the self,’ because Arendt frames the self as 
‘expressive and relational, and whose reality is symptomatically external in so far as it is entrusted to 
the gaze, or the tale, of another.’ See Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 41. However, for Arendt, in the 
case of politics, it is in the polis that this self must find expression as vita activa. On this note, 
Cavarero quotes Arendt’s analysis of the ancient Greek citation ‘Wherever you go, you will be a 
polis,’ to reinstate that the Greeks considered interactive spaces those where action and speaking 
could occur, where ‘politics takes place, but it is not a place.’ For more on this distinction see, 
Adriana Cavarero, For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, trans. Paul 
A. Kottman (California: Stanford University Press), 204. 
38 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 24. 
39 Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth Meek (Florida: 
University of Miami Press, 1971), 217 quoted in Barbara Johnson, Persons and Things (Harvard 
University Press, 2010), 6. 
40 Barbara Johnson, Persons and Things (Harvard University Press, 2010), 6. 
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In this sense, Cavarero’s ‘you’ is not an innocent bystander to one’s 
biography, neither are they a haphazardly chosen narrator, rather, they actively 
address the person (I) whose story they narrate through a mutual exposition at the 
scene of speech. In fact, the storyteller is in a position of immense power over the 
other’s story. Faced with this great responsibility, the narrator can purposefully or 
unintentionally produce an undesirable effect to the vulnerable and now exposed 
protagonist.41 This dilemma can raise questions regarding the viability or utopian 
resonance underlying Cavarero’s framing of storytelling as an altruistic ethics.42 As 
Cavarero indeed affirms, ‘the narratable self thus re-enters into what we could call a 
relational ethic of contingency; or, rather, an ethic founded on the altruistic ontology 
of the human existent as finite.’43 However, self-exposure entails the inevitable risk 
of being misunderstood or poorly portrayed by the other narrating our story. This risk 
is briefly touched upon but certainly not denied by Cavarero in her work.44 She often 
refers to the fragility, vulnerability, fear and courage that comes with the act of self-
                                                 
41 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 59. I find productive resonances between Cavarero’s framing of the 
“necessary other” and the ethical “respons-ability” that arises in Ettinger’s theorisations. For Cavarero 
the desire for one’s story can be the result of a ‘justifiable fear that the partially unexposed is partially 
non-existent.’ Focusing on the disavowal of collective and historical trauma the art historian and 
theorist Griselda Pollock states that Ettinger’s ethics propose a way ‘to remember the obliviated 
[which] drastically calls for an intersubjective respons-ability to the trauma of the other.’ See Griselda 
Pollock, “Thinking the Feminine: Aesthetic Practice as Introduction to Bracha Ettinger and the 
Concepts of Matrix and Metramorphosis,” Theory, Culture & Society 21, no.1 (2004): 14.  
42 I am grateful to Dr. Alice Andrews for her incisive commentary during my upgrade examination on 
the possible risk in self-exposure. On the open-endedness and ambiguity of Cavarero’s ‘altruistic 
ontology’ see Ann V. Murphy, Violence and the Philosophical Imaginary (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2012), 85-94. 
43 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 87. 
44 In his introduction to Relating Narratives, the translator Paul A. Kottman offers a clarification on 
how Cavarero’s theory moves beyond theories of interpellation, through the example of how hate-
speech works on the level of interpellation: ‘hate-speech comes not solely from what one is being 
called, but from the fact that one’s singularity, a singularity that exceeds any ‘what,’ is utterly and 
violently ignored, excluded from these semantics. Put quite simply, it is the total disregard for who 
one is that makes hate-speech so painful. In addition, in so far as this disregard prevails, to varying 
degrees, in all scenes of interpellation, one could not hope to radically counteract hate-speech without 
also offering alternative versions of social existence that do not rely chiefly upon ‘interpellation’ as 
the model for the formation of linguistically vulnerable beings. On this point, perhaps, Cavarero’s 
thinking might offer just such an alternative.’ See Paul A. Kottman, translator’s introduction to 
Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood, by Adriana Cavarero (London: Routledge, 2000), xix-
xx. 
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disclosure. However, Cavarero does not propose that there is an ethical imperative to 
disclose one’s story, rather, whether we choose to appear to an other or not, our 
decision either way, does not eradicate the ontological desire to have our story, the 
uniqueness of who we are, narrated back to us by someone who acknowledges this 
desire. The narratable self is then ontologically relational in the sense that our story 
can only ever be told through a condition of mutual exposure.  
Most of the case studies that Cavarero puts under the test of a ‘relating 
narrative’ or a ‘narratable self’ reveal more about the methods of relation rather than 
the two unique participants of the story. The reciprocal exposure of ‘who’ the 
protagonists are is an effect of the very act of relating to one another, where 
individual identities are produced through their interlacing with other specific and 
equally unique lives. The plot of the protagonists’ exchange, its dramatic unfolding 
or happy end, is of little, if any, significance to Cavarero’s principles of 
communication. In fact, the story is to some extent evacuated from what is generally 
considered “a narrative,” rather, the process of reciprocal communication 
demonstrates that we are inevitably consigned to one another.  
I superimpose Cavarero’s methodological oddity unto the less popular 
narrative practice of art-writing, to explore the ‘you’ who experiences and narrates a 
work of art. This strategy serves the purpose of analysing how writing with art can 
reveal ‘who’ the narrator is, as well as to delineate how the ‘gift’ of an artwork’s 
story appears in narrative form.45 To this effect, the art-writing I have selected for 
analysis is not strictly autobiographical.46 It is less about the identity of the writer 
                                                 
45 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 19. Cavarero conceptualises the action of relaying one’s story back 
to them as “the gift of the story”, which consummates how ‘the uniqueness which pertains to the 
proper is always a given, a gift.’ See also, the chapter On the Outskirts of Milan in the same book. 
46 Cavarero is careful to note that standard ‘autobiography is a mistake of desire’ because telling 
‘one’s own story is to distance oneself from oneself, to double oneself, to make of oneself an other.’ 
To make this differentiation clearer she offers the example of the writer Gertrude Stein who hands 
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who writes about art autobiographically (even though there are auto/biographical 
accounts woven into the writing).47 It is more about how artworks expose the story, 
or the desire for a story, of the singular affective experience of the encounter 
between the narrator and the artwork. By transposing this equation unto the practice 
of art-writing, I argue that writing with art resonates with a similar desire for (self-) 
narration and that, as storytellers, our desire is to reveal the ‘who’ of the subject of 
our engagement: the uniqueness of the artwork imparted in our reciprocal 
communication.  
In search for an alternative model for thinking through the experience 
produced by the agency of art, the writer and artist Kate Love narrates an encounter 
with the artwork of artist Gabriel Orozco as a moment where she was able to capture 
‘the artist’s consciousness, as it was intended towards its object.’48 Love describes 
her experience as being left ‘with a vivid and very living impression of something 
which I had previously understood only as a theoretical concept – that is, that the 
constitution of subjectivity as entirely dependent on the “other” for any estimation of 
                                                 
over her story to her lover Alice B. Toklas who in turn writes Stein’s story in autobiographical format. 
The title of this work is The Autobiography of Alice Toklas by the author Gertrude Stein which 
nevertheless is a biography of Stein narrated in the first person by Toklas. Even though Stein stages, 
orients and exhibits her own biography through Toklas’ autobiographical narrative, Cavarero 
differentiates this exhibitionistic act from a narcissistic impulse. Cavarero proposes that the self is 
inherently exhibitionistic and that our desire to hear our story narrated back to us relies on a necessary 
exposure which renders the self both ‘fragile and unmasterable’, and which also reveals that identity 
can never be created in isolation, or in ‘protected spaces or private rooms of impenetrable refuge for 
self-contemplation.’ Furthermore, Toklas’ first-person narrative unfolds ‘the expositive and relational 
reality of the self,’ where Toklas is not simply a ‘literary artifice,’ but ‘the necessary other’ who 
makes clear that one’s life is interwoven with the stories of others. See Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 
81-84.  
47 An excellent example of auto/biographical writing that responds to the genre of literary art can be 
found in the philosopher Jacques Derrida’s part-memoir, part-critical analysis and theoretical 
exposition H. C. for Life, That Is to Say… In this book, Derrida offers a critical recollection of the 
work of his lifelong friend, the writer and philosopher Hélène Cixous, through a narrative that unfolds 
his early encounters with Cixous’ work. Simultaneously, Derrida provides an overall analysis of the 
differences between their work which he formulates as a type of writing which is “for life” in the case 
of Cixous, while his own work gravitates towards death. See Jacques Derrida, H.C. for Life. That Is to 
Say… (California: Stanford University Press, 2006). 
48 Kate Love, “The Experience of Art as a Living Through of Language,” in After Criticism: New 
Responses to Art and Performance, ed. Gavin Butt (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 172. 
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the “self”.’49 Love’s analysis can provide a sense of how the auto/biographical tale 
that arises from an encounter with a work of art reveals the narrator’s relational 
interdependence and vulnerability. An exposure between the self and the work can 
result in the production of a story that narrates an aesthetic encounter from an 
embodied perspective, where the story of the work takes on a unique life, capable of 
shaping and being shaped by the lives it encounters.  
To return to Cavarero’s exposition of storytelling as a political praxis, while 
the auto/biographical gesture or the “narratable self” opens up a narrative space for 
politics and a relational identity, more strategically, it exposes how philosophical 
discourses are unable to grasp the uniqueness of “who” one is.50 As the aim of 
philosophy is to elucidate the category of the human, and not the unique individuals 
that constitute the category, philosophy provides universal narratives for human 
matters relating to ethics, aesthetics, epistemology and ontology. Subverting this 
tendency, Cavarero argues that the narratable self is ‘constitutively altruistic, rather 
than by choice, the ethics and politics of uniqueness indeed speak a language that 
does not know general names.’51 Correspondingly, as the discursive tools of art 
criticism have been shaped by similar philosophical and theoretical discourses, it is 
no surprise that writing about art has embraced the domain of universality.52 In line 
with Cavarero’s postulation, this thesis seeks out narratives that expose the relational 
                                                 
49 Love, “Experience of Art,” 172. 
50 Cavarero cites the “rational and political animal” of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle and the 
homini lupus of the 17th century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes as examples of ‘universalizing 
ethics (or politics) that are founded on Man, and those that champion the modern individual,’ as 
doctrines that ‘ignore the who and focus instead on the what.’ Cavarero argues that their 
‘individualistic theory’ fails to grasp the ‘competitive nature of the single, or “dissolves” it into the 
political principle of equality.’ In her critique of these forms of individualism Cavarero articulates 
how ‘residing together [stare insieme]’ becomes an ‘artificial’ and disciplined form of politics 
whereas ‘being together [essere insieme],’ conveys that our uniqueness is constituted through a plural 
space of appearance. See Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 88 
51 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 90. 
52 Questions of universality will be examined further in the section Art-Writing is in the Situation of a 
Fulcrum. 
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context of the story: the insubstitutable protagonist and the necessary other in the 
form of an embodied narrator. I argue that a transposition of Cavarero’s ‘narratable 
self’ can elucidate aspects of art-writing that appeal to the singularity of the 
reciprocal engagement between the writer and the work. Such idiosyncratic forms of 
auto/biographical art-writing produce incongruous forms of narrative practice which 
are often excluded from traditional fields of cultural analysis. Nevertheless, this 
distinct genre, tradition and methodological approach, can offer equally significant 
contributions to critical discourses. More radically, precisely because of its appeal to 
‘constitutively altruistic’ relational and narrative forms, art-writing produces a form 
of storytelling, politics, ethics and desire that art criticism cannot partake in. 
To conclude, by focusing on the element of desire for our story, which 
figures the other as a necessary protagonist, I explore what new configurations this 
desire can produce in terms of psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity. Do we all, 
without exception, share this desire? Why is it that Cavarero’s male heroes seek their 
story in the public sphere while women are able to expose their political selves in 
private?53 If we seek each other out as unique existents that share this desire to be 
narrated from without, does that mean that our desire is indeed the same within? As 
Cavarero proposes, if ‘the ontological status of the who – as exposed, relational, 
altruistic – is totally external,’ what is it then that drives our desire from within?54 In 
other words, in the desire for self-disclosure, is there something that can be disclosed 
about the mechanism of desire as it relates to the psychic dimension of our lives? 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 See, A Tale of Two Births: Embodiment and the Exchange of Gazes in Part One, Chapter Two of 
this thesis. 
54 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 89. 
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Living Attention: Psychophysical Creative Organisation 
 
 
 
Cavarero’s analysis of storytelling indicates that the ontological basis of self-
exposure has at its root a ‘loss of unity’ which then ‘gets turned into the lack that 
feeds desire.’55 Drawing from this argument, I examine what psychic mechanisms 
are activated in the desire to narrate the story of the encounter between the narrator 
and the work of art. While Cavarero’s principle of communication relies on an 
exchange between two subjects, my aim is to transpose her argument unto the 
relation between a subject and an artwork. However, in order to accomplish an 
effective transposition, it was necessary to draw from theories that frame artwork as 
holding affective agency that can arrest the viewer.56  
The properties of what will constitute an artwork with agency will depend on 
the relationship between the viewer and the work. That is, what the viewer brings 
with them in terms of personal history as well as the unpredictability of one’s 
emotional disposition during the encounter.57 An artwork can also capture one’s 
                                                 
55 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 39. 
56 I concentrate on Bracha L. Ettinger’s elaborations on the relationship between aesthetics and affect 
as they provide a strong framework to examine subjectivity more broadly and through the lens of 
psychoanalysis and ethics more specifically. From a different perspective but on the same topic, the 
anthropologist Alfred Gell considers how the agency of artwork elicits powerful responses such as 
love, hate, desire, awe and fear in the viewer, to the extent that these responses seem to be directed 
towards another living person and not an inanimate object. Gell states that the viewer enters into a 
personal relationship with the artwork as if it were a person because of the way artworks bear 
similarities to personhood in that they too ‘come in families, lineages, tribes, whole populations, just 
like people. They have relations with one another as well as with the people who create and circulate 
them as individual objects. They marry, so to speak, and beget offspring which bear the stamp of their 
antecedents. Artworks are manifestations of “culture” as a collective phenomenon, they are, like 
people, enculturated beings.’ See Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1998), 153. 
57 In response to the school of New Criticism and specifically the text “The Affective Fallacy” 
authored by Wimsatt and Beardsley (1949), the literary critic and theorist Jane P. Tompkins presents 
the “reader-response movement” as an oppositional approach to the form of textual analysis provided 
by New Criticism which insisted on formalism, objectivity and unemotional criticism. For instance, 
Wimsatt and Beardsley claim that ‘the report of some readers [...] that a poem or story induces in 
them vivid images, intense feelings, or heightened consciousness, is neither anything which can be 
refuted nor anything which it is possible for the objective critic to take into account.’ See William K. 
Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley, “The Affective Fallacy,” The Sewanee Review 57, no. 1 (1949): 45. 
On the contrary, reader-response theory proposes that the reader is an active agent who produces a 
 37 
affective response in different ways depending on the context of its manifestation. It 
is at this injunction – the spatial and material aspects of an artwork as they are 
perceived by an embodied viewer – that the work of writer and artist Kristen Kreider 
provides a critical methodology to examine how artworks ‘that combine poetic, 
artistic and spatial aesthetic strategies are capable of communicating symbolically.’58 
Kreider draws our attention to how the experience of a work of art will depend on the 
unique perspective that arises from a specific body: ‘the viewer’s height, trajectory, 
speed.’59 But also, the specificities of a space such as light conditions and placement 
of work. Kreider’s project places emphasis on the artwork’s agency, figured as a 
form of speech or a “voice,” and that we, as embodied recipients, are located in an 
ethicoaesthetic transaction that has captured our “listening.” The “voice” of the 
artwork is to be considered in its expanded sense as a metaphor for communication, 
while “listening” gains an ethical dimension in that it captures our attention in a way  
that inevitably solicits a response.60 In similar ways to Cavarero’s strategy, Kreider 
also draws on Arendt’s formulation of political action as the interaction of a specific 
“you” and “I” in the public space of appearance, to propose that the ‘ethical contract’ 
lies in the desire of artists and critics ‘to communicate precisely through what we do 
not (or cannot) know or understand.’61  
                                                 
unique performative textual response to the work. Central to this movement is the value of reader 
specificity, including the psychological effect that a text incites in the reader. For instance, Tompkins 
argues that a poem ‘cannot be understood apart from its results. Its “effects,” psychological and 
otherwise, are essential to any accurate description of its meaning, since that meaning has no effective 
existence outside of its realization in the mind of a reader.’ See Jane P. Tompkins, introduction to 
Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-structuralism, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), ix. 
58 Kristen Kreider, Poetics and Place: The Architecture of Sign, Subjects and Site (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2014), 1. 
59 Kreider, Poetics and Place, 50. 
60 Ibid., 7. 
61 Ibid., 14. 
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In line with this particular aspect of Kreider’s analysis, I too examine the 
interaction between the work and the viewer, while concentrating on the affective 
and psychic impact that leads to an art-writing response. I contend that such a 
response is not only ethical, but it is also erotic as it employs the writer’s 
psychophysical faculties and their living attention – terms that I will shortly elaborate 
on. However, my argument is nuanced by Cavarero’s modulation of Arendt’s thesis, 
where Cavarero dematerializes our understanding of public space, instead proposing 
that the space of appearance is the material effect of an interaction between a specific 
you and I. I suggest that the consequence of Cavarero’s subtle gesture has radical 
effects for how we, artists, critics and viewers, engage with artwork when the work is 
no longer materially defined by the physical properties of its exhibition (gallery, 
institution, and so on), neither by the imperative to respond to the work in a “public 
space” as defined by legitimized areas of literary or critical production. As 
mentioned in the previous section, Cavarero proposes that “it is the action of self-
exposure that reveals the uniqueness of ‘who’ one is,” and for this reason the story 
told in the case of auto/biographical art-writing captures a unique experience while 
resisting a universal narrative for interpreting an artwork. 
However, some artworks will fail to affect us regardless of the material, 
spatial and poetic efforts that an artist has implemented to “voice” their ideas. This 
acknowledgement orients my analysis to the subjectivity of the storyteller, while 
simultaneously disorienting the experience of art as one which has at its basis an 
instrumentalization of aesthetic experience for the production of art criticism. In 
other words, in spite of the strategies taken by the artist to produce an artwork, the 
prompt to respond is not only subjective to the writer, but almost random and 
contingent on the conditions of the encounter: the subject’s memory bank and lived 
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experience; their training in, or lack of, art historical discourses and, most 
significantly, the level of fragility or resistance experienced during the encounter. 
With these observations in mind, my aim is to develop an understanding of the 
relation between artwork and subject which is not simply a consequence of 
representation, vision and interpretation. In this regard, Brennan’s reframing of affect 
as energetic transmission is essential to interpreting experience beyond perception. 
Through Brennan’s hypotheses, visual affectivity moves beyond the elemental 
science of intromission and gains a psychophysical register when it is (co)affected by 
forces beyond the self-contained subject’s control. Simply said, vision is not a matter 
of looking at, rather, it is a physical experience whereby our perception can be 
arrested (or transformed) from without. This element of psychophysical co-
affectivity and response between a specific you and I is what renders the encounter 
political. 
However, this is not an attempt to trivialize the artwork’s intended message, 
or the thoughtful strategies deliberated by the artists to produce a work which can 
communicate effectively to a viewer. On the contrary, Kreider’s astute analysis 
clearly demonstrates that these aesthetic negotiations are indeed “heard” by their 
interlocutors. However, my argument is that these artworks arrest our attention 
because of their ability to bypass our resistance and affect us on a nonconscious 
level, prior to our conscious interpretation of the intended message.  
Considering the relationship between trauma and aesthetics, Griselda Pollock 
proposes that trauma can be transmitted intergenerationally ‘through non-verbal and 
non-intentional communication.’62 Furthermore, that traumatic experience infiltrates 
                                                 
62 Pollock, After-affects, 8. 
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the artwork in ways that the artist may not be fully aware of, even while returning to 
the same process of artworking: 
Trauma is not an anterior source from which imagery is generated by a 
knowing subject. Trauma is the not-yet-experienced non-thing towards which 
a lifetime of making art might be unknowingly journeying.63 
  
In her analysis, Pollock centralises the role of affect in the experience of art because 
it affords ‘an opening towards something or a complete enclosure in its grip such as 
depression,’ that it is more readily ‘transmitted via mediated experience of the 
aesthetic.’64 In the same vein, I argue that a response to an encounter with art in the 
form of auto/biographical art-writing, arises from the affective impact that an 
aesthetic experience has produced. But how does affect determine our experience of 
something or someone as the agent that invokes our desire for storytelling? How is it 
transmitted from the work to the storyteller? Furthermore, what does the response, 
the living attention directed towards a work, do for the storyteller and the work? 
 In this section, I focus on the affective dimension of an experience with art as 
it is the affect that creates the possibility for the auto/biographical art-writing process 
to manifest. I propose that a response to artwork in the form of auto/biographical art-
writing is prompted by an affective and ethical imperative, which requires an 
alternative model of subjectivity to examine such responses. To support the argument 
that affects can induce a creative response, I borrow feminist philosopher and social-
political theorist Teresa Brennan’s conceptualisation of affect as energetic 
transmission.65 Brennan’s argument is complex, and I will return to and expand on 
                                                 
63 Pollock, After-affects, xxvii. 
64 Ibid., 27. 
65 Brennan, Transmission, 5. Brennan maintains that affects and emotions are distinct yet overlapping 
psychophysical processes. Succinctly phrased, ‘by an affect, I mean the physiological shift 
accompanying a judgment. […] Feelings are not the same thing as affects. Putting it simply, when I 
feel angry, I feel the passage of anger through me. What I feel with and what I feel are distinct. […] I 
define feelings as sensations that have found the right match in words’. 
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several terms throughout the course of this chapter. For now, I will offer an 
abbreviated account of the connections between affect and creativity, in order to lay 
out the ground for how I am employing Brennan’s framing of ‘living attention’ in 
this thesis.  
 Brennan maintains that affects have a distinct physiological effect and 
transmission both prior to (nonconscious) and during conscious assessment. Affects 
are mobile in the sense that they can be projected from one individual to another, and 
may therefore become psychically contained. Affects that are projected towards us 
can turn into repressed images. They can also be internalized projective judgments 
(from without) which become distorted and ‘enmeshed in fantasy and memory.’66 
Brennan contends that the role of psychoanalysis has traditionally aimed to free the 
subject’s life drive from draining internalised affects such as projective judgments 
and repressed images.67 However, she notes that this can be an increasingly difficult 
process unless psychoanalysis embraces a theory of transmission: the understanding 
that certain affects are not necessarily our own and that projecting them 
(energetically) is one way to release their negative effects.68  
While psychoanalysis provides one course of action to bring a feeling into 
consciousness, or a way to unlock a repressed image, the other way is through 
creative activity. In fact, it seems that the creative process is more prone to 
embracing a theory of transmission as it is the condition whereby one works in a way 
that strives to make connections and to bring thoughts, feelings, things and situations 
into harmony. My proposition draws from Brennan’s stipulations on the force of the 
                                                 
66 Brennan, Transmission, 113. 
67 Ibid., 113-114. 
68 Ibid., 13-14. 
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life drive to bring about such harmony, even though the aspect of creativity is not the 
focus of her research. 
The parallelism between psychoanalytic work and creative work is also 
briefly touched upon by the psychoanalyst Anna Freud in her foreword to Marion 
Milner’s book On Not Being Able to Paint.69 However, in the below extract, Freud 
also draws an interesting distinction between the analytic and creative process which 
I think provides some clues as to why Brennan undertook such a long journey into 
the realm of affects: 
 
the legitimate result of analysis is the inner experience of formerly unknown 
affects and impulses which find their final outlet in the ego processes of 
verbalisation and deliberate action. The creative process in art, on the other 
hand, ‘remains within the realm in which unknown affects and impulses find 
their outlet, through the way in which the artist arranges his medium to form 
harmonies of shapes, colours or sounds’; whether deliberate action is affected 
or not in the last issue, the main achievement is, according to the author, a 
joining of that split between mind and body that can so easily result from 
trying to limit thinking to thinking only in words.70 
 
Anna Freud proposes that on the one hand there is analytic work which relies 
on very tangible effects such as bringing affects into consciousness through 
“verbalisation and deliberate action” – this being the work of the ego. Assuming this 
holds true, the question is, how does the affect move from “the unknown” inner place 
to one’s tongue? According to Brennan, it is the feeling – an internal sensation that 
has become conscious – that finds articulation. By this logic, words can be thought of 
as vehicles that “carry” feelings (and not exactly affects: the affects drive the 
                                                 
69 Anna Freud, foreword to On Not Being Able to Paint, by Marion Milner (2nd ed. New York: 
International Universities Press, 1967. First published 1958), xiii-xv. While similarities can be drawn 
from Freud’s foreword that can support Brennan’s convictions of the duties (and oversights) of 
psychoanalysis, Freud nevertheless differentiates analysis from creativity. 
70 Freud, “Foreword,” xiv. 
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feelings) into symbolisation which then become released from repression.71 On the 
other hand, Freud states that the “outlet” of affects through creative processes, unlike 
analytic work, “remain” in the realm of creativity, or in the resulting artwork.72 Even 
though this may sound as if Freud was proposing that an artwork can be the 
depository or the container of affects, she certainly does not explicitly phrase it this 
way. Milner, on the contrary, makes this effect quite clear throughout her book, for 
example, when she states that ‘when the drawing was finished the original anger had 
all vanished. The anger had apparently gone into the drawing.’73  
The language of psychoanalysis is laden with words that indicate that affects 
involve at least some degree of mobility. Psychic activity has often been expressed 
through a topographic language such as “underneath” or “underlying” the ego, and as 
requiring movements that can “expel”, “push”, “charge”, “discharge”, “go into”, 
“release” psychic phenomena from the unconscious or preconscious into 
representation – particularly linguistic representation.74 The differences between 
                                                 
71 Queer-feminist theorist Sara Ahmed explores how objects can become ‘saturated with affects as 
sites of personal and social tension.’ For example, Ahmed notes that the affect of anxiety can be 
“sticky,” as in contagious and attached to objects, which means that the affect ‘sustains or preserves 
the connection between ideas, values, and objects.’ See Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness 
(London: Duke University Press, 2010), 29-44. 
72 Anna Freud places this phrase in quotation marks, ‘remains within the realm in which unknown 
affects and impulses find their outlet, through the way in which the artist arranges his medium to form 
harmonies of shapes, colours or sounds,’ which leads the reader to assume that this conviction is 
expressed by Milner. I have not been able to locate this quote in Milner’s work so I will assume that it 
either belongs to Freud or it is found in the first edition. It is more likely that Milner believed the 
creative and analytic process to be indivisible in terms of freeing the subject from psychic blockages. 
For instance, she notes that ‘[…] drawings […] are intended to illustrate the gradual discovery both of 
ways by which the creative process is freed and of the content of unconscious ideas which interfere 
with that freedom.’ See Marion Milner, On Not Being Able to Paint, 2nd ed. (New York: International 
Universities Press, 1967. First published 1958), xxi.  
73 Milner, Not Being Able, 5 (italics mine).  
74 For instance, Sigmund Freud states that intolerable experiences could lead to a successful psychic 
defence mechanism where the experience and ‘affective consequences’ become ‘expelled from 
consciousness and from the ego’s memory.’ However, in the case of hysteria, ‘what had been expelled 
pursued its activities in what was now an unconscious state, and found its way back into 
consciousness by means of symptoms and the affects attaching to them, so that the illness 
corresponded to a failure in defence.’ See Sigmund Freud, “My Views on the Part played by Sexuality 
in the Aetiology of the Neuroses (1906),” in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Vol. 1-24, ed. Ivan Smith (2010): 1580. The point on hysteria will be of relevance to Brennan’s 
stipulations on the transmission of affect especially for how it renders the subject defenceless. See the 
section Sublimation: A Matter of Life & Death. 
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analytic work and creative work are plenty in terms of processes, but psychically, I 
will argue, the results are strikingly similar if Brennan’s transmission of affect is 
taken into account. 
Anna Freud frames the distinction between the practices as follows: the 
process of analytic work is “discursive”, hence linguistic, and perhaps this suggests 
that creative work is not equally effective outside the realm of language. All other 
forms of symbolisation, of imaginary potential, deliberate or otherwise, remain 
locked in the realm of their (non-linguistic) processes, in this case painting. Simply 
said, an artwork can contain the affect, but it cannot release it the way language 
does. The idea that language directs from the inside out, while artworks contain from 
the outside in, sets up an inequitable relationship that favours the agency of the 
subject rather than the artwork.75 This idea reveals how, in psychoanalytic theories, 
there is a tendency to divide words from other forms of action, to create clear-cut 
distinctions and hierarchies in what qualifies as agency in discussions of 
subjectivity.76 The distinction here is one where primacy is given to a linguistic 
process over any other process, where ‘deliberate action’ arrives in the form of 
language and its close association with consciousness, the ego and the mind. What 
this distinction means in terms of broader divisions such as mind and body, nature 
and culture, word and image, subject and object, will be examined further, and with a 
                                                 
75 Contrary to this assertion, Bracha L. Ettinger proposes that encountering ‘an image can carry a 
transformative potentiality for a subject when the subject enters into relations of fascination with its 
site (or timespace) of fascinance.’ The term fascinance is elaborated as an alternative subjectivizing 
stratum parallel to Jacques Lacan’s theory of the gaze as fascinum. For more on this topic see the 
essay “Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine Difference,” in Psychoanalysis and the 
Image: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Griselda Pollock (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 72. See also, 
The Matrixial Gaze: Vision as Non-verbal Intensity in this chapter. 
76 The writer and philosopher Hélène Cixous boldly states that ‘organization by hierarchy makes all 
conceptual organizations subject to man.’ Critiques of logocentrism and phallocentrism in 
psychoanalysis can be found in a number of Cixous’ works. See Hélène Cixous, “Sorties,” in The 
Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, and Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986), 64. 
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stress on the relationship between subjectivity and art-writing in Chapter Three, The 
Physicality of Ideas: Writing and Embodiment. 
For now, it will suffice to say that words can be thought of as the expression 
and hence release of negative/positive affects. However, when we follow the quote 
through, Milner offers the second clue, that “thinking only in words” has created a 
“split between mind and body.” Milner suggests that artworking, thinking in/with 
images, does something that brings the mind and body closer together.  
However, how the affect moves from the subject and goes into the object is 
eclipsed. And it is this information which is crucial to an understanding of how the 
mind and body work on a continuum during creative processes. For this reason, 
Brennan’s hypothesis that the life drive incites a form of living attention that unites 
the mind with the body, provides the theoretical ground to unpack what “thinking” 
means when it is structured or directed otherwise. When the divisions between 
subject and object, mind and body, are not clearly divisible and when they are 
expressed through non-linguistic processes. Or, even in ways where language can be 
the form of expression, but one where “deliberate action” is not entirely deliberated 
by the subject. That is, when the subject is no longer in control of the activity 
(because of the affective impact it entails) but feels inspired to act, create or respond 
without pre-meditation based on an affective encounter with a work of art. I propose 
that auto/biographical art-writing is such an activity, and this activity has much to 
reveal about the ego during the process of living attention it repays. 
Brennan theorizes living attention as a biological force, an energy that can be 
transmitted from one individual to another through the affect of love.77 Unlike 
                                                 
77 Brennan provides examples of studies of children whose physical growth was below average 
because even though they were provided with material needs such as food, they lacked the material 
effects of love and attention. See Brennan, Transmission, 34-35. 
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negative affects such as greed and envy, the affect of love is the condition by which 
the subject thrives and where intellectual, creative and emotional growth can come 
into being. Brennan asks that we take into consideration Sigmund Freud’s analyses 
of the psyche through the mechanisms of drives and instincts for it is here that we 
can think of how ‘one’s basic driving energy is sexual,’ and how it is ‘also and 
simultaneously a life drive.’78 As noted earlier, psychoanalysis aims to “free” the life 
drive from affects that have been repressed. The libido, ‘shaped in its interactions 
with its objects, whether these objects exist in reality or in fantasy,’ manifests in the 
sexual drives as well as in processes that require intellectual concentration, 
coherence and organization.79 Considering the close (indivisible yet distinct) 
associations between love, libido and the life drive, we can deduce that creative 
organisation is erotic.80  
But how does thinking with images, reflecting upon, writing with them, or 
producing them, bring the mind and body closer together? Art historian and critic 
James Elkins declares that ‘paintings repay the attention they are given […] the more 
you look, the more you feel.’81 How does this form of attention come into effect or, 
what does this type of attention have to say about subjectivity? More interestingly, 
how are artworks able to shape what Griselda Pollock defines as, 
 
unacknowledged psychic economies that enable encounters with traumatic 
moments that can be processed transitively, hence be shared, transported and 
                                                 
78 Brennan, Transmission, 35. Brennan notes that Freud assumed that the life drive and the libido are 
the same, while he made the distinction that the life drive is originary whereas our libido is 
constructed. Brennan, extends this thought to propose that the libido, as a distinct element, is not only 
designated to the sexual drives but it is also an active force in the attention that allows intellectual 
concentration. 
79 Brennan, Transmission, 36. 
80 I elaborate on this distinction and the role of the life drive in the section Sublimation: A Matter of 
Life and Death. 
81 James Elkins, Pictures & Tears: A History of People Who Have Cried in Front of Paintings (Taylor 
& Francis e-Library, 2005), PDF e-book, 6. 
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passed into another bearer, be that the artwork or the willing partner who 
comes to meet it.82 
  
This can only be understood retroactively. That is, through Brennan’s notion 
of ‘self-containment’ we are offered a detailed account of how and why a subject 
‘presupposes that thinking can be clear of emotion and that affects can be studied as 
objective physiological states.’83 It is self-containment that prohibits the subject from 
“discerning” that affective transmission is taking place.84 It is also the process by 
which the ego comes to support the ‘belief that it is self-contained in terms of the 
affects it experiences,’ and it does so by separating thought from emotion, sensation 
from knowledge, and the self from the other. 85 These divisions also contribute to the 
way we employ language. So, while language can carry the affect and release it from 
repression, the disavowal of affective transmission can influence the associations we 
make between words and objects, images and others. Words can simply be words 
that carry no affective trace even if they are directed outwards. A moment of silence 
can be laden with grief or overflowing with serenity and can fill up a room even 
when there is no apparent action taking place. 
With this information at hand, I am able to better elaborate why the practice 
of art-writing can be thought of as a relational, emotional, affective, physical, erotic 
and psychic praxis.86 It will require an application of Brennan’s hypotheses and an 
                                                 
82 Pollock, After-affects, xxiii. 
83 Brennan, Transmission, 1. 
84 Discernment has a specific meaning for Brennan. I use it here in its common significance as a 
means for distinguishing or recognizing differences, but also in Brennan’s sense of doing so through 
the employment of sensorial faculties and educated reflection described further in the section 
Brennan’s Hypotheses in this chapter. 
85 Brennan, Transmission, 95. 
86 I would like to clarify that I do not claim to know whether artworks are capable of transmitting 
energy in the way that Brennan proposes that the hormonal transmission of affect can be perceived 
through the faculties of smell. Rather, I am claiming to know more about how making or encountering 
an artwork can be an energetically charged process that arouses the viewer on a biological level. 
Throughout this thesis, the physical transmission of affect between viewer and artwork (sculpture, 
painting and all object based work) is considered as unidirectional from the subject. It is the 
engagement with the work, the living attention directed by the subject onto the artwork, or by the 
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examination of the liberating effects that can manifest when the burden of self-
containment is lifted and consciousness is extended through feelings.87 Furthermore, 
the practice of art-writing reveals one model of subjectivity with an ethics founded 
on a distinct mode of relating which I term erotic responsiveness. I will expand on 
this model at different instances in this chapter and how it conjoins Brennan’s 
hypothesis in the sections to follow. 
 
 
 
 
Brennan’s Hypotheses 
 
 
 
Brennan has been an important thinker at the intersections of psychoanalysis and 
feminism, relentlessly challenging established psychoanalytic and philosophical 
theories of subjectivity, sexuality, maternality and subject/object schemas. In 1989, 
in her introduction to the edited volume Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis, she 
addressed the necessity to develop models that moved beyond phallic symbolic 
economies.88 This vibrant engagement between psychoanalysis and feminism led to 
robust critique being developed across the fields of both clinical and cultural 
                                                 
creative response that it arouses, that unfolds the affective experience. An artwork and an object can 
nevertheless inspire or evoke feelings through the visual associations one makes. Or, and according to 
Ettinger, a work of art can be imbued with the artist’s affects, or as Milner notes, the artist’s affects 
can “go into” the painting. I am interested here in the idea of affect having/being a psychic 
nonconscious impact – prior to its emotional and therefore discursive status – prompted by an 
encounter with art. The encounter that prompted my thinking occurred during the live art event I 
attended which I describe in the introduction. In agreement with Brennan’s assertion that affect is 
energetically and hormonally transmitted through the senses, I propose that during body-based 
performances physical energies are actually exchanged between artists and their audiences and can be 
experienced with varying degrees of intensity.  
87 Brennan contends that there are (at least) three liberating effects that are brought about by an 
awareness of the transmission of affect. First, the “scientific” claim is that we can ‘explore 
communication by smell and sound in ways that can heal.’ Secondly, that such an awareness would 
bring about an altered state of consciousness which is more attuned to feelings. Thirdly, the “spiritual” 
proposition is that it offers ‘an understanding of our lacks and faults and sins.’ See Brennan, 
Transmission, 95. 
88 Teresa Brennan, introduction to Between Feminism and Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1989), 
1-23. 
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analysis.89 However, as much as the critique was significantly tackling the problems 
of phallic binarism, there were very few alternative developments to the symbolic 
dimension of sexuality and subjectivity and how it is informed by the imaginary.90 
Brennan has been amongst many feminist theorists who insisted that psychosis is not 
the only possibility outside Oedipal logic91, but she is one of the few to have 
developed that possibility specifically through the reconceptualization of affect as 
physical transmission. Brennan highlights how transference, counter-transference, 
projection and projective identification are all psychoanalytic methods that support 
the idea that affects may be transmitted. She cites Wilfred Bion’s “alpha function”, 
Daniel Stern’s account of the mother/infant relationship and Jean Laplanche’s theory 
of the “enigmatic signifier” as examples where affect is framed as unconscious 
communication and inscription.92 However, Brennan notes that even the object-
relations theorists hesitate to ‘think physically’, which makes her argument on affects 
                                                 
89 In Britain, since the mid-seventies, the work of Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose has aimed to 
reconcile feminism and psychoanalysis (especially the work of Freud and Lacan) while remaining 
critical of phallocentric views on femininity and female sexuality. See Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline 
Rose, eds., Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the École Freudienne (New York: WW Norton & 
Company, 1985). In the field of social psychoanalysis, Nancy Chodorow draws from the work of 
Karen Horney (Feminine Psychology, 1967) in the vein of object-relations theories and towards the 
development of pre-Oedipal concepts that focus on the mother-child bond. See Nancy Chodorow, The 
Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (California: University of 
California Press, 1999). 
90 In an effort to develop psychoanalytic accounts that respond to female sexuality, feminist 
psychoanalysis has had the pitfall of developing models that respond to heterosexual and 
heteronormative subjectivities. Furthermore, new binaries develop when identities are framed as either 
socially and culturally constructed or essentially and biologically determined.  See Adrienne Rich, 
“Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence” in Signs 5, no. 4 (University of Chicago Press: 
Summer, 1980), 631-660. Toril Moi, states that ‘psychoanalysis still needs to be creatively 
transformed for feminist purposes, the fact remains that feminism needs a non-essentialist theory of 
human sexuality and desire in order to understand the power relations between the sexes.’ See Toril 
Moi, “Feminist, Female, Feminine,” in The Feminist Reader: Essays in Gender and the Politics of 
Literary Criticism, eds. Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 131. 
91 See Jane Gallop, The Daughter's Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis (Cornell University 
Press, 1984) and Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1990). 
92 Brennan, Transmission, 32 & 41. 
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unique in that it stresses the physical dimension of affective transmission and how it 
is later rationalised (processed or repudiated) in the mind of the subject.93  
Brennan’s theoretical premise differs from general psychoanalytic 
understandings of affect by forging two main distinctions.94 Firstly, Brennan puts 
forward the hypothesis that affects are ‘independent of the individual experiencing 
them’ and may be transmitted from one individual or group to another.95 Brennan 
broadly termed the study of affects and their transmission (or connective capacity) as 
‘energetics.’96 She makes a persuasive claim that ‘energetic connections’ have been 
eclipsed from current discourses on affect due to the conventional ‘tendency to think 
in subject/object terms,’ developed since the seventeenth century philosophical shift 
towards interior consciousness.97 By framing affect as self-originating and often  
                                                 
93 Ibid., 23 & 41. 
94 While there are ongoing developments in work that examines the intersections of psychoanalysis 
and affect, Brennan’s innovation lies in articulating affect as energetic transmission. Brennan’s 
recourse to physiology (smell, hormones) to establish the psychological shift during transmission is 
not the focus of this research. An emphasis on neurophysiological proof of affect (and less so 
transmission) has similarly been the basis of research by Brian Massumi, “The Autonomy of Affect,” 
Cultural Critique, no. 31 (1995): 83-109 and William E. Connolly, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, 
Speed (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). I retreat to Brennan’s 
elaboration for how her hypotheses may provide useful ways to reexamine the connection between the 
life drive and creativity through a psychoanalytic framework. For an overview of affect, transmission 
and psychoanalysis in relation to new materialist vitalism in studies of sociology and cultural theory 
see Lisa Blackman, “Affect, Relationality and the ‘Problem of Personality’,” Theory, Culture & 
Society 25, no. 1 (2008): 23–47, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407085157. For an overview of 
theories on emotion and affect see Kristyn Gorton, “Theorizing Emotion and Affect: Feminist 
engagements,” Feminist Theory 8, no. 3 (2007) 333–348, https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700107082369. 
95 Brennan, Transmission, 13. 
96 Teresa Brennan, Exhausting Modernity: Grounds for a new Economy, (Taylor & Francis e-library, 
2003. PDF e-book), 10. 
97 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 10. Barbara Johnson also notes that ‘the distinction between 
“persons” and “things” may here be a legacy of the Enlightenment in the twenty-first century.’ See 
Johnson, Persons and Things, 3. The Subject of Enlightment and interiority has been the basis of 
much feminist and postcolonial critique and the literature is too vast as to be able to condense it here. 
Brennan’s work on the subject/object distinction traces a pre-socratic non-unified conception of the 
subject that transforms with Plato’s inauguration of the unified individual who embodies clear 
subject/object parameters. Brennan notes that from Plato onwards there are few western and modern 
exceptions to the idea of the self-contained subject such as the work of philosopher Baruch Spinoza. 
See Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 45-51. For an analysis of how philosophers (Immanuel Kant, 
Friedrich Nietzsche) and psychologists (Francis Galton amongst others) dealt with aesthetics and 
value in this period in a way that perpetuated gender, racial and class bias in the arts, see the still 
pertinent chapter “Scientific Facts and Aesthetic Values,” by Christine Battersby, Gender and Genius: 
Towards a Feminist Aesthetics (London: The Women’s Press, 1989), 124-133. 
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unconscious, psychoanalytic accounts of subjectivity provide narratives that 
perpetuate the idea that the human is ‘the source of all agency’, ‘energetically 
separate’ and inside a ‘shell […] called the ego’.98 To this effect, psychoanalysis 
figures the individual as the “subject” in relation to all its others as “objects”.  
The philosopher Kelly Oliver has lauded Brennan’s notion of intersubjective 
energies, their exchange and circulation between people, as one of the ‘most 
revolutionary’ theories that can offer ‘tools to develop an ethics and politics of 
difference with a radical responsibility for others and the environment.’99 The notion 
of “energetics” can be traced back to Brennan’s first book Interpretation of the Flesh 
and it is repeated and applied throughout her work albeit in various forms and for 
different end results (from the psychic mechanisms of femininity and masculinity to 
the psychology behind environmental destruction). It is also of cardinal significance 
to the development of her hypotheses on affective transmission in her last book, and 
especially of interest in that “energetics” turned to biology and the sciences for 
“proof” of transmission. This is a noteworthy point, for it seems that the transmission 
of affect (a revolutionary idea) has had no basis for verification when it was 
corroborated by equally untenable methods such as psychoanalysis, metapsychology 
or, Brennan’s most criticised approaches, theology and mysticism. Following the 
publication of five books and numerous essays on the topic, her “hypotheses,” as 
well as her personal infectious energy, have always been met with an equal amount 
of passionate inspiration as well as scepticism.100 This paradox remains. 
                                                 
98 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 11. 
99 Kelly Oliver, “Living A Tension,” in Living Attention: On Teresa Brennan, eds. Alice A. Jardine et 
al. (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 14 & 21. 
100 It is interesting to note that there are a number of expositions of Brennan’s work which involve an 
elaboration on her character described in terms of her affective energy. While most writers attest to 
her personal energy they do not always respond to her thesis on energetics with an equivalent amount 
of persuasion. See Alice A. Jardine et al, eds., Living Attention: On Teresa Brennan (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2007). While the majority of Brennan’s work deals with self-
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The second distinction can also be traced back to Interpretation of the Flesh, 
where Brennan introduces her thoughts on how the self-contained, self-originating 
subject came to be the norm rather than the exception. Within a year, Brennan 
followed up with the publication of History after Lacan, to expose how the illusion 
of the energetically self-contained subject originates with the “foundational fantasy”: 
the fantasy that the primary caregiver is the passive container of the infant’s 
projected affects.101 Brennan tracks how this ‘hallucinatory fantasy’ produces a self-
contained subjectivity typically described in the work of psychoanalysts Jacques 
Lacan, Sigmund Freud and Melanie Klein.102 The purpose of exposing the 
“foundational fantasy” is to demonstrate how our natural environment has become 
the surface for the human ego to “act out” originary fantasies of separation from the 
mother. Brennan carefully attends to how psychic mechanisms of separation, 
distanciation and objectification become naturalized processes by which the subject 
comes to define their distinct identity. She argues that if these are the culturally 
endorsed processes by which we come to define ourselves “against” others on a 
psychic level, then it is no surprise that the same mechanisms are at play when we 
seek to define (and hence control) the external world.  
The effects of Brennan’s “foundational fantasy” can be demonstrated in a 
number of systems that rely on subject-object antagonisms whereby the subject is 
always located at the centre of meaning and action.103 For instance, technology, the 
                                                 
containment, energetics and subject/object distinctions, it is the final work The Transmission of Affect 
which deals exclusively with proving that physical energy is transmissible.  
101 Teresa Brennan, History After Lacan (Taylor & Francis e-library, 2003), PDF e-book, 11-12.  
102 By thinking through intersubjective relations in energetic terms Brennan seeks to shake ‘the 
illusion that subjects’ mental or psychical processes are individually self-contained, an illusion that 
can only be maintained when these processes are regarded as unphysical.’ The concept of the 
‘foundational fantasy’ borrows from her earlier work The Interpretation of the Flesh: Freud & 
Femininity (London & New York: Routledge, 1992), 34. 
103 In Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-17), Freud asserted that there had been three 
great wounds to the ‘naïve self-love of men.’ Firstly, the Copernican revolution made man recognise 
that he is ‘not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system,’ secondly, that 
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environment, animals and culture can all be considered as the objects created and/or 
regulated by humans. In order to cement this perception into place, it is necessary for 
the subject to hold on to the illusion that these objects have no agency or affective 
ability, thus denying that they too can have an effect on the subject’s mental and 
physical state.104 
I rely on this hypothesis to examine how writing about art may similarly 
reproduce a pattern whereby aesthetics are the “object” of analysis by a self-
contained subject. And, that there is a lineage of practice and thinking whereby the 
writer of aesthetics must necessarily “objectify” an artwork (or artist) to formulate, 
or rigidly hold onto, his/her own distinct identity. Therefore, the idea of “acting out” 
onto the artwork/artist (the two are often regrettably conflated) can also be figured as 
the effect of the ‘foundational fantasy.’ A process that entails a denial of affective 
transmission, in order to maintain a distinct identity from the object under analysis. I 
aim to make this argument clearer in the section Art-Writing is in the Situation of a 
Fulcrum by elaborating on the disparity between art criticism and art-writing, both as 
literary forms and for how they consequently activate distinct psychic mechanisms 
during their production. In the next section I elaborate on some of the productive 
associations between Brennan’s hypotheses on subjectivity and how these can relate 
to art-writing. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
Charles Darwin reduced man’s ‘privileged place in creation’ to animal nature and, lastly, ‘human 
megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the psychological research of 
the present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must 
content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.’ See Sigmund 
Freud, “Fixation to Traumas - The Unconscious,” in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. 1-24, ed. Ivan Smith (2010), 3361. 
104 Brennan, Lacan, 14. 
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If Brennan’s hypotheses encountered art-writing what would they do? 
 
 
 
Returning to Brennan’s hypotheses, it is with her final book The Transmission of 
Affect that her theories come full circle. Brennan’s sources are vast, drawing from 
psychoanalysis, science, group psychology and theology. As the philosopher Susan 
James notes, Brennan employs a different set of tools and languages to grab ‘the 
attention and sympathy of scientists, historians, philosophers, psychoanalysts, 
phenomenologists, and theologians.’105 In some ways, Brennan directs her ambitious 
project to the very theories that have consolidated the ‘historical aberration’ of the 
self-contained subject of the Western tradition.106 Brennan argues that because self-
containment requires a structure of subjectivity where affects are perceived as 
isolated in the person, the subject maintains a sense of self by (consciously or 
unconsciously) fixating on the idea that feelings stem from the individual and are 
therefore predisposed to regulation and control. Contrary to this common assertion, 
Brennan claims that fantasies, symptoms and impulses are not sourced from the 
individual’s psyche, but they are the effect of a broader social order.107  
This is not to be confused with psychoanalytic postulations such as Jacques 
Lacan’s theory that the subject is interpellated by the (always phallic) symbolic, or 
feminist philosopher and theorist Judith Butler’s concept of ‘performativity’108 
                                                 
105 Susan James, “Repressed Knowledge and the Transmission of Affect,” in Living Attention: On 
Teresa Brennan, eds. Alice A. Jardine et al (New York: State University of New York Press, 2007), 
47. 
106 Brennan, Transmission, 25. 
107 Ibid., 22-23.  
108 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 
1997), xiv-xxv. While this might seem like an outdated position on the construction of identity, on 
which Butler has offered much more nuanced perspectives with work such as The Psychic Life of 
Power: Theories in Subjection (California: Stanford University Press, 1997), it remains a dominant 
framework of analysis to examine artwork and performance that makes reference to identity politics, 
especially at the intersections of gender and sexuality. See Amelia Jones and Adrian Heathfield. 
Perform, Repeat, Record: Live Art in History (Bristol: Intellect, 2012), 12 & 41. For a relational 
approach to performativity that aims to bridge the gap between the material and the discursive see 
Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to 
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whereby identity is constructed through the reiteration of sociocultural acts, even if 
the construction of identity also entails these processes. Unlike these examinations of 
how language, culture and discourse shape and impact the psychic and social 
realisation of the subject, Brennan posits the affective dimension before its symbolic 
and representational conscious register. Affects do not rely on linguistic/discursive 
transmission; they are extremely physical, prior to cognition, and can produce 
material impact even when outside symbolization. In fact, Brennan goes to the extent 
to propose that ‘affects and impulses pre-exist the infant’ and what is enacted on the 
level of the social is a fantasy that is realized ‘in the social order, rather than the 
psyche.’109 Of course, the social does “get inside” the biological and Brennan’s 
theory of the transmission of affect provides exactly that: the means by which 
something gets inside. By focusing her analysis on the pre-Oedipal stage of identity, 
Brennan does not deny that social factors shape sexual, gender and overall identity. 
Rather, she understands “social force” as that which eventually cements the 
Oedipalisation process into fixed identity structures, demonstrated for instance in the 
                                                 
Matter,” Signs 28, no. 3 (Spring 2003): 801-831, https://doi.org/10.1086/345321. For performativity 
in the arts and as a mode of political mobilisation see Judith Butler and Athina Athanasiou, 
Dispossession: The Performative in the Political (Polity Press, 2013): 176-183. The authors here 
postulate a plural notion of performativity which constitutes a ‘performativity of plurality and 
performativity in plurality.’ Interestingly, Athanasiou states that ‘affect, in this context, signifies 
affecting and being affected by the corporeal dynamic of relatedness, mutual vulnerability, and 
endurance. It involves being beside oneself: taken out, given over, moved, and moving.’ It is in the 
aggregation of bodies that publicly protest that ‘corporeal vulnerability and revolt become each 
other’s indeterminate condition of possibility. The body becomes a turbulent performative occasion, 
one that both constrains and enables action qua embodied situatedness and extension. Perhaps this 
multivalent interaction of bodies, in all its affective and political intensities of empathy, kindness, and 
alliance – but also of tension, distress, or conflict – opens ways for thinking the materiality and 
affectivity of embodied agency without restoring the body as a hypostatized foundation of identitarian 
action and agency.’ This extract indicates an interpretation of affect that could benefit from Brennan’s 
theorizations of affective transmission. For instance, one could examine how an otherwise inert 
subject can be mobilized through ‘empathy’ and ‘kindness,’ as Athanasiou posits, but also of 
‘attention’ and ‘love’ towards the other that had until the moment of collectivity been insufficiently 
received. Brennan stipulates that through the concept of energetic transmission in gatherings we can 
better understand how, for instance, ‘working-class participants are carrying the affective refuse of a 
social order that positions them on the receiving end of an endless stream of minor and major 
humiliations, from economic and physical degradations in the workplace to the weight of the negative 
affects discarded by those in power.’ See Brennan, Transmission, 67. 
109 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 8-9. 
 56 
correlation between masculinity equating activity, or femininity corresponding to 
passivity.110 The fundamental difference being that for Brennan the social force bears 
a psychophysical force, more than it does a cultural or socio-economic impact. 
Furthermore, this psychophysical force can equally alter our biological make up. In 
fact, becoming attuned to the psychophysical powers of the world, is one of the ways 
by which we can shake the fixity of our bounded selves or protect ourselves from 
influences that affect us from without. 
Brennan’s theorisations, especially in The Transmission of Affect, aim to 
refigure ideas of human relationality by proposing a way to understand how we can 
come to ‘feel another’s feelings.’111 By exposing how the subject is predisposed and 
socially upheld by the illusion of self-containment, Brennan aims to offer an 
alternative model for human relations. One of the concrete actions she proposes is 
the process of tuning into ‘finer feelings’ which she terms ‘discernment.’112 Finer 
feelings are feelings that assess sensations (produced by affects) that through a 
process of self-reflection, meditation, psychoanalytic sessions or exchanges with 
friends can lead to an accurate articulation.113 Brennan’s succinct explanation is that 
‘feelings are sensations that have found a match in words’ and in this sense feelings 
are differentiated from affects, as affects can be transmitted in the absence of 
language.114 However, the necessary process for matching thoughts to the affects that 
we feel requires an activation of the logic of living attention. In Brennan’s words,  
 
                                                 
110 Brennan, Interpretation, 226. Brennan states that ‘The available socio-economic material 
opportunities are evidently critical in relation to social force as much as social circumstance, if not 
more so. Understanding their effects on, and the concept of, the physical force of masculinity and 
femininity in general, takes us back to the two-stage imprinting process, and then back to the father.’ 
The two-stage process and its correlation with language are examined further in the section The 
Physicality of Ideas: Writing and Embodiment in this chapter. 
111 Brennan, Transmission, 27. 
112 See the last chapter “The Education of the Senses” in Brennan, Transmission, 116-138. 
113 Brennan, Transmission, 121. 
114 Ibid., 5, 19 &120. 
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any faculty of discernment must involve a process whereby affects pass from 
the state of sensory registration to a state of cognitive or intelligent reflection; 
this does not mean that the process of reflection is without affect, just that the 
affect is other than the affect that is being reflected upon.115  
 
By Brennan’s argument, a process of “sensory registration” requires an active 
deployment of the physical senses to calculate, reason and infer in words. The 
assumption that one is energetically self-contained will often transpire as the main 
obstacle to reconnecting thinking with sensing, the mind with the body, the self with 
the other.  
However, psychoanalytic and literary scholar Amber Jacobs, notes that 
Brennan’s strategy to reveal the ‘illusion of the autonomous unified affectively self-
contained subject –/in the humanities at any rate –/is well and truly undermined, and 
[…] the critique exhausted.’116 I should remind us here that Sigmund Freud stated 
that psychoanalysis is a threatening enterprise precisely because it undermines the 
liberal and rational subject of the Enlightenment by introducing the destabilising 
agency of the unconscious.117 Nevertheless, a century later, Brennan’s work clearly 
indicates that the strategies provided by psychoanalysis are still in need of extensive 
revision, especially when affective agency is regulated by the self-contained 
mechanisms of the ego.  
Written in 2006, it seems that while Jacobs’ critique that the self-contained 
subject is undermined holds true, the illusion of self-containment nevertheless 
persists in numerous fields and new forms.118 Art criticism has been considered a 
                                                 
115 Ibid., 120. 
116 Amber Jacobs, “Perspectives on Teresa Brennan’s The Transmission of Affect,” in Women: A 
Cultural Review 17, no. 1 (2006): 114, https://doi.org/10.1080/09574040600628724 
117 In this thesis, see the section Brennan’s Hypotheses, p. 52, footnote 100 for Freud’s ‘three great 
wounds’. 
118 Work on subjectivities in the humanities has certainly been proliferating. Not only is the ‘self-
contained subject’ undermined, but alternative subjects have been theorised through more relational 
theories. See Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Patricia MacCormack, Posthuman 
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field entrenched in modes of perception enabled by what literary theorist Rita Felski 
describes as the general tendency in fields of critical reading: ‘analytical detachment, 
critical vigilance, guarded suspicion; […] the uncontrollable urge to put everything 
in scare quotes. Problematizing, interrogating, and subverting are the default options, 
the deeply grooved patterns of contemporary thought.’119 
Writing about art follows similar patterns of analysis where, as Felski notes, 
value is found in the ‘reading and none to the objects read’; when critical 
engagement means ‘keeping one’s distance from a work of art in order to place it in 
an explanatory frame, whether drawn from politics, psychoanalysis, or 
philosophy.’120 Such a modality of reading and writing from a distance has 
encompassed the field of art writing, art history, art criticism and theory of art where 
the hierarchical pattern of subject over object reproduces itself even in the most 
astute poststructuralist (and post-“self-contained”) elaborations. While the 
humanities offer robust critique to de-center the hegemonic subject, in the case of art 
criticism, there is the danger that criticism can decenter the artwork or artist in order 
to centralize the critic’s reading and interpretation.121 In other words, by dismantling 
                                                 
Ethics: Embodiment and Cultural Theory (Ashgate, 2012. PDF e-book); Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist 
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (London: Duke University Press, 2007). However, 
this proliferation might be a necessary way to ensure that the self-contained subject remains 
undermined. Furthermore, Puar’s work is a good example of how alternative subjectivities are 
necessary to respond to the epidemic of nationalism, xenophobia and white supremacy. An epidemic 
which is increasingly sentient in the last few years and indicates that the “undermining” that happens 
in the humanities is either not accessible to a broader audience, or that there is still much more work 
to be done. 
119 Rita Felski, Uses of Literature (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 3. 
120 Ibid., 57. 
121 I am here thinking of recent work by new materialist feminist approaches such as Rosi Braidotti, 
Elizabeth Wilson or Vicki Kirby whose analyses focus on the material effects of human embodiment. 
Posthumanist approaches pose a challenge to anti-humanist or postrtucturalist strategies to 
“decentralize” power particularly by bringing the body centre stage. These perspectives promote 
theories of relationality, intersectionality and the inextricable interconnections (and power relations) 
between the subject and technology, environment, non-human others and so forth. But while art and 
culture are being analysed through the synergies provided by posthuman theories, there is little 
comprehensive work that examines the materiality of art-writing responses to artwork and their effects 
on the human psyche. Kirby argues that textual strategies that draw from anatomy in order to theorize, 
are then interpreted as metaphorical references to anatomy, in order to purge them of any essentialist 
claim. Kirby argues, ‘the pervasive yet unpalatable belief that the anatomical body locates the 
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the myth of the autonomous unified artist-subject we often run the risk of replacing it 
with an “autonomous unified affectively self-contained” critic. As the cultural 
theorist and critic Mieke Bal observes in her monograph Louise Bourgeois’ Spider, 
most ventures that select a single work of art are ‘an attempt to redirect art-writing to 
the art it writes about but too often subordinates and subjects to the derivative status 
of illustration of the art-writer’s argument.’122 
Jacobs is right to point out that simply highlighting the illusion of self-
containment might not be enough. However, she concludes with a more optimistic 
note, suggesting that perhaps Brennan’s strategy was aiming to conceptualize  
 
theories, cultural and epistemological models and discourses that are 
underpinned by a different logic, a different structure in order to break the 
stagnation of contemporary theory-making that can only critique and not 
innovate.123 
 
 
While Brennan’s work in a sense provides a different logic, through recourse 
to biological evidence, it rarely draws from culture to substantiate or give examples 
of the mysterious exchange of energies and affects and what positive effect they 
might have on a creative and ethico-aesthetic level.124 However, by bringing 
                                                 
unarguably real body, the literal body, the body whose immovable and immobilizing substance must 
be secured outside the discussion. This improper body is quarantined for fear that its ineluctable 
immediacy will leave us no space for change, no chance to be otherwise, no place from which to 
engender a different future.’ See Vicki Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal 
(London: Routledge, 1997), 70. 
122 Mieke Bal, Louise Bourgeois’ Spider: The Architecture of Art-Writing (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 7. 
123 Jacobs, “Perspectives,” 114. 
124 A similar observation is noted by Jacobs where she states that Brennan ‘did not take examples 
from life or even other disciplines/practices outside psychoanalysis in which the transmission of 
affects have surely been experienced.’ See Jacobs, “Perspectives,” 112. Conversely, I have come 
across ample examples where Brennan draws from various disciplines to substantiate her argument, 
such as, mysticism, Christian moral philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas’s typologies of passions 
and philosophers such as Benedictus de Spinoza and his notion of affects (affectus). A number of 
examples taken from “ordinary” life can be found in Brennan’s descriptions of fantasies of revenge 
(pp.134-135), sensorial responses (p.136) as well as examples taken from lived experiences narrated 
by psychoanalysts Darlene Ehrenberg and Wilfred Bion (p.126-127), to name but a few. However, on 
the topic of art, and the relationship between affects and creativity, there are few and scattered 
references, most notably on the writings of mystics ‘capturing some part of the union of spirit and 
sensuality that was lost with the fall into a divided mind and body - into the feeble form of recollected 
 60 
Brennan’s conceptual frameworks into relation with cultural analysis, it is my aim to 
outline a cartography of alternative responses to aesthetics – responses that embrace 
emotional, physical and intellectual elaborations – to argue that another model of 
subjectivity is necessary for examining auto/biographical art-writing. For this reason, 
the consilience of Cavarero’s framework of storytelling as a relational ethic with 
Brennan’s development of living attention as the basis of human flourishing can 
provide an important framework to examine a new variant of the art writer and apply 
it to the art-writing response. This innovation will become clearer when the 
discussion turns to subject/object dynamics and through the analysis and unfolding 
of art-writing. In turn, Brennan’s hypotheses provide an original way to re-examine 
the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, self and other, specifically through the 
problematizing of subject/object schemas within philosophical and psychoanalytic 
discourses on subjectivity and creativity.  
By amplifying the distinction between writing about art and writing with art, 
the former is figured as following the mechanisms of a self-contained subjectivity 
while the latter relies on a psychic and erotic activity closer to the way Brennan 
figures the mechanisms of the life drive and/or love and positive affects. Erotic 
responsiveness relies on the proposition that writing with art is mobilized by the life 
drive because of the subject’s deployment of psychophysical energy. In other words, 
living attention towards an artwork requires a subjectivity that seeks to communicate 
and make connections with others, diverting from the routine of a subject analysing, 
                                                 
words.’ (p.159). However, there are enough references across her work and ample in depth work on 
the senses, particularly in relation to vision (simultaneously an enabling and disabling sense for the 
purposes of art-writing), that when pulled together can strengthen the part about creativity and living 
attention. See Teresa Brennan, “The Contexts of Vision from a Specific Standpoint,” in Vision in 
Context: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Sight, eds. Teresa Brennan and Martin Jay 
(New York: Routledge, 1996), 217-230. 
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dissecting and interpreting an object. In this sense, writing with art, moves beyond a 
bounded notion of the self and towards a relational model of subjectivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “Art Writing is in the situation of a fulcrum”125 
 
 
 
At the brink of meaning, poised between abjection and regression, writing 
as doing displaces writing as meaning; writing becomes meaningful in the 
material, dis/continuous act of writing. 
– Della Pollock126 
 
Professor of philosophy and film critic Noël Carroll states in his book On Criticism, 
that criticism is in fact an ‘operation of evaluation’ whereby the critic engages in 
‘methods of description, contextualization, classification, elucidation, interpretation, 
and analysis.’127 The primary purpose of this “operation” is to produce a type of 
criticism that can ‘say what is good in a work.’128 This activity proposes that the 
critic contrives meaning, assesses an object under analysis and employs methods that 
can “fix” an object into a position for (good or bad) evaluation. Securing an object at 
a distance (energetically speaking) or establishing the object’s existence as a separate 
entity from the self, can facilitate an interpretation or viewpoint about the object. 
However, what happens in cases where the relationship to an artwork overturns 
                                                 
125 The title directly quotes a co-authored manifesto produced when the MFA in Art Writing was 
running at Goldsmiths University of London by the teaching team Maria Fusco, Yve Lomax, Michael 
Newman and Adrian Rifkin, Eleven Statements Around Art Writing, http://blog.frieze.com/11-
statements-around-art-writing/ 
126 Della Pollock, “Performing Writing,” in The Ends of Performance, eds. Peggy Phelan and Jill Lane 
(New York: New York University Press, 1998), 75. 
127 Noël Carroll, On Criticism (New York & London: Routledge, 2009), 9. 
128 Ibid., 36. 
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presumed physical and energetic boundaries? For instance, in the live performances 
of artist Adrian Howells, where physicality is a necessary part of the work and the 
audience (and critics) are entering a space of intimacy and engagement with each 
other’s bodies, emotions and senses.129 Or, how do we assess forms of writing that 
respond to a painting or sculpture in unorthodox ways such as lyrical and evocative 
descriptions that borrow from the age-old tradition of ekphrasis?130 What can an 
exploration of these unconventional forms of practice, process and creative response 
tell us about the way meaning is constructed through writing with art? And, how or 
why is writing about art a distinct form?   
It is no surprise that forms of art that resist fixity, such as performance, public 
actions and experimental theatre, are accompanied by substantial literature that both 
questions the methodologies of art criticism, while producing unconventional forms 
of art-writing as criticism.131 As Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson declare in 
their introduction to the edited volume Performing the Body/Performing the Text, 
live art is a process which is ‘no longer viewed as a static object with a single, 
                                                 
129 For a description of a “missed” encounter between Howell’s work and a critic see the first chapter 
of Jennifer Doyle, “Introducing Difficulty,” in Hold It Against Me: Difficulty and Emotion in 
Contemporary Art (London: Duke University Press, 2013). 
130 The art historian Jaś Elsner argues that ‘art history […] is nothing other than ekphrasis, or more 
precisely an extended argument built on ekphrasis.’ See Jaś Elsner, “Art History as Ekphrasis.” Art 
History 33, no. 1 (February 2010): 10-27, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8365.2009.00720.x 
131 For a well-known example of art-writing that fuses autobiography and theory see Peggy Phelan, 
Unmarked: The Politics of Performance (London: Routledge, 1996). Writing that interlaces 
autoethnography, diary writing and letter correspondence, which reads as a manifesto and a critical 
commentary on the role of performance art within the general sphere of the arts and society, see 
Guillermo Gómez-Peña, “In Defence of Performance Art,” in Live: Art and Performance, ed. Adrian 
Heathfield (London: Tate Publishing, 2004), 76-85. On the topic of performing knowledge and the 
similarities between performance and writing, see an autoethnographic performative writing approach 
by Heather M. Carver, “Methodology of the Heart: A Performative Writing Response,” Liminalities 3, 
no. 1 (2007). For more recent examples, the groundbreaking work of Portuguese writer, theorist and 
artist Grada Kilomba whose interdisciplinary work fuses performance, lecture, postcolonial theory, 
psychoanalysis, poetry and autobiography as a way to decolonise the Eurocentric production of 
knowledge. See Grada Kilomba, Plantation Memories: Episodes of Everyday Racism, 2nd ed. 
(Munster: Unrast Verlag), 2010.  
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prescribed signification that is communicated unproblematically and without default 
from the maker to an alert, knowledgeable, universalized viewer.’132 
Attempts to force apart the alliance between criticism and universalism 
persist to this day, despite the overwhelming scrutiny the field of art criticism has 
received since the advent of foundational texts such as artist and art historian Giorgio 
Vasari’s The Lives of the Artists (1550) to contemporary art theory such as Hal 
Foster’s influential book The Return of the Real (1996).133 While these texts, and the 
general sphere of art criticism and theory, have offered tools for interpreting the 
culture we encounter, it has been noted that “culture” cannot be a catch-all 
enterprise, because it is often the result of a particular intimate milieu, a geographical 
and socio-political context and especially the critic’s background that come to define 
what counts as worthy of cultural interpretation.134 While I agree with a number of 
critiques from the hard and perpetual work of minority discourses and politics that 
highlight criticism’s exclusions, meritocratic standards, elitism, discrimination and 
short-sighted understanding or lack of investment in the diversity of knowledge 
production, I do not take up these operations of bias as central to my argument 
                                                 
132 Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson, introduction to Performing the Body, Performing the Text, 
eds. Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), PDF e-book, 1.  
133 Giorgio Vasari, The Lives of the Artists. Trans. by Julia Conaway Bondanella & Peter Bondanella 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Hal Foster, The Return of the Real: The Avant-Garde at the 
end of the Century (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1996). 
134 The art historian Linda Nochlin instigated the discussion on ‘how the white western male 
viewpoint, unconsciously accepted as the viewpoint of the art historian, may – and does – prove to be 
inadequate not merely on moral and ethical grounds, or because it is elitist, but on purely intellectual 
ones.’ This quote is found in the 1971 essay “Why have there been no Great Women Artists?” in 
Women, Art, and Power and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 146. On the production 
of the “male genius” in the arts see the incisive historical work of Christine Battersby, Gender and 
Genius: Towards a Feminist Aesthetics (London: The Women’s Press, 1989). For an excellent 
critique of how hegemonic euro-patriarchal and euro-feminist discourses have led to the erasure and 
marginalization of black female voices in the arts see the 1993 essay by Freida High W. Tesfagiorgis, 
“In Search of a Discourse and Critique/s that Center the Art of Black Women Artists,” in Theorizing 
Black Feminisms: The Visionary Pragmatism of Black Women, eds. Stanlie M. James and Abena P.A. 
Busia (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), PDF e-book, 231-270. Most recently, the artist and writer 
Hannah Black made a powerful exposition of how artists who address race and gender in their work 
are employed as ‘evidence of the institution’s purity,’ serving as a marker of ‘universality, […] 
artificially cleansed of race/gender’ while simultaneously being ‘called on to represent it.’ See Hannah 
Black, “The Identity Artist and the Identity Critic,” Artforum 54, no. 10 (Summer 2016): 338. 
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between art-writing and art criticism. I do however take stock of these critiques to 
address the generalizable and hegemonic stance afforded by texts that provide 
interpretative tools with the expectation that these tools (and the resulting 
interpretations) would work across contexts and cultures in their multifarious 
pluralities. They don’t. But the issues are not strictly a matter of clarifying what type 
of discourse is appropriate for a designated field.135 Instead of setting up art-writing 
and art criticism as oppositional fields, it must be emphasized that it is the 
concurrence of both methods within narrative practice that has led to major 
innovations in both art-writing and traditional criticism.136  
For the purposes of this research, I am interested in elucidating the 
complexity of auto/biographical art-writing – a distinct field and methodological 
approach – what it can reveal about psychic processes and in turn what can be 
gleaned from these narratives to account for discourses on subjectivity in 
psychophysical terms. In a similar move to Jones and Stephenson who claim that an 
‘embodied reception of visual artworks is a process that can be engaged as 
performative,’ I try to bring the performative, the embodied as well as the erotic 
function to the fore, to assess how it figures in textual form as well as how it 
implements different modes of reading and response.137  
However, the embodied affective impact should not be restricted to looking, 
that is, it is not solely the visual or representational that can affect us, and neither 
                                                 
135 Part Two of this thesis addresses the distinctions between theory, criticism and art-writing in more 
depth, drawing from feminist and black writers. 
136 For work that advocates for new forms of writing and criticism that do not follow hegemonic 
discourses, see the collection of essays by Trinh T. Minh-ha, When the Moon Waxes Red. 
Representation, Gender and Cultural Politics (New York & London: Routledge, 1991). Drawing 
from autobiographical accounts and postcolonial theory see bell hooks, Art on my Mind: Visual 
Politics (New York: The New Press, 1995). Fusing personal narratives and prose to examine artwork, 
see Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects: Essays on Ecstasy and Effrontery (London: Vintage, 1996). An 
excellent example that merges the personal with the critical, the humorous with the theoretical, see 
Jane Gallop, Anecdotal Theory, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002). 
137 Jones and Stephenson, Introduction, 2. 
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does the affect necessarily find adequate expression in language. As art historian, 
critic and theorist Griselda Pollock notes, the material aspects of an image, their 
tangibility and affective force, cannot be divorced from the psychophysical effect 
they produce beyond our visual senses: 
We think of images as visual, yet in art they are material and tangible. A 
material object, a painting, creates a field not simply of vision. It solicits our 
gaze not at the object but with what it tips into the field of vision through 
colours and gestures that trigger sensations of pulse, rhythm, and movement – 
as actually deposited by the painting body in its creative work. In turn, these 
sensations open up time as we are drawn further towards their energies, 
flows, and above all, their affects. We are led to affectivity through the 
psychological strings that the materials themselves set vibrating.138 
 
Auto/biographical art-writing attempts to convey the “vibrations” that 
galvanize the story that arises from a psychophysical aesthetic encounter. This 
venture presents a new set of difficulties both for the narrator and the reader’s 
engagement with such narratives. As Kate Love argues, it might not be possible to 
properly communicate an experience with art, when the ‘sensual, affecting, bodily 
and cognitive moment that is experience is seen as either outside of or as entirely 
collapsed to language.’139 Love advocates for writing that attempts ‘to retain some 
sort of estimation of what actually experiencing something feels like, in contrast, say, 
to the feeling of understanding or knowing something […] to think about the work 
that the word experience does.’140 I turn to responses that attempt to capture these 
occasions that Love describes as “sensual” and “affecting”, psychophysical instances 
that can lead to confusion and incoherence or a disjunction between action and 
speech. Moments where our cognitive faculties struggle to translate an aesthetic 
                                                 
138 Griselda Pollock, “Between Painting and the Digital: Matrixial Aesthetics Creates Matrixial 
Thought-Forms,” in And My Heart Wound-Space, ed. Bracha L. Ettinger (Leeds: The Wild Pansy 
Press, 2015), 262. 
139 Kate Love, “The Experience of Art as a Living Through of Language,” in After Criticism: New 
Responses to Art and Performance, ed. Gavin Butt (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 169. 
140 Love, “Experience of Art,” 169. 
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experience in words. Love describes these encounters as located ‘both in language 
but yet not quite in language, at the limit of language but unequivocally not 
beyond.’141  
I figure the embracing of these moments in the form of auto/biographical art-
writing to mean that the writer has taken on the task of responding to the experience 
of an artwork with what Brennan formulates as loving, living attention. Brennan 
argues that as ‘love […] cannot really be divorced from attention and, therefore, 
from thinking,’ it only follows that reason and logic must necessarily flow from the 
affect of love.142 Attentive love, or living and loving attention, manifest ‘forms of 
resistance’ that counteract negative affects through the deployment of energy which 
is both ‘erotic and cohering.’143 I propose that the auto/biographical art-writing task 
does not merely follow cognitive exercises or purely performative forms of writing. 
As Love suggests, an aesthetic encounter can enable a recognition of what we  
 
have just lived through (as an experience) was in some way an experience of 
a negotiation with language – or that there is language – a feeling which 
corresponds to the openness of experience that is made possible by 
experience itself.144  
 
 
While Love’s description resonates with my framing of erotic responsiveness 
as an attempt to write with aesthetic experience, what differentiates auto/biographical 
art-writing from performative writing or writing with experience, is an emphasis on 
the psychophysical impact that such experience has on the subject. By focusing on 
the psychic dimension of experience and response, I aim to outline both a new 
formulation of the subject, as well as an ethical aspect that arises from the process of 
                                                 
141 Love, “Experience of Art,” 169. 
142 Brennan, Transmission, 132. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Love, “Experience of Art,” 169. 
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writing with, that draws from a relational ontology. For this reason, I have selected 
Cavarero’s theoretical exposition of the narratable self as a suitable framework to 
posit experience as an unrepeatable encounter between the work and the subject 
writing with the work. The auto/biographical art-writing response is produced by the 
subject narrating the other’s story and, to some extent, the encounter is revealed in 
language.  
Cavarero’s stress on the uniqueness of each individual provides a way to 
examine the intelligibility of aesthetic responses that are not restricted to the domain 
of art history, criticism or theory as the only legitimate forms of engaging with works 
of art. Rather, auto/biographical art-writing discloses not only the unrepeatability of 
the encounter and its unique participants, but also, that such narrative practice can 
only be theorised through a relational ontology of the self. While it is important to 
address the literary aspects of writing with art, it is equally significant to consider the 
psychic implications of responding to and with a work of art, without eclipsing the 
effects of such writing on subjectivity. 
Auto/biographical art-writing should not only be understood as an evaluating 
or utilitarian mechanism, but as an emotional and/or affective response to an image 
or event that has impacted the writer. The primary purpose is then to express the 
resonance of the affective encounter (good or bad judgements are of little 
significance). An evaluation of the “quality” of the work, or the artwork’s eminence 
in a variety of contexts, might not be meditated by the subject responding to the 
artwork. The only evaluation that might be considered would be a re-assessment of 
the subject’s sense of self, after the subject’s perception has been destabilized by an 
aesthetic encounter.  
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Conventional methods of critically approaching a work of art leave little 
room to elaborate on how critical operations can have a transformational effect on 
the subjectivity of the writer, which is where erotic responsiveness is of centrality.145 
As I shall demonstrate, there exist alternative writing practices where the 
subject/object distinction is radically altered. The distance between the subject and 
the work, in energetic terms, is bridged by the impact the work creates on the writer 
and by the attention that the writer bestows on a work of art. Such forms of writing 
with art call for readings that approach the writer’s subjectivity in its physical, 
embodied, affectively and physiologically informed materiality produced by an 
aesthetic encounter.  
The important point is not to simply produce a different technique or 
methodology for reading art-writing responses, but to keep in mind that a different 
framework of analysis is required – one that corresponds to an altogether different 
subject responding to artwork. A framework that considers how the storyteller is 
affected from without and compelled to respond to a work of art without necessarily 
relying on the methods of “description, contextualization, classification, elucidation, 
interpretation” described by Carroll. Case studies of art-writing processes and the 
psychic impact they produce on the subject will be examined further in Part Three. In 
the meantime, I turn to a deeper examination of subjectivity and how it has been 
reframed psychoanalytically and philosophically by employing the category of the 
maternal in the work of Cavarero, Brennan and Ettinger. By doing so, I aim to clarify 
                                                 
145 For an overview of the field of “critical reading,” its professionalization, institutionalisation and 
how it has become the dominant discourse that postulates “uncritical reading” as the ‘unsystematic 
and disorganized’ form of reading susceptible to ‘identification, self-forgetfulness, reverie, 
sentimentality, enthusiasm, literalism, aversion, distraction’ see Michael Warner, “Uncritical 
Reading,” in Polemic: Critical or Uncritical, ed. Jane Gallop (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 13-
38. 
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how new models of subjectivity have been advanced by the respective authors that 
propose ethical and political alternatives to the self-contained subject. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
Incestuous Mothers: Subjectivity and Desire through the Maternal Relation 
 
 
 
The girl needs to find ways, and many times she fails again and again to 
find them, for sharing in the secrets of femininity with a m/Other whose 
fascination she must catch in/for their shareable space. She looks for a 
Woman-Mother figure whom she might adore and whose secrets she 
would be able to share on condition that such a m/Other would open 
herself to allow such a sharing and accommodate her gaze. She looks for 
proofs of the desirability of this figure by images and symbols. Any 
rejection or betrayal of and by such a figure feels catastrophic for the girl 
who is trying to become a woman. 
– Bracha L. Ettinger146 
 
 
The maternal as a category of inquiry in the fields of philosophy and psychoanalysis 
is a relatively recent enterprise in the history of Western thought.147 Both Brennan 
and Cavarero have offered significant contributions and radical reconfigurations of 
the maternal in these fields. There are a number of parallelisms between their work, 
particularly in their unfolding of how philosophical and psychoanalytic dualisms 
such as mind and body, subject and object, male and female, have been 
hierarchically and unequally developed where the first term reigns over the latter 
through a negation of maternal agency or through symbolic matricide. The idea that 
the foundations of subjectivity begin prior to the genital stage, before the Oedipus 
                                                 
146 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine Difference,” in 
Psychoanalysis and the Image: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Griselda Pollock (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006), 67. 
147 Albeit from a more sociological perspective, important work that put this category of analysis on 
the map includes Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution 
(London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995. First published, 1976) and Sara Ruddick, Maternal 
Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1995. First published 1989).  
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complex, and even during the prenatal stage, has been explored by a range of 
psychoanalysts and psychoanalytic theorists such as Alison Stone (2012), Julia 
Kristeva (1984), Donald Winnicott (1956) and Melanie Klein (1948) to name just a 
few.148 However, at the intersections of subjectivity and the maternal, it is the work 
of artist and psychoanalyst-theorist Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger that has been able to 
consolidate a framework of psychic development to produce a truly comprehensive 
method and vision for an alternative psychoanalytic dimension of the subject.  
 Ettinger’s concepts provide insight into how prenatal and prematernal 
encounters shape psychic development and affect aesthetic experience. These 
concepts also lay out the ground for an ethics and politics of the subject premised on 
a relational ontology. While Brennan’s work concurs with many of Ettinger’s 
stipulations on the resignification of maternal agency, Brennan’s analysis hinges on 
the role of affect and its physical as well as psychic effects. It is through Brennan’s 
psychophysical account of affects, as they are set against the self-contained subject, 
that we can come to conceive of new systems of interpersonal and environmental co-
affectivity, as well as responsibility. My aim is to furnish the practice of 
auto/biographical art-writing with an ethicoaesthetic and political dimension drawn 
from these new configurations of subjectivity. Even though Brennan figures 
creativity as a form of energetic attention sourced from the life drive, there were very 
few examples in her work that demonstrate how creative action or response is made 
to work. For this reason, Cavarero’s narrative strategies can be thought of as one 
modality of creative resistance through living attention directed towards an other.  
                                                 
148 Alison Stone, Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984). Donald Winnicott, “Primary Maternal Preoccupation.” Collected Papers: 
Through Paediatrics to Psycho-Analysis (London: Tavistock, 1956). Melanie Klein, “Early Stages of 
the Oedipus Conflict, 1928,” in Contributions to Psycho-Analysis 1921-1945, ed. Ernest Jones 
(London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1948), 202-214. 
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Despite the many similarities between these key thinkers, there are 
distinctions between their approaches that can offer different functions and valuable 
strategies to elucidate how we respond to art as artists, writers and audiences. In the 
sections to follow, I will unfold the respective author’s progressive concepts in more 
detail in order to delineate their alternative frameworks of subjectivization. These 
new models for thinking through the subject will be employed to consider 
auto/biographical art-writing responses and their effects on a psychophysical level. 
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Embodiment and the Exchange of Gazes 
 
 
 
Adriana Cavarero’s significant contributions to continental feminist philosophy and 
rigorous work on a re-evaluation of western metaphysics can perhaps only be 
paralleled to the work of the philosopher of sexual difference Luce Irigaray.149 In 
fact, Cavarero explicitly notes that her work at the intersections of feminism and 
philosophy owes ‘an enormous debt toward Luce Irigaray, second only to the one I 
owe Hannah Arendt’150 It is by converging the thought of these two thinkers 
(Irigaray and Arendt) that Cavarero produces a strategy that subverts traditional 
readings of philosophical texts. Through a rigorous criticism of the conceptual and 
epistemic flaws purported by ancient Greek philosophy, Cavarero argues that reason, 
objectivity and methods for questioning life and ethics, have solely drawn from lives 
and experiences that are gendered male. Cavarero’s innovation lies not only in a 
vigorous critique of the implicit misogyny that excludes a female symbolic from 
philosophical texts, but on how philosophy precludes the possibility of theorising the 
singularity and uniqueness of each individual. The philosopher Rosi Braidotti 
                                                 
149 Sexual difference is a strategy that examines theoretical, philosophical, social and political 
propositions which are structured on the interests and perspectives of the male subject and as such do 
not translate or apply to the experience of women. This strategy brings embodied and epistemological 
perspectives to the fore in order to counteract universal claims purported across culture, society and 
politics. Sexual difference rejects any totalising viewpoint of subjectivity or gender. For instance, 
social categories such as “man” and “woman” are not necessarily structured in opposition or 
antagonism to each other, cannot be naturalised as if they had an essential common denominator that 
defines all members of that category, but should be approached as the ‘the site of multiple, complex, 
and potentially contradictory sets of experiences, defined by overlapping variables such as class, race, 
age, lifestyle, sexual preference, and others.’ See Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and 
Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
4. Luce Irigaray’s work on sexual difference has been foundational in shaping contemporary feminist 
theory and literature, political movements and cultural representations. See Luce Irigaray, This Sex 
Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke (New York, Cornell University Press, 
1985. First published 1977 by Editions de Minuit). On the influence and eventual schism between 
Luce Irigaray and the Italian feminist movement see Teresa De Lauretis, introduction to Sexual 
Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice. The Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective, ed. 
Teresa De Lauretis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 16-17. 
150 Elisabetta Bertolino, “Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with the Italian 
Feminist Philosopher Adriana Cavarero,” Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 19, no. 
1 (2008): 148. 
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elucidates in her introduction to In Spite of Plato how Cavarero’s work involves the 
following strategies: 
 
the desire to transcend patriarchal dualism and to reintegrate the subject in a 
continuum of mind and body, starting from a radical redefinition of women’s 
relation to the mother. In this regard, following Irigaray, Cavarero traces both 
a historical account of phallocentric thought and also the itinerary of female 
transcendence from it. I would define this as Cavarero’s own brand of 
mimetic strategy, which is a subversive political move inspired by Luce 
Irigaray’s work.’151 
 
 
For Cavarero, the sites of antagonism are found between the literal and the 
metaphorical uses of female figures and the conceptualisation of the feminine in 
male-authored narratives. The struggle to provide an alternative story to hegemonic 
portrayals of a “living for death” necessarily takes place in the fields of myth and 
metaphysics.152 Cavarero’s tactic is to repossess and rewrite male-authored female 
characters found in ancient Greek philosophical texts in order to return these figures 
to ‘their literal, as opposed to their metaphorical, significance.’153 That is, by 
reappropriating these female figures, Cavarero aims to enrich the representational 
and symbolically impoverished culture of the feminine and of woman. Through this 
strategic reclamation, what becomes evident in the book In Spite of Plato is that in 
the ancient Greek philosophical tradition ‘embodiedness’ has often been set in 
opposition to mind and reason.154 Cavarero unveils how the history of philosophy is 
                                                 
151 Rosi Braidotti, introduction to In Spite of Plato, by Adriana Cavarero, trans. Serena Anderlini-
D’Onofrio and Aine O’Healy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), xiv. 
152 Adriana Cavarero, In Spite of Plato, trans. Serena Anderlini-D’Onofrio and Aine O’Healy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 24-30. Cavarero draws from figures such as the mythical Odysseus 
narrated by Homer, or the philosopher Socrates accounted for by Plato. Both protagonists are granted 
heroic status not only for their accomplishments in life, but for how their acts were more significantly 
marked by the danger of being met with death. As Cavarero argues, ‘Both are cases of a “living for 
death” where death itself is the emblematic figure of a kind of finitude defeated and eternalized at the 
same time, by the legend that grants immortality, and by philosophy that dwells near the eternal.’ See 
Cavarero, Plato, 30. 
153 Cavarero, Plato, xiii 
154 Cavarero, Plato, 28-29. Cavarero argues that, in the case of Plato’s Phaedo, philosophical 
discourse defines life by its relation to eternal life, where immortality is the achievement of the ‘true 
life of the soul’ that can supersede physical death. On the other hand, ‘mere life’ is represented by the 
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founded on a strategy that not only separates body and mind, but which 
simultaneously establishes a series of metaphysical operations that repetitively 
culminate in the production of a subject founded on matricide. Cavarero tracks how 
this operation is made manifest, for example, in the myth of Demeter and 
Persephone. The god Hades abducts Persephone from her mother Demeter and takes 
her to the underworld to live with him. By doing so, Persephone who was Demeter’s 
daughter, now becomes Hades’ wife, and in this sense, is rendered motherless. In this 
first attempt to negate the role of the mother, the possibility of a ‘mutual exchange of 
gazes between mother and daughter’ is obstructed, which leads to devastating 
consequences which I will shortly elaborate on.155  
Cavarero’s use of the term “gaze” is a metaphor for describing Demeter’s 
persistence to see her daughter, but also to be seen by her.156 This metaphorical 
exercise proposes that the exchange of gazes between mother and daughter are a 
necessary process of subjectivization and identification beyond the reductive 
prescriptions offered by a patriarchal society.157 Through the lens of sexual 
difference philosophy, Cavarero argues that there exist a dual set of gazes directed at 
the mother which figure differently for each sex. Cavarero states that ‘humans are 
bisexually differentiated, and that the common origin of both male and female is 
                                                 
body, a mortal entity which ceases to exist upon death. Juxtaposing two different heroes, Odysseus 
and Socrates, and contrasting them with the figure of Penelope, Cavarero reads a very different story 
in the act of Penelope’s weaving, which here manifests as a reconnecting of the mind and body. 
Cavarero notes that, ‘If untying is the work of philosophy, Penelope […] simply weaves together what 
the philosophers have undone.’ Penelope is presented as a figure who experiences life as a unity 
‘where mind and body are joined indissolubly together.’ This strategy of creating an alternative 
interpretation to how women have so far been figured – mythicized, exoticized and used to support 
male-authored claims – runs throughout Cavarero’s work. 
155 Cavarero, Plato, 64. 
156 Cavarero’s development of a reciprocal exchange of gazes resonates with a similar concept found 
in the work of sexual difference philosopher Luce Irigaray’s essay “Universal as Mediation,” in Sexes 
and Genealogies. Trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 131-132.   
157 Cavarero, Plato, 64. Cavarero is careful to note that this is not an obligation for daughters to 
become mothers. It is more about women formulating their distinctiveness in differentiation to other 
women rather than through patriarchal interpellation. 
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gendered in the feminine.’158 To concede that the regeneration of humans is an innate 
ability specific to the female sex is hardly a mystery, yet, it is strangely this very 
ability (and thus power) which narratives from philosophy to literature seek to 
undermine or vilify.159 
In the case of the myth of Persephone, the sabotage is conducted in two ways 
and through two gazes. As described earlier, the first is executed in the myth by a 
male figure who intentionally seeks to obstruct the “mutual gaze” between the 
mother and daughter. In the second instance, the masculine gaze looks towards the 
direction of death (a living for death) and this outlook can only be made possible if 
the subject abandons any sense of origin. In other words, by foreclosing their 
maternal origins, the subject is (self-)directed without any genealogical recognition 
and no responsibility for those that have shaped their history (or their very 
existence).160 As this form of matricide has become both naturalised and culturally 
endorsed, for Cavarero, the opposition can only be undone if we pay attention to the 
significance of a ‘maternal continuum’ through ‘an endless backward movement 
toward our origins.’161 That is, in tracing the past of every human to their origin – the 
recognition that all beings are born from a mother – Cavarero also highlights how 
                                                 
158 Cavarero, Plato, 62. 
159 The writer and historian Marina Warner examines mythical representations of the grotesque and 
monstrous embodied by the female form, especially in relation to motherhood. Warner argues that 
these fictitious depictions can dangerously misrepresent women’s power when it is portrayed as 
ungovernable, cunning, voracious and of supernatural proportions. Warner makes the case that the 
historical construction of female monstrosity has distorted our understanding through a ‘chronic 
scaremongering about female behaviour, about wild sexuality and aberrant maternity,’ which can 
affect present-day ‘matters of urgent social policy, the proper provision of childcare, tax reform, job 
training and retraining, nursery schools, housing, play areas all sink into a quagmire of prejudice.’ 
See, Marina Warner, “Monstrous Mothers,” in Witches: Hunted, Appropriated, Empowered, Queered, 
ed. Anna Colin (Montreuil: Éditions B42, La Maison Populaire, 2012), 89. For a discussion on the 
occlusion of the maternal in psychoanalysis see Amber Jacobs, On Matricide: Myth, Psychoanalysis, 
and the Law of the Mother (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).  
160 Cavarero, Plato, 63. 
161 Ibid., 60. 
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‘coming into the world has birth, not death, as its standard and measure.’162 It is this 
radical shift of perspective that Cavarero argues can allow us to consider our 
‘finitude, contingency, and irreducibility’ by looking ‘toward the origin of the living 
individual to find its own measure, and not toward its fateful end.’163 And it is with 
this definition that Cavarero’s thought meets the conceptual framework of Ettinger’s 
ethics of subjectivity.  
 
 
 
 
The Matrixial Gaze: Vision as Non-verbal Intensity 
 
 
 
The matrixial gaze of fascinance is an affective vibration: not an objet a 
but a link a.  
– Bracha L. Ettinger164 
 
A dual order of gazes can also be found in Ettinger’s psychoanalytic theorisations, 
where a similar strategy, reminiscent of Cavarero’s “maternal continuum,” is 
developed into distinct psychic trajectories and elaborations on the gaze. Cavarero 
affirms that sexual difference contributes to the uniqueness of each individual from 
their inception, that ‘the one who is born does not yet have any qualities; and yet has 
                                                 
162 Cavarero, Plato, 56. Cavarero is here inspired by her long-standing scholarship on the work of 
political theorist Hannah Arendt. Arendt states that ‘since action is the political activity par 
excellence, natality, and not mortality, may be the central category of political, as distinguished from 
metaphysical, thought.’ Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (1958; Chicago & London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 9. Arendt proposes that since action is the basis of politics, 
the category of birth as starting point, as the introduction to something new, can be thought of as the 
ultimate configuration of action. Arendt terms this conceptual framework “natality” to examine how 
freedom is actualized but also to elaborate how metaphysical thought stands in opposition to political 
thought. For Arendt, metaphysics relies on thinking rooted in mortality while natality considers action 
as the fundamental basis of living-together and politics. Cavarero extends this line of thought in 
Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 28. 
163 Cavarero, Plato, 82. 
164 Ettinger, “Fascinance,” 85. 
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a sex.’165 I understand Cavarero’s assertion to mean that sex can significantly shape 
‘what’ we become but that sexual difference should here be understood as a 
fundamental aspect of ‘who’ we are from the start. In other words, in a society 
significantly dominated by heteronormativity and patriarchy, the socially prescribed 
roles that are assigned to men and women can limit ‘what’ one is permitted to 
embody. While social expectations can be defied – to the extent that ‘what’ one 
becomes moves beyond the designated limits of one’s gender – sex is nevertheless an 
irreducible marker of one’s uniqueness (a fundamental aspect of ‘who’) that predates 
and subsists in the ‘what’ of our becoming.  
A comparable argument is found in Ettinger’s analysis of how accounts of the 
feminine, female sexuality and desire, have so far lacked robust interpretative tools 
or, in the case of psychoanalytic thought, have been subsumed into perspectives and 
symbolic representations that were modelled on the male infant and further 
developed into a paranoid masculinity or a pathologized (hysterical, neurotic) 
femininity. However, for Ettinger there are more than two gazes, but her initial 
hypotheses also draw from the understanding that the gaze is, from the outset, 
sexually differentiated. Ettinger states: 
 
I would like to deepen the analysis of the phallic gaze and briefly delineate 
the difference, within the phallic scope, between the post Oedipal “active” 
gaze emanating from the “armed eyes” and linked to gender identification, 
and the pre-Oedipal “passive” gaze as an object a linked to lost archaic part-
objects. Thus at least three kinds of gazes should be differentiated, (a) a 
phallic, post-Oedipal gaze, which recuperates the object in an imaginary way, 
through domination and control; (b) a phallic objet a tracing loss or archaic 
lack through castration; and (c) a matrixial object/objet a.166 
 
                                                 
165 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 38. 
166 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze (1994),” in The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 51. 
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The concept of the gaze has been traditionally associated with an active 
subject, one who possesses an “armed” sight that they can direct onto an other. This 
association derives from a configuration of subjectivity that must undergo the above-
mentioned processes where the phallic gaze, following oedipalisation and castration, 
will either conjure an imaginary phantasy of control or repress an originary 
experience as loss. This experience of control or repression will eventually be 
redeemed through the postulation of a phallic objet a.167 But what kind of act is 
gazing when it is not a visual act? Can the psychoanalytic concept of the gaze exist 
outside a scopic field and if so, what are the consequences on subjectivity and 
creativity?  
Ettinger’s conceptual framework takes to task psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan’s 
theories on the gaze for fundamental exclusions in his analysis of human psychic 
development. Nowadays, it is no revelation to say that Lacan did not consider the 
plurality of genders and sexualities and our manifold ways of relating to aesthetic 
experience.168 Lacan’s theory of the gaze unfolded the relationship between vision 
and the development of (a paranoiac) identity by comparing infant activity with the 
sexual development, or “mirror stage,” of pigeons and locusts.169 For Lacan, the 
                                                 
167 The objet a and the matrixial link a are further examined in this section, pp. 81-85. 
168 For an analysis of the absence of a sexed “concrete living body” in Lacan’s work see Toril Moi, 
“From Femininity to Finitude: Freud, Lacan, and Feminism, Again,” Signs: Journal of Women in 
Culture and Society 29, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 841-878. Julia Kristeva suggests that the pre-Oedipal 
phase is a feminine modality with processes of signification that pre-exist language and are yet to be 
separated into the Lacanian real or symbolic register. Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, 
trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 25-30. Psychoanalyst Patricia 
Gherovici advocates for a closer relationship between psychoanalysis and sexology, given that a 
number of both analysts and analysands now identify as transgender or non-binary. Gherovici argues 
that Lacan’s theory of the ‘sinthome,’ which moves beyond the phallus and oedipalisation, allows a 
rethinking of sexual difference which is not entirely pathological. See Patricia Gherovici, Transgender 
Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference (New York: Routledge, 2017). 
169 To propose that identity for Lacan can only be a negotiation of a paranoid existence is no 
exaggeration. Ettinger makes a distinction between Lacan’s early work and his later formulations on 
subjectivity, but for what concerns the development of the gaze, the paranoid aspect remains. The note 
on pigeons and locusts, as well as the talk on the mirror stage can be found in the 1949 text/lecture 
Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
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occasion of an infant seeing their image (what Lacan calls the imago) reflected in a 
mirror, provides the first stage of identification and mastery (an identification of an 
idealized version of the self, what Lacan termed, following Freud, the “Ideal-I”). 
This process of identification is crucial for how the Lacanian subject formulates its 
“spatio-temporal bearings”, to use a phrase from Teresa Brennan’s analysis of the 
same topic and how it relates to femininity and masculinity.170 Lacan stipulates that 
the mirror stage is directly correlated with and conducive of a problematic ‘libidinal 
dynamism’ on which he goes on to establish ‘an ontological structure of the human 
world that fits in with my reflections on paranoiac knowledge.’171 According to 
Lacan, human psychic development matures by entering the symbolic sphere – the 
level of language, discourse and signifiers. In this transition, the subject moves from 
dependent, vulnerable and defenseless infant to autonomous and self-contained adult 
through entry into language. Lacan creates a simultaneous analogy and polarity 
between humans and animals, first by attempting to draw out the biological 
similarities (see the case of pigeons and locusts) and later by shoring up language as 
the indissoluble difference between animals and humans, but also as the condition of 
paranoia. For instance, Lacan explicitly states that ‘human knowledge is more 
                                                 
Experience,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink, Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2006), 75-81. 
170 Brennan is here referring to Freud rather than Lacan, while Lacan is also developing Freud’s thesis 
on the ego-ideal, albeit towards what will eventually become an important recasting of the ego as an 
unequivocally distinct function of the subject. This split, prolific in terms of what it can offer to an 
analysis of subjectivity, has nevertheless been the locus of scrutiny in both Brennan’s and Ettinger’s 
close readings of the ego and it’s imperative for sustenance only via alienation. Brennan states: ‘In 
fact, most people do split the ego’s capacities, maintaining their self-image in the manner laid down 
by the structure of narcissism and the ego-ideal, at the same time as they direct the ego’s capacities for 
testing and acting on reality externally. None the less, the external other is a means for consolidating 
the spatio-temporal bearings a subject needs to establish in order to function in reality. I say 
‘consolidate’ because the suggestion here is that it is establishing bearings in time and space that bring 
repression, and, with it, the unconscious and subject-to-be, into existence. As I have indicated, when 
the subject-to-be represses an hallucination, it establishes a fixed reference point for itself (the 
beginning of a sense of time) at the same time as it makes the repressed wish or hallucination as real 
for it now as it was then (that is to say, ‘timeless’).’ See Brennan, Interpretation, 33.  
171 Lacan, “Mirror Stage,” 76. 
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independent than animal knowledge from the force field of desire because of the 
social dialectic that structures human knowledge as paranoiac.’172  
Examining Lacan’s essay in isolation can lead to a misapprehension of his 
ideas, or at least a misconception of the gaze, especially as it progressed in its later 
developments. The role of the gaze in Lacan’s later work moves beyond the scopic 
field and takes the shape of the “objet a,” where Ettinger notes that the ‘subject and 
objet a are as inseparable as the front and back of the same fabric, the recto and verso 
of the same sheet of paper.’173 In this sense, the primal phase of the mirror stage 
becomes a much more complex formation of desire because desire is figured as the 
relationship between identification and repression that continues throughout one’s 
life as the objet a. Lacan claims that the primary experience of the reflected self 
during the mirror-stage is frequently repeated with new instances of subjectivization, 
for instance, when ‘the “ideal-I” […] the rootstock of secondary identifications,’ 
subsumes ‘the libidinal normalization functions.’174  
But what is meant by “libidinal normalization” in the phallic sphere? The 
normalizing aspect of desire, the aspect that both produces paranoia and keeps it at 
bay, is a libidinal form of regulation, what Lacan affirmed earlier as the “knowledge” 
that arrives with the dialectic of language and maintains our independence from the 
throes of desire. It is here that Lacan develops the concept of the gaze from vision 
and self-reflection to a more complex fantasy that also entails being gazed at by the 
object that we are looking at, as well as by an omnipotent other. The gaze in this 
                                                 
172 Lacan, “Mirror Stage,” 77. 
173 Ettinger, “Matrixial Gaze,” 41. 
174 Lacan, “Mirror Stage,” 76.  
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sense becomes a psychic self-regulation or self-censoring from without – an extimate 
experience and fantasy.175 
This significant theoretical shift has allowed cultural analysis to move beyond 
the field of vision and representation and towards an intersubjective relation between 
the self and other, and between the viewer and culture. However, this was not exactly 
Lacan’s aim, or, put differently, the “inter” part of subjectivity, the shareable aspect 
of relating and relations between subjects, and not subjects and their objects, was 
elaborated as an ungraspable or antagonistic relation – a ‘reciprocal imaginary 
objectification.’176  
Ettinger remarks that Lacan’s formulation problematically renders vision into 
‘an erogenous zone with the gaze as its objet a, at the level of lack.’177 Due to such 
psychoanalytic tendencies to theorize human relations “at the level of lack,” the 
possibility of a reciprocal relation is reduced to ‘a missed encounter.’178 Ettinger 
resituates the encounter as an essential part of her conceptualisation of the gaze, 
which moves from an assessment of our representational world towards a ‘psychic 
field of vision.’179  
Ettinger argues that what we understand on a visual level – and what we can 
interpret from our scopic field through ‘thinking reason’ – is only one aspect of our 
visual experience.180 Drawing from Matrixial theory, Griselda Pollock argues that it 
                                                 
175 Lacan employs the word extimate to create the compound meaning of “existence” and “outside”. 
Here, Lacan’s ontological thesis borrows from philosopher Martin Heidegger’s notion of being as 
“ek-sistence”. The translator Bruce Fink notes that, ‘Lacan uses it to talk about “an existence which 
stands apart from,” which insists as it were from the outside, to talk about something not included on 
the inside, something which, rather than being intimate, is “extimate”.’ See translator’s endnote 11,3 
in Jacques Lacan, Écrits, 767. 
176 Lacan, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink, Héloïse Fink and Russell 
Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 40. 
177 Ettinger, “Matrixial Gaze,” 43. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 123. 
180 Ibid. 
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is not possible to fully represent or (re)perform the affects that we experience during 
a traumatic event. Nevertheless, that it is through an aesthetic encounter that, 
 
something of trauma’s radical otherness may be intimated and hence 
encountered aesthetically and affectively. Something is the key word here. 
Not everything, but some aspects may be allusively encountered, but never 
mastered and not fully seen.181 
 
As the psyche is the register for emotional and affective impact, and since 
such impact can carry information that bypasses ‘optical laws’ – laws that regulate 
our comprehension of visuality as an experience that entails a subject/object dynamic 
– the psychic field of vision opens up a space where emotions and affective impact 
may be processed.182 With this substantially different protocol for examining visual 
culture, Ettinger moves beyond ‘reciprocal imaginary objectification’ and presents us 
with new tools for understanding the relationship between vision and its relation to 
sexuality and desire. For the purpose of clarity, I offer in Ettinger’s words an 
interpretation on the difference between the phallic and matrixial gaze in this brief 
excerpt: 
 
The phallic gaze alleges that something was there and is now lost. The 
matrixial gaze indicates that something happened and the event has passed, 
and also that someones were there and these someones have already 
changed.’183  
 
 
Antithetically, Lacan understood intersubjectivity as the limit of our ability to 
truly share or know someone’s viewpoint, while the desire to (re)experience this 
impossibility both haunts and regulates our actions. This impossible or “lost” mode 
                                                 
181 Pollock, After-affects, 7. 
182 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 123. 
183 Ettinger, “With-In-Visible Screen,” 119. 
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of relating and its relationship to language and desire is succinctly captured by Lacan 
in a seminar from 1964 as follows: 
 
desire is situated in dependence on demand—which, by being articulated in 
signifiers, leaves a metonymic remainder that runs under it, an element that is 
not indeterminate, which is a condition both, absolute and unapprehensible, 
an element necessarily lacking, unsatisfied, impossible, misconstrued 
(méconnu), an element that is called desire.184  
 
 
In the Lacanian sense, human intersubjective experience is based on a failure to truly 
relate to one other, or, we could also say that according to Lacan, human relations 
can only be experienced through misrecognition (méconnaissance).185 Ettinger 
argues that Lacan’s theory illustrates that the subject can only formulate their 
distinctiveness through a mode of relating that simultaneously objectifies the other 
and alienates the self: 
 
the metaphor of seeing myself from the spot where I am seen is a metaphor of 
self-observation, reflectivity, reason, consciousness, and control all 
combined. When I look at myself in a process of relating to the other, I don’t 
actually relate to the other as to another subject, but as to an object. Since I 
also observe myself, I am also alienated from myself as a subject and become 
an object by the same gesture; I act in a theatre in which both I and the other 
are objects. In this sense, consciousness – to know myself as knowing – is, 
for Lacan, an illusion and alienation that first appears on the plane of specular 
images in the “mirror stage”.186 
 
It is precisely this alienating formulation of desire that Ettinger aims to 
supplement with a theory that traces inscriptions from a pre-Oedipal stage to inform 
                                                 
184 Jacques Lacan, “Sexuality in the Defiles of the Signifier,” in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 
XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Bruce Fink 
(New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 154. 
185 The word “méconnaissance” is translated as misrecognition by Bruce Fink while Alan Sheridan 
maintains the French term to indicate how Lacan’s concept of ‘knowledge (connaissance) is 
inextricably bound up with méconnaissance’ and it ‘belongs to the imaginary register, while savoir 
belongs to the symbolic register’. See “Translator’s Note” in Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. 
by Bruce Fink (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 281. 
186 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist with-in the Matrixial Encounter-Event (1999),” in The 
Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 218. 
Footnote 32. 
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how the psyche and the gaze carry these inscriptions towards sexually differentiated 
positions. Through Ettinger’s analysis an alternative structuring of desire and 
sexuality is elaborated that moves beyond castration and lack by excavating the pre-
imaginary and pre-symbolic potential of human existence. Based on this return, the 
concept of the matrixial gaze becomes ‘a measure of difference in the field of affects, 
not in the field of perceptions’ that takes into consideration how matrixial affects can 
be diffused from one or several ‘partners’ and can return to affect the participants of 
a specific encounter.187 A further point of differentiation is that the partners during an 
encounter are rendered partial and yet singular and unique in their exchange. On this 
note, Griselda Pollock maintains that the process of aesthetic wit(h)nessing requires 
that we move beyond ideas of sympathy or empathy ‘between fully formed human 
subjects’ rather, that we approach subjectivity at the 
 
level of the fragilization of parts of a partial self, opened by the aesthetic 
processes, to share in, to carry something of, to be a transsubjective partner in 
transformation, whatever the affective cost, for the trauma and jouissance of 
the Other. This possibility is founded in and re-solicits the recurrence of what 
Ettinger daringly conceives of as a primordial human capacity for co-
affection and transsubjective sharing that she names Matrixial.188  
 
Ettinger’s Matrixial theory relies on the proposition that subjectivity does not 
follow Lacan’s well-known postulation of the barred subject ($): the principle that 
subjectivity and desire are bound by a primordial loss. Due to this fundamental 
difference, the matrixial gaze does not correspond to an objet a as the unattainable 
object of phantasy. Rather, subjectivity for Ettinger is established through a 
shareable dimension, both on an affective and physical level, where instead of an 
objet a we are presented with a link a: a gaze that provides ‘a link between trauma 
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and the phantasy of I and non-I’ and a form of desire that aims to retrace connections 
with the other.189 The subject is then rendered partial and permeable especially when 
it encounters the other. In fact, it is necessary for the ego’s drive for mastery to 
relinquish its barriers in order to experience this reawakening of ‘an almost-missed 
relation (of borderlinking, encounter) with a non-I.’190 Ettinger theorizes subjectivity 
through these vital and formative sexually differentiated aspects of our originary 
relating to one another, and how they inform us later in life, as follows: 
 
A certain awareness of the borderspace shared with an intimate stranger and 
of the co-emergence in difference corresponds to a feminine dimension of 
subjectivity, since joint recordings of shared-but-singular and particular 
experiences revoke archaic phantasies of the link between the female invisible 
bodily specificity and the late prenatal subject-to-be. Traces of these contacts 
are at the basis of new joint and singular psychic alliances. The matrixial 
awareness of the co-emergence of the I with the unknown non-I, both with-in 
and with-out, alternates or co-exists with the phallic awareness of being one, 
either inside or outside. Thus, the matrixial awareness does not “belong” to 
women only. We all carry a unique set of matrixial traces at the level of the 
archaic Real, and inasmuch as the subsymbolic layer infiltrates and infuses 
the Symbolic, men and women are not less equal in the symbolic Matrix than 
in the symbolic Phallus – but they are not the same.191 
 
 
In Ettinger’s model of psychic development, the fundamental relation 
between primary carer and child draws from an “originary” and “archaic” 
dimension.192 This return to origins is comparable to Cavarero’s theoretical advances 
through the category of “natality” which at their locus entail a recognition of 
                                                 
189 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 124. 
190 Ibid., 124. 
191 Ettinger, “Matrixial Gaze,” 70. 
192 For an essay which best encapsulates Ettinger’s stipulations for a primordial ethical model of 
subjectivity drawn from the prenatal relation see Bracha Ettinger, “(M)Other Re-spect: Maternal 
Subjectivity, the Ready-made mother-monster and The Ethics of Respecting,” in Studies in the 
Maternal 2, no.1 (2010), 23. Ettinger argues that it is through respect for how our subjectivity has 
been shaped by the maternal, that we can ‘reach the domain of Ethics. […] It is this prolongation of 
life that in my view is concerned by the elaboration of the primary affect of awe into respect in the 
passage from the proto-ethical to the ethical. If human beings are to survive beyond the personal self, 
[…] the re-spect of the (m)Other […] is required not in order to satisfy her or for getting something 
from her in return, but is inherent, like awe and compassion, to the futurality of life itself in its 
continual re-passage to the ethical.’ 
 87 
maternal agency and reciprocity. Furthermore, both authors stress the uniqueness of 
each individual whose identity is shaped by specific encounters with equally unique 
others. While Cavarero’s philosophical strategy involves the direct action of 
transforming narratives through appropriation and symbolic “theft” – leading to new 
configurations of the feminine and the maternal – Ettinger refigures the 
(psychoanalytic account of the) symbolic through a more subtle approach provided 
by the ‘knowledge of being-born-together.’193  
Lacan uses the term ‘extimate’ to signify an existence that is inscribed from 
without and which also shapes the self through ego formation processes. The 
‘knowledge of being-born-together’ can be thought of as an archaic inscription both 
from within and without, or, more radically, an originary experience that carves an 
ethics of relating to the outside in a way that is not as alienating and foreign during 
ego processes of subjectivization, as Lacan would allow us to imagine. Rather, that 
the outside is on a continuum with the inside, and entails at least a faint degree of 
familiarity. Even though for Lacan the extimate is also intimate, it is this familiar or 
intimate aspect which must be foreclosed. In other words, Lacan proposes that 
because our originary experience of an external (traumatic) intimacy has had such an 
alienating impact on the ego, it must necessarily exist on the level of the Real – an 
ungraspable and overwhelming dimension of existence that can only be experienced 
as profoundly traumatic, anxiety inducing or jouissant.  
Unlike Lacan’s theorisation of the extimate which is later restricted to an 
elusive Real that responds to the regulations of the unknowable Other, Ettinger 
theorises ‘subjectivity-as-encounter’ as having both ‘imaginary and symbolic 
impact.’194 Co-naissance is the term used to describe and discern that a shared 
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194 Ettinger, “Matrixial Gaze,” 64. 
 88 
commonality underlies both our experience and existence, simultaneously proposing 
that trauma, phantasy, desire and the unconscious are shareable dimensions of our 
multifaceted identities. This conceptual framework underpins the subject’s 
relationship to both the self and to the other, the subject’s interiority and exterior 
relationship to the world in one stroke. Griselda Pollock has elaborated on the 
profound significance of this psychoanalytic term as follows:  
 
Co-naissance in French allows for two meanings of equal importance. The 
idea of naissance (birth) is joined with the sense of knowing (connaissance) 
from the verb connaître (to know), and linked to reconnaissance 
(recognition), which, in English, has both the sense of acknowledging an 
other, and of cognitive understanding at a second take (re-cognition). The 
prefix co- before naissance introduces the sense of a complementary process, 
a shared, doubled, subjective event associated with a prolonged period of co-
emergence. At the same time, the process of human genesis is to be 
understood as generating a specific kind of knowledge, or rather a knowing, 
which will show itself as re-cognition or re-co-naissance only in retrospect, 
since for the becoming infant, the encounter happens too soon. It could be the 
condition for understanding premised upon a joint venture between co-
affecting partners that occurs in what Lacan named the Real – the traumatic 
bodily events impacting on the psyche that come before a psychic apparatus 
is in place to fantasise and later think the event as memory, image, or idea. It 
also happens as this trauma of the archaic is retrospectively re-activated once 
a psychic apparatus of fantasy and thought develops and becomes the 
affective underside of certain aspects and dimensions of our relational modes 
with the world, our others, living and dead, alive and not-yet-alive, human 
and non-human, past and present.195 
 
In addition, I would like to draw attention to how the neologism co-naissance also 
forges a direct parallelism to Lacan’s use of the word “méconnaissance.” Recalling 
that Lacan’s term is produced through the dual meaning of both knowledge and 
misrecognition, it is no surprise that Pollock is careful to note that “human genesis” 
produces a specific type of “knowing” rather than knowledge. Thus, co-naissance is 
marked by a distinct dual meaning: a sense of knowing (prior and later parallel to 
                                                 
195 Griselda Pollock, “Mother Trouble: The Maternal-Feminine in Phallic and Feminist Theory in 
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knowledge) which results in a recognition that the common thread that underlies 
human existence is our entry into the world as vulnerable, interdependent and 
relational creatures.196 
Ettinger’s radical proposition of an alternative register for human becoming 
holds a number of repercussions for cultural analysis, ethics and intersubjective 
relations. Of relevance to this research is the field of aesthetics and how co-naissance 
informs the viewer’s experience of the artist’s work and the artist’s relationship to 
their work. However, it is important to note that the experience of an encounter with 
art firstly impacts (and potentially transforms) the subject on a “nonconscious” level. 
I will clarify this term shortly. Ettinger terms the overall transformative occurrence 
Metramorphosis, which she describes as: 
 
a process of intrapsychic and interpsychic, as well as transindividual and 
transsubjective, exchange; of transformation and affective “communication” 
between/with-in several matrixial entities. It is a passage-lane through which 
affected events, materials, and modes of becoming infiltrate and diversify 
onto the nonconscious margins of the Symbolic through/by subsymbolic 
webs.197  
 
An encounter with artwork is for Ettinger an event that entails the possibility 
of metramorphosis. However, this procedure highlights the potential of the imaginary 
                                                 
196 Just to offer a point of clarification, “knowing” is not set in opposition to “knowledge,” where 
preference is given to one form over another. Neither does this analogy propose that these two 
different forms of understanding are gendered. Rather, knowing provides an altogether different form 
of knowledge which stems from a psychic register than a strictly mental process. Calling for a theory 
of knowledge that ‘includes the body in thought,’ Toril Moi argues that Freud’s theory of 
epistemophilia (a desire or drive for knowledge) allows for an understanding of knowledge with ‘no 
firmly established binary opposites, it cannot be gendered as either masculine or feminine, thereby 
offering us a chance to escape the patriarchal tyranny of thought by sexual analogy.’ See Toril Moi, 
“Patriarchal Thought and the Drive for Knowledge,” in Between Feminism & Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Teresa Brennan (London: Routledge, 1989), 189-205. Moi’s argument can also be traced in Brennan’s 
work on femininity and affect. However, Brennan focuses on how drives require an active deployment 
of psychophysical energy to flourish and finds that Freud’s epistemophilia forges a connection 
between scopophilia, the sexual drive and the drive for knowledge. With Freud’s focus on the scopic 
drive, knowledge is bound to vision rather than affect, which renders Freud’s propositions into ‘a 
theory of how curiosity and knowledge are inhibited in women.’ See Brennan, Interpretation,140; and 
the section Attentive Love in Utero in this thesis that elaborates on Brennan’s position as well as 
Melanie Klein’s hypothesis that the drive for knowledge is bound to the death drive.  
197 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 143-144. 
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(internalized image-based or pre-linguistic process formative of the ego) rather than 
producing a direct interference into the existing and already phallically inscribed 
symbolic (language as a set of signifiers and associations that determine the 
unconscious/conscious mechanisms of the subject). That is, the subject of 
metramorphosis, has a different relationship to the symbolic, one that is activated on 
a nonconscious level. To recall Pollock’s earlier point about knowledge, it is 
important to reinstate that “knowing”, and its auxiliary nonconscious, is a sense 
which ‘is not cognitive and does not enter direct representation,’ yet it informs the 
subject’s ethics, perception, mode of communication and relating by bearing a 
different potential and by remaining in a psychic tension with the phallic 
symbolic.198 In other words, and to return to Cavarero, this account of the subject 
also holds ‘birth, not death, as its standard and measure’ for reasons that I will 
attempt to clarify in the section to follow.  
 
 
 
 
The Matrixial Nonconscious: Affect as Non-verbal Intensity 
 
 
 
And I want to suggest the possibility that a number of states of mind that 
are different from everyday conscious awareness may be in part an 
expression of the unconscious or half conscious need to give this 
creativeness [of something new] its freedom. 
– Marion Milner199 
 
For Ettinger, feminine prenatal experience is distinct from genital-phallic and 
Oedipal logic.200 It is prior to, and later beside, Oedipal and phallic mechanisms such 
                                                 
198 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 144. 
199 Milner, Not Being Able, 155. 
200 It is important to note that Ettinger’s use of the “feminine” is not specific to biological females. 
Rather, the feminine can be conceived of as a category of thought, as well as a psychic register 
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as castration, the mirror stage and intrauterine fantasies. Ettinger claims that in the 
matrixial sphere of subjectivity, feminine prenatal experience has a nonconscious 
register for both the mother and infant. In classic psychoanalytic accounts, the 
disavowal of prenatal experience returns in the form of intrauterine fantasies.201 
Whereas in Ettinger’s conceptualisation of a matrixial subjectivity, prenatal 
experience does not undergo complete repression, it is not pushed into the 
unconscious and it is not perpetually disavowed.202  
As a result, this experience bears psychic inscriptions that become part of the 
organisational structure of subjectivity on a nonconscious level. The nonconscious is 
here understood as a distinct system from the unconscious. Ettinger has proposed this 
succinct explanation in relation to Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis: 
 
Freud differentiates between two uses of the term unconscious: one to 
designate a particular system (which for Lacan corresponds to the treasure of 
repressed of signifiers), the other to designate a phenomenon. I use the term 
non-conscious to indicate this second possibility of unconscious phenomena 
outside the “unconscious” as a system [ ... ].203 
 
To offer a simplified parallelism, we can extrapolate that if Lacan’s hypotheses are 
predicated on loss and its substitute language, Ettinger’s theories consider the 
undetonated potential of memories or traumatic experiences of something or 
                                                 
inscribed in all genders. For an interpretation of how the ‘feminine is to be understood, matrixially, as 
a differential potentiality before and beyond this [phallic] dichotomy,’ see Ettinger, “Fascinance,” 68. 
201 For instance, Sigmund Freud’s claims that ‘A large number of dreams, often accompanied by 
anxiety and having as their content such subjects as passing though narrow spaces or being in water, 
are based upon phantasies of intra-uterine life, of existence in the womb and of the act of birth.’ See 
Sigmund Freud, “The Interpretation of Dreams,” in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. 1-24, ed. Ivan Smith (2010), 856. 
202 To facilitate an understanding of the fundamental difference between Ettinger’s concepts and 
Freudian and Lacanian theories, I would like to reiterate the earlier analogy between the phallic gaze 
as desire produced through lack or loss, in contrast to the matrixial nonconscious which indicates that 
“something happened and the event has passed.”  
203 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Trans-Subjective Transferential Borderspace,” in Canadian Review of 
Comparative Literature 24, no. 3 (1997): 625-47, quoted in Anna Louise Johnson, “Bracha Ettinger’s 
Theory of the Matrix: Contexts and Commentary” PhD diss., (University of Leeds, 2006), 57. Note 
that in Ettinger’s earlier work the nonconscious is written as non-conscious but has the same 
signification. I use the most recent non-hyphenated version throughout. 
 92 
someone that has happened to us. In this sense, some memories do not exactly 
undergo repression, instead, they fade into oblivion or they can be (partially or 
completely) recuperated through nonconscious processes or through a “wit(h)ness” – 
a witness who not only witnesses, but who also shares with someone the affective 
impact of a traumatic event.204  
Ettinger delineates how, for Lacan and Freud, the phallic symbolic associates 
all structures outside the symbolic with psychosis. She maintains that this is due to 
their inability to conceive of a primordial relationship as one where ‘all mothers are 
incestuous’ and therefore outside the realm of repressed desire:205 
 
It is because of the highly psychotic potentiality of this [Matrixial] prebirth, 
nonprohibited incest for male subjects that it was deeply silenced. It was not 
excluded from the Symbolic (from which it could have returned as its 
repressed, to produce an-other desire) but rather marginalized as unthought or 
crazy, and foreclosed. The aspects of this matrixial twilight zone that did get 
elaborated in psychoanalysis were subjugated to its phallic order, by which 
they were regulated as a question of bringing children into the heterosexual 
framework, where objects-women are exchanged in “the Name of the Father” 
and the womb stands for fusional symbiosis and undifferentiation, which can 
emerge in culture only as psychosis. I suggest that evocations and irruptions 
of feminine/prenatal encounters, and emergences of matrixial cross-scribed 
imprints, are not psychotic. They only become psychosis-like when they have 
no symbolic access whatsoever in a culture that takes them for non-sense. 
Not only are such cross-scriptions not psychotic, they are a ground for 
thinking the enigma of the imprints of the world on the artist and of the 
inscriptions of the artist on the world’s hieroglyphs.206 
 
 
In order to counteract theorizations of the subject that are underpinned by a 
heterosexist and phallocentric logic, Ettinger proposes a relational ontology and 
ethics founded on the prenatal relation. In contrast to the aforementioned dominant 
                                                 
204 Ettinger stipulates that if an event is too traumatic for the subject to elaborate, it can become 
‘inscribed in another so that the other crossed in/by me will mentally elaborate them for me.’ This 
someone that can be affected by an other’s traumatic experience is termed a wit(h)ness. Similarly, art 
also provides a space where traumatic events can potentially be communicated and processed. See 
Bracha L. Ettinger, “Art as the Transport-Station of Trauma,” in Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: 
Artworking 1985-1999 (Brussels: Palais des Beaux-Arts, 2000), 91-115. 
205 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 142. 
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ideas where the prenatal relation evokes incest, symbiosis and psychosis, the 
concepts of “co-naissance” and the “nonconscious,” render gestation and birth as 
sites of potential – frameworks from which new psychic modalities can be 
elaborated. To propose that subjectivity is informed by the archaic and uncognized 
experience of having shared the physical and psychic space of the womb is 
simultaneously the most and least original of Ettinger’s innovations. Several 
psychoanalysts have attempted to theorize the effects of this experience, with often 
ill-conceived results.207 While Ettinger proposes a version which is no less traumatic 
than classic accounts of the intrauterine experience, her framework withstands the 
temptation to foreclose the experience into a terrifying fantasy. Instead, in thinking 
through the body, or the bodies of the female subject and the infant interrelated in 
physical space, Ettinger retrieves bodily experience from the abstracted notion of a 
universal agent without body and without origin.  
‘All human life on the planet is born of woman’ – the poet and writer 
Adrienne Rich begins her book Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and 
Institution. 208 This notable quote has been crucial to the persistent feminist effort to 
bring the category of birth centre stage since we all ‘carry the imprint of this 
experience for life.’209 In Ettinger’s theoretical elaborations, the imprints of this 
experience figure differently for each sex. Female subjects have the potential to be 
doubly inscribed in the Real through the experience of ‘the womb as an in-side and 
future-site as well – as an actual or virtual space and as a future and possible, or 
                                                 
207 For an excellent defence of thinking through the feminine and all the blasphemy it conjures see the 
work of Griselda Pollock generally, and on the topic of the womb specifically the essay “Mother 
Trouble: The Maternal-Feminine in Phallic and Feminist Theory in Relation to Bracha Ettinger’s 
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potential, posterior time,’ offering females a ‘privileged access.’210 This privilege 
should not be understood in terms of socio-cultural or biological advantage, rather, it 
should be grasped in a psychic sense, one that creates a doubled entry point into a 
‘surplus-of-fragility.’ The term ‘surplus-of-fragility’ can be perceived as a moment 
of psychic uncoiling, where physical affective exchange occurs and it is 
apprehended; where, precisely because of the affective exchange, individual psychic 
boundaries are transformed into thresholds of attunement with, and because of, the 
presence of someone.  
These psychic dynamics are not restricted to females. In fact, the only 
differential is that women can experience a ‘time where the future traumatically 
meets the past, and to this paradoxical site where outside meets inside.’211 In other 
words, through pregnancy women can have a retrospective recognition of the co-
emergence that constitutes the prenatal phase: a re-co-naissance. On the other hand, 
the sexually differentiated trajectory for the male subject means that they too can 
access ‘the matrixial time and site through transference relations and via art, when 
they are affected, like women, by joining-in-difference with others.’212 In this 
respect, the shareable dimension of the experience of co-emergence inscribes its 
psychic traces (of the incestuous rapport) in the infant (of any gender) in what 
Ettinger defines as a ‘subknowledge’ with its own sense-making system. This system 
does not eradicate the phallic symbolic, rather, it ‘dwell[s] beside it’ and has the 
potential to work in tandem with mechanisms of castration, oedipalisation, repression 
and objectification.213 Griselda Pollock describes this originary phase as a site of 
potential that is ‘brutally crushed after birth when conditions of survival necessitate 
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other relations to the world and the familiar elements of aggressivity, narcissism and 
object relations take over.’214  
Even though “feminine/prenatal” psychic experience shapes subjectivity, on 
the level of culture and symbolisation it is foreclosed. It is this exclusion from 
symbolic representation that can lead to psychosis and not necessarily the lack or 
loss experienced in reality. Ettinger takes these originary cross-inscriptions and 
transposes them onto the activity of art making in order to reveal how artists are 
inscribed by the world and in turn inscribe their work and others with traces of 
meaning. As Pollock reminds us in her Matrixial analysis of artworking, 
 
When aesthetic or literary activity creates its forms, these are not a repetition 
of that which already exists as a memory or a known event in the subject or in 
culture. They are occasions for potentially transformative encounter marked 
by the potentiality of the aesthetic to touch, identify with and formulate 
trauma as trace, as tracing.215 
 
In relation to this research, I draw from Ettinger an alternative postulation of 
the subject and the psyche – a subject co-affected since inception which is in stark 
contrast to the self-contained subject examined by Brennan. As Ettinger’s 
configuration of subjectivity proposes that humans have all experienced a degree of 
psychophysical connection, which is eclipsed later in life, I believe that this 
conceptual framework matches Brennan’s elaborations on how affect can be 
transmitted psychophysically from one person to an other. Following an analysis of 
how Ettinger’s and Brennan’s concepts converge, an alternative formulation of the 
subject emerges, with which I examine in Chapter Three, The Physicality of Ideas: 
Writing and Embodiment, how the affect influences the psyche, and in turn, the 
effect that affect has on creative processes. In the next section, I elaborate on 
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Brennan’s theorisations of co-affectivity and what they reveal in terms of the 
maternal thread that runs throughout Chapter Two. 
 
 
 
 
Attentive Love in Utero: Beyond the Foundational Fantasy 
 
 
 
To say that pregnancy reveals a state where there is no subject/object 
distinction is to point to a remarkable fact. But what do we do with this 
fact? How is the subject/object distinction abolished? I have argued that 
it is abolished by a rapidity of communication which is only possible 
where this rapidity is not impeded by the fixed points at base of 
subjectivity, which leads us into the various implications for nature and 
technology, as well as the psyche. 
– Teresa Brennan216 
 
Ettinger’s developments of an alternative psychic journey to the dominant Freudian 
and Lacanian models have several interconnecting points with Brennan’s hypotheses. 
Specifically, in the way both thinkers return to the maternal and the prenatal 
dimension of subjectivity as the basis for thinking through broader questions about 
how we relate to each other. Brennan proposes that if physical exchanges of energies 
are to be taken seriously, then it is possible to understand how the subject is affected 
even before birth since ‘attentive love or energy [begins] in utero.’217 Brennan 
unravels how the eclipse of affective transmission between individuals originates and 
is inextricably linked to the denial of maternal transmission. For Brennan, this 
information is often eclipsed by psychoanalytic (and other) theories because it comes 
to contradict notions of subjectivity founded on self-containment. As Brennan 
                                                 
216 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 72. 
217 Brennan, Transmission, 36. 
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argues, the self-contained subject may only persist by separating the body from the 
mind and by disavowing its history, ‘in so far as that history reveals its dependence 
on a maternal origin. There is no ‘before’ before this very present subject.’218  
Drawing from a number of psychoanalytic thinkers, Brennan synthesizes 
their propositions on the subject/object distinction to construct her claim that self-
containment is the result of sustaining the illusion of the foundational fantasy. 
Scrutinizing Freud’s principle of “unlust” or “unpleasure”, she traces how psychical 
reality becomes distinct from material reality when the infant’s desire for instant 
gratification results in fantasizing about the object of its desire. In this equation, ‘the 
longed-for object,’ as Brennan calls it, is either the breast or mother.219 When it is not 
present or available, it is hallucinated in order to bring about short-term satisfaction. 
This absence and auxiliary hallucination formulate the foundations of psychic reality. 
As the fantasy of the breast can never actually fulfil the need of hunger, a build-up of 
“unpleasure” ensues with no relief. The accumulation of unexpelled tension creates a 
surplus of energy which leads Brennan to investigate what happens to this energy. To 
do so, Brennan moves beyond the paradigm of needs, towards a more complicated 
(and potentially malicious) set of desires that are set in motion:  
 
the desire to be waited upon; the desire to believe one is the source of agency 
who makes it happen; the desire to dominate and control the other who is 
active in providing, but whose activity is controlled by a relatively passive 
director, and the aggressive desire towards the other.220 
 
 
Brennan borrows from Melanie Klein’s theorizations in order to substantiate 
Freud’s inquiry and to better elaborate how the unexpelled tension is resolved. 
Klein’s analysis of infant behavior is viewed through the death drive, which is tied to 
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a drive for knowledge more than it is to pleasure.221 According to Klein, the infant’s 
aggressive desires to cut, devour, dismember (the mother and/or the breast) are tied 
up with the desire to understand ‘what is hidden, and in the process destroy it.’222 
Brennan states that, along with the death drive, the forces of envy ‘of the 
creativeness embodied in the mother and mother’s breast’ and greed, which creates 
the desire ‘to devour the entire breast, and beyond that, the mother’s body,’ are 
interrelated.223 Klein proposes that these desires lead to the fear that the aggressed 
object will strike back, and it is this fear which founds a ‘paranoid-schizoid’ 
subjectivity. The fear of retaliation is what results in the paranoid aspect, while in 
order to reconcile this fear, the infant hallucinates a “good” or “bad” breast resulting 
in a schizoid subjectivity.  
This observation – the separation between fantasy and reality as a form of 
resolution – will be crucial in understanding Brennan’s hypothesis that details how 
the self-contained subject re-performs the “hallucination” in adult life. By separating 
the source of (hallucinated) anxiety into good or bad, the infant actually splits its 
own ego. In other words, the source of fear materially exists as a breast, which in 
reality the infant cannot separate into good or bad. Therefore, by forging this 
separation in fantasy, it must split the ego in order for the ego to act in a good or bad 
way towards the perceived (hallucinated) object of desire. What Brennan aims to 
elucidate is that the impulse to transform what we fear into an object in fantasy – 
even if what we fear happens to be another human, animal or object – gives way to 
justifying our unreasonable behavior towards it. Eventually, this pattern of behavior 
                                                 
221 Brennan is here referring to a number of Klein’s works, including Melanie Klein, “Early Stages of 
the Oedipus Complex,” in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 11 (1928): 167–80 and Melanie 
Klein, “Envy and Gratitude,” in Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963, Collected Writings, 
vol. 3 (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1975), 176–235. 
222 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 24. 
223 Ibid. 
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is not only enacted in fantasy, it is permitted and endorsed in the social order.  
Both Klein and Freud formulate distinct yet interrelated negotiations or 
resolutions of these destructive tendencies. For Klein, trying to repair the destruction 
created in fantasy can lead to reparation which is a way to recuperate ‘a psyche felt 
to be in pieces’ through creative labour.224 For Freud, the negotiation is best 
exemplified in the now over-examined case study of the “fort-da” game.225 In this 
scenario, the infant inverts its dependency on the mother by imagining that he 
controls her through a set of repetitive actions that call her into being on a 
fantasmatic level. Freud observed that when his grandson of a year and a half would 
toss small objects away from himself he seemed to have ‘an expression of interest 
and satisfaction.’226 Upon closer examination, Freud discerned that this repetition 
was not simply a game but a ‘great cultural achievement’!227 According to Freud, the 
greatness of this achievement resides in:  
 
the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual 
satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without 
protesting. He compensated himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the 
disappearance and return of the objects within his reach.228  
                                                 
224 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 25. I will return to the resolution through creative labour in the 
section Sublimation: A Matter of Life and Death. 
225 Written in 1920, the ‘fort-da’ game is found in Sigmund Freud, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle,” in 
The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 1-24, ed. Ivan Smith (2010), 3720-3722. 
Freud analyzes an infant’s gesture of repetitively throwing a reel and then drawing it back. When the 
infant throws the reel, he exclaims “fort” (translated from the German as “gone”) and upon retrieving 
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The sexual difference philosopher Luce Irigaray notes that the infant under analysis is a boy and that 
his gesture should not come to define the psychic development of both sexes. Irigaray then 
hypothesizes that a girl would ‘not play with a string and a reel that symbolize her mother, because 
her mother is of the same sex as she is and cannot have the object status of a reel.’ See Luce Irigaray, 
“Gesture in Psychoanalysis,” in Sexes and Genealogies, trans. Gillian C. Gill (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993. First published 1987 by Les Editions de Minuit), 97. Similarly, Ettinger 
remarks that a series of psychoanalytic theories support notions of lack, loss, absence and presence, 
‘mother as object,’ by drawing from this case study. Ettinger notes that in this way ‘phallic symbolic 
lack’ neutralizes sexed distinctions by being presented as a universal narrative accountable for the 
psychological development of both sexes. See Bracha L. Ettinger, The Matrixial Gaze (Leeds: 
Feminist Arts & Histories Network, University of Leeds, 1995), 4-6. 
226 Freud, “Pleasure Principle,” 3720. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid., 3721. Elsewhere, Freud notes that ‘Civilization has been attained through the renunciation of 
instinctual satisfaction, and it demands the same renunciation from each newcomer in turn.’ 
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It is through this necessary transformation of the passive and hurtful 
experience of the absent mother into a repetitive fantasy of control that the infant’s 
achievement is made manifest. Furthermore, Freud suspects that throwing the objects 
away is also a way for the infant to ‘satisfy an impulse […] which was suppressed in 
his actual life, to revenge himself on his mother for going away from him.’229  
These two similar narratives on the construction of subjectivity and the 
aggressive affects towards the primary caregiver are what Brennan seeks on the one 
hand to support (Brennan believes that these formulations correctly point to a self-
contained subjectivity premised on what she terms the ‘foundational fantasy’), and 
on the other, to expose their limits in thinking through non-visual and beyond 
subject-object constructions of subjectivity.230 
What is noteworthy in Brennan’s analysis, and of particular significance to 
this research, is that Brennan untangles the confusion between fantasy and reality 
(and therefore the mechanisms of desire) by re-inserting the role of physicality in the 
                                                 
Furthermore, in the case of art he asserts the following: ‘An artist is originally a man who turns away 
from reality because he cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction which it 
at first demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious wishes full play in the life of phantasy. He 
finds the way back to reality, however, from this world of phantasy by making use of special gifts to 
mould his phantasies into truths of a new kind, which are valued by men as precious reflections of 
reality. Thus in a certain fashion he actually becomes the hero, the king, the creator, or the favourite 
he desired to be, without following the one roundabout path of making real alterations in the external 
world. But he can only achieve this because other men feel the same dissatisfaction as he does with 
the renunciation demanded by reality, and because that dissatisfaction, which results from the 
replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle, is itself a part of reality.’ See Sigmund 
Freud, “Formulations on the Two principles of Mental Functioning (1911),” in The Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 1-24, ed. Ivan Smith (2010), 2556. 
229 Freud, “Pleasure Principle,” 3721. The literary critic Elisabeth Bronfen reads this text through a 
Derridean analysis to locate the ‘autobiographical and the rhetorical strategy of self-reflexivity.’ 
Bronfen argues that Freud is here actually mourning the death of his daughter Sophie which was the 
mother of the infant under observation. In this way, Freud will transform ‘maternal loss to paternal 
castration, from the position of mourning to that of rivalry and possession.’ See Elisabeth Bronfen, 
Over Her Dead Body: Death, Femininity and the Aesthetic (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press: 1992), 28. 
230 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 36. Brennan sees a direct link between ‘the desire for instant 
gratification’ and ‘the preference for visual and ‘object’-oriented thinking this entails, the desire to be 
waited upon, the envious desire to imitate the original, the desire to control the mother, and to devour, 
poison and dismember her, and to obtain knowledge by this process, constitute a foundational 
psychical fantasy.’ 
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construction of subjectivity. The idea of ‘energetics’ is Brennan’s concise term for 
‘the study of the energetic and affective connections between an individual, other 
people and the surrounding environment.’231 While this idea is further elaborated in 
her final book The Transmission of Affect, Brennan’s claims remain the same 
throughout all her work. Mainly, that the denial of ‘energetics’ or ‘transmission’ are 
founded on the foundational fantasy and that the illusion of self-containment is 
sustained because thinking in subject/object terms is naturalized in the social order. 
This tendency reveals that ‘a psyche that thinks in subject/object terms denies its 
connection with “objects”,’ and thus ‘the subject is precisely other than the object’ 
but also automatically separated from their environment.232 By unravelling how the 
psyche has been psychoanalytically founded on this fantasy, Brennan elucidates why 
there is a propensity for the subject to detach from physical logic in order to 
authenticate one’s individuality. 
This argument can be extended to how physicality and consequential 
affective transmission and impact are unconsciously omitted, or consciously rejected, 
from textual and oral narratives that respond to encounters with art. To this extent, 
texts can be re-read through a lens that locates these omissions by highlighting the 
disavowal of material (and maternal) affectivity and, on a deeper level, locating the 
core of such narratives in the foundational fantasy. In other respects, narratives that 
expose the psychophysical deployment of energetic connections, the interdependent 
aspects of subjectivity and affect, the interrelated material effects of writing and art 
encounters, can be read with a set of tools that posit subjectivity as energetically and 
relationally affected in reality. 
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Brennan attempts to restore to reality what is eclipsed or purported in fantasy. 
For instance, anxiety is not always the hallucinatory fear of what exists on a 
fantasmatic level, such as the breast or mother, but it could be the effect of an anxiety 
that materially exists in the social order, internalized unconsciously from without, 
and legitimately re-enacted on the level of the social. In this sense, the process of 
self-containment begins with the question of identity. Identity requires separation 
between the self and others in order to create clear-cut psychic and physical 
distinctions. Facilitating factors in this procedure are a number of processes such as 
castration and Oedipalisation. However, these psychic processes are not self-
generated – they also require external factors to ensure that they are secured into 
place, through a repetitive process of confirming one’s identity (first as separation 
from the mother, then as separation from the other) on a social and material level. 
According to Brennan, these gaps between the polarized sites of subject and object, 
fantasy and reality, culture and nature, self and other can all be bridged through the 
recognition of our energetic connections. 
But what set of actions does such a recognition lead to? What does such 
recognition do to slow down the destructive speed of capitalism described in 
Brennan’s third book Exhausting Modernity? Brennan argues that it is because we do 
not recognise how interdependent we are with the environment that surrounds us that 
we continue to abuse and consume on a level where environmental resources cannot 
replenish themselves. This misrecognition arises because the environment/nature are 
experienced as external to the self, as objects that we can control and manipulate, but 
which will consequentially lead to our own extinction.  
What can the recognition of how ‘emotions are exchangeable in a dynamic 
process’ do for subjectivity and creativity when Brennan “unriddles” the feminine 
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psyche in her first book The Riddle of Femininity? Brennan supports that unless we 
come to understand how external affects transform us on a biological level, we will 
not be able to make sense of our emotional responses, particularly when the 
dominant model of psychology expects the subject to source positivity from the self 
– a self which might be entirely depleted of energy and has been locked into a 
physical state of inertia (a condition that Freud claimed was part of the negative 
effects of femininity).233 
While Brennan provides strategies relative to the affliction, all her work 
echoes the clear message that (the absence of) physicality is at the root of the 
problem, while it can also be conducive of a more holistic future once we recognise 
its multifaceted agency. This conviction resonates with Ettinger’s theorisations that 
draw from an archaic, pre-natal relationality to structure an understanding of the 
ethico-aesthetic dimension of subjectivity. The relationship between self and other – 
configured from a model of pregnancy, the maternal relation and nonconscious 
transmissive affectivity – can offer an antidote to phallic desire with consequent 
ramifications for aesthetics. Of central significance to this research, is what an 
elaboration of subjectivity as relational and co-affected offer to our understanding of 
how (and why) we write about art as storytellers that seek to translate visceral, 
physical and psychic impact and response. Perhaps, by proposing that living 
attention is a resolution put into effect by creative labour, we might be able to 
understand the material effects and thus differences between a self-contained subject 
and a subjectivity aware of its energetic connections. The following chapter explores 
the intersections between words, affect and the life drive.   
 
 
                                                 
233 Brennan states that femininity for Freud is ‘a specific psychical state that is always disabling’ and 
can be experienced by anyone regardless of gender. See Brennan, Interpretation, x. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
The Physicality of Ideas: Writing and Embodiment 
 
 
 
In the long run, to emphasize the non-reductionist nature of certain 
physical effects, without raising old spectres, the term ‘physicality of 
ideas’ may be preferable to ‘materialism’. The physicality of ideas means 
no more than it says. Ideas are physical. 
– Teresa Brennan234 
 
Brennan’s curious brand of materialism attempts to avoid reductionist essentialist 
interpretations by highlighting the dynamic relationship between embodiment and 
subjectivity and by expanding notions of femininity and masculinity as intrinsic to 
both males and females. For Brennan, the polarised sites of mind and body, society 
and the individual, are engaging in a dynamic exchange of affects which transform 
both how we feel and think. In this respect, ideas are physical because what we think 
of requires a corresponding embodiment. Simultaneously, new feelings, the 
processing of affects and experiences, especially those that reach us on a 
nonconscious level, can come to transform even our most fixed ideas. But that is not 
to say that there are no instances where there is a prolonged delay, a gap, or a 
disjunction between a thought and an emotional or linguistic response. As many 
might know through trying to break a habit, a pattern of behaviour, or a reoccurring, 
stubborn mental image, the recognition of such a disjunction is in itself the first and 
hardest achievement towards any transformation. There are certain experiences, or 
encounters, that open up a more dynamic space for affective impact and which can, 
as a result of such impact, facilitate transformation.  
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Taking into consideration Ettinger’s postulations on aesthetic encounters, in 
the section Sublimation: A Matter of Life and Death, I propose that artworking and 
art-writing are sites that open unto psychic transformational potential. In the next 
section, I draw from Brennan’s examination of the relationship between logic and 
language, an analysis that can facilitate an understanding of the relationship between 
subjectivity and art-writing and what questions this relationship raises regarding 
embodiment. 
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Fleshy Memories: The Physical Logic of Communication 
 
 
 
Brennan argues that language is a mimesis of intra-uterine communication that 
functions differently for the masculine and the feminine subject (of any sex).235 By 
intra-uterine communication Brennan means that during the in-utero stage 
communication takes place between the mother and the child through both mental 
and physical forms. The idea that communication is both a mental and physical 
process might sound like an obvious statement.236 However, Brennan argues that 
physical logic is eclipsed by mental logic in a process to establish one’s distinct 
identity.  
While communication during the in-utero stage is not verbal, Brennan’s 
analysis focuses on language in adult life as the vehicle that has the ability to express 
(project) affects in linguistic form. Simultaneously, language can interrupt or 
facilitate connections – whether these connections manifest in our mind as logical 
processes or with others in intersubjective ways. Even though the non-verbal initial 
form of communication must necessarily be eclipsed during adult life, it is this 
primary form of communication that Brennan draws from to formulate her 
hypothesis that co-affectivity can be energetically communicated: 
 
Presumably facilitating connections are basic to the language of the flesh, 
which has to be logical, in the sense that one thing connects with another in a 
way that facilitates growth. This suggests that logical thought, the 
connections made through words, is a kind of mimesis of a hypothetical 
original form of communication which was both mental and physical.237  
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236 Elizabeth Wilson argues that biological data – anatomy, physiology, biochemistry – can offer 
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to be analytically interesting.’ See Elizabeth Wilson, “Gut Feminism,” Differences: A Journal of 
Feminist Cultural Studies 14, no. 3 (2004): 71. 
237 Brennan, Interpretation, 223. 
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Brennan figures “logical thought” as ‘the ability to make consistent 
connections,’ which are however, prone to interruption when the repressed affect of 
anxiety triumphs over the subject.238 As discussed in Chapter Two, in order to 
overcome the hold of repressed affects, one has to externalize (expel) them through a 
psychical representation or action (as in the fort-da game). In this sense, while one 
can employ ‘a word or chain of words’ to express the affects, Brennan suggests that 
the affects can also be communicated through image-based representations or simply 
through energy projected outwards.239  
Brennan’s argument here has two aims: firstly, to indicate that 
communication is also physical and secondly that, since it is physical, it is embodied 
differently by the masculine and feminine party. By clarifying these points, Brennan 
is then able to argue that the masculine party employs a form of reasoning that splits 
language from affects (words from their physical import) in a way that purports ‘a 
belief in the arbitrary nature of signification, a belief that denies any origin at all.’240 
As Brennan argues: 
 
If […] the word can be turned in certain directions, a turning hinged on its 
connection with a visual image, affects, and motor activity, then this direction 
will affect the ease with which connections are made. This must be so, given 
that the image can lock a word inside in hysteria (femininity). In masculinity, 
the outward forceful projection of image and affects should allow those 
words to flow more freely, but at the price of a divorce from affective feeling. 
While this divorce cannot be understood unless the spatial underpinnings of 
language are taken into account, the physical, spatial projection of an image 
and affect help secure the grounding or anchor any subject needs to follow a 
chain of words. Moreover it is a divorce that suggests that affects, or 
emotions, are the confused residue of the original logic of the flesh, left over 
and muddled up once they have been subtracted from that original logic 
through speech, after the subject has been cut off from that fleshly logic, or 
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castrated.241 
 
For Brennan, recognizing that communication is actually taking place in 
utero ‘may point to the source of the “common substance” Freud presupposed lay at 
the origin of language and physical symptom alike.’242 Brennan argues that if ‘the 
experience of call and answer exists in utero in bodily codes’ then we may 
conceptualize subjectivity as composed of a ‘fleshy memory’ which predisposes the 
subject to assess physical codes of communication (affects and emotions included) to 
inform their experience.243 
The concept of a ‘fleshy memory’ holds important repercussions for 
discourses on affect and their attendant investigations of corporeality and aesthetics. 
If we take the “experience of call and answer” to be prior to language – a priori 
inscribed in the subject during the pre-natal stage – and firstly impacts the bodily 
(fleshy) aspect of our memory and experience, then the assumption is that such a 
form of communication can endure as a physical (fleshy) inscription that affects our 
conscious and nonconscious adult life. With this suggestion, terms such as 
“embodiment” and “language” become radically intensified.  
Feminist theorist Samantha Frost notes that the vexed question of ‘the body 
as a living organism,’ has been a ‘sidelined, bracketed, or ignored’ debate for 
feminist philosophers and theorists.244 However, recent new materialist feminists 
(Brennan included) theorize embodiment through physical and biological sciences in 
ways that:    
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244 Samantha Frost, “The Implications of the New Materialisms for Feminist Epistemology,” in 
Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge, ed. Heidi E. Grasswick 
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seek also to challenge the very notion that matter is passive and unthinking, 
to undo the opposition between reason and passions, and to question the 
distinction between self and world that positions individuals as separate from 
yet in relation to the contexts of their actions.245 
 
While the new materialist agenda provides a way to situate Brennan’s work 
within discourses of embodiment, the equally vexed question of the immaterial 
forces in her work should not be brushed aside either. On this point, theorist Lisa 
Blackman expresses reservations regarding Brennan’s recourse to hormones as proof 
of affective transmission through the senses (smell and touch). Blackman instead 
advocates for an examination of immaterial affects and how they affect embodiment 
(for instance, hypnotic suggestion and voice hearing), contending that ‘increasing 
evidence […] suggests that bodies cannot be reduced to materiality and that the 
body’s potential for psychic or psychological attunement […] is one that the turn to 
affect must adequately theorize.’246 In my opinion, Brennan’s proposition that the 
psychic cannot be severed from the physical, should not be interpreted as a reductive 
strategy. The term psychophysical proposes that sensorial, biological and 
organoleptic potential works with the psychic (and immaterial) and vice versa. In 
fact, it is the condition by which we come to life (in utero), a condition which is 
generally dismissed on the grounds of self-containment. Self-containment can be 
thought of precisely as a body whose “potential for psychic or psychological 
attunement” has been foreclosed. Blackman states that ‘Brennan removes any trace 
of its [the affect’s] spiritualist lineage, equating the concept of energetic exchange to 
an exchange or transfer of chemicals.’247 I would argue that Brennan’s investigation 
into endocrinology is one way to ensure that the spiritual gains a physical dimension, 
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in a way that complements rather than negates its immaterial affectivity. In fact, it is 
very likely that the “spiritualist lineage” was the basis from which Brennan began to 
speculate about energetic transmission and its effect on the body: 
 
Nothing is more material than mysticism. Through sustaining living attention 
by concentration, the mystic enters into a timeless state that eventually yields 
an experience that is evidently sensual and spiritual.248  
 
 
Brennan’s use of physiological data, particularly neuroscience and endocrinology, is 
not only a way to materialize the immaterial force that is affect, but it is a stepping 
stone to explaining how this energetic matter alters both the material of the body and 
the (im)material aspects of the psyche. 
If Brennan’s idea of embodiment and language could be deployed in 
assessing a form of embodied writing, then how would it figure? Embodied writing 
should not to be taken in its usual sense for writing that is produced by a (textually) 
linguistically intelligible body which is coded in biological categories or markers of 
identity such as male/female, able/disabled, and so forth.249 I would suggest that 
there is a physicality in writing or, that experiences can be so viscerally 
psychophysical in ways where the affect exceeds what the body can withstand in its 
embodiment and spills into writing. Psychophysical experiences then not only shape 
the writing, but reveal that writing can be a form of communication that arises from 
the very form of co-affection it seeks to communicate: a co-affection which was once 
experienced as pre-linguistic.  
                                                 
248 Brennan, Transmission, 159. 
249 For one of the most influential edited volumes written by feminists concerned with female 
embodiment from an intersectional and interdisciplinary perspective see the collection of essays in 
Writing on the Body: Female Embodiment and Feminist Theory, eds. Katie Conboy, Nadia Medina 
and Sarah Stanbury (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).  
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For the purposes of this thesis, the psychophysical aspect of affect and 
experience can serve as a bridge between mind/body dichotomies by maintaining 
that each individual is also uniquely shaped and informed by their bodily specificity 
and experience. But how embodiment can become a very material or visible form of 
an experience, and the associated affects that come with experience, is a matter that 
has been theorised in psychoanalytic terms as sublimation. The next section 
examines the aspect of creativity, what Brennan defines as “resolution through 
creative labour,” its relationship to theories of the death drive, and how it concurs 
with Ettinger’s proposition of an ethico-aesthetic dimension to artworking. 
 
 
 
 
Sublimation: A Matter of Life & Death 
 
 
There is no energy outside the freely mobile energy of the life drive. The 
differentiation between the life and death drives lies not in the energy they 
in fact share, but in the pathways anchored in fixed points formed through 
repression. What makes the death drive deathly is the fact that the subject 
seeks to regain its prior state on the basis of the same pathways which fix 
its subjectivity in place. In other words, the only way it can regain the 
prior state is to do away with the pathways, but on these its subjectivity 
depends. In one sense, then, the idea that life tends towards death is based 
on a mistake about direction. 
– Teresa Brennan250 
 
For Ettinger, the process of artworking and an encounter with artwork can provide 
access to a psychic state of affective potentiality whereby the ‘aesthetical informs the 
                                                 
250 Brennan, Exhausting Modernity, 64. 
 112 
ethical.’251 Ettinger argues that meaning is a co-generative process between the self 
and other, activated by the retrieval of memory, the analysis of trauma or during an 
aesthetic encounter.252 However, such potentiality requires a reconfiguration of the 
subject’s central belief system of which the imaginary – as conscious and 
unconscious structure of identification and the ego – has a substantial role. Ettinger 
argues that ‘believing in the reality of imaginary mother-phantasies is a psychic 
dead-end,’ which hinders the potential for psychic transformation.253  
As noted in Chapter Two, the evacuation of maternal agency from 
psychoanalytic interpretations has largely contributed to presenting a limited scope 
of subject formation that relies on binary and antagonistic ideas. The ‘dead-end’ here 
alludes to both the death drive and to a psychic, ethical and creative blockage. This 
‘dead-end’ is inevitably tied up to the primary relationship between infant and 
caregiver, or the foundational fantasy as Brennan demonstrates. By unveiling the 
illusions that support this fantasy, both Brennan and Ettinger provide a radically 
different analysis of the relationship between subjectivity and creativity. In this 
section I examine the key transformations in order to deepen insight into how 
aesthetics impact the organizing system of the life drive through nonconscious co-
affective exchange.  
While a number of psychoanalytic interpretations have relied on the role of 
the death drive as a productive agent in analyses of creativity, the life drive has 
remained under-examined in such a relationship.254 In relation to identity formation, 
the death drive has served as an analytic tool to describe, following Brennan, how 
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human perception is often liable to objectifying all others (humans, objects, artwork) 
in order to secure psychic individuality. As I have elaborated in Chapter One, 
Lacan’s and Freud’s concept of the death drive figures as a regulation of the desire to 
possess an unattainable lost object in fantasy. Based on their propositions, Brennan 
stipulates that the death drive figures prominently for masculine sexuality and 
subjectivity, where masculinity is the effect of keeping the ego at a distance from 
others. On the other hand, Brennan argues that in the case of femininity, ‘it depends 
on a distance from the death drive that is guaranteed only by a living attention that 
protects her from the aggression turned towards or back against herself.’255 
Brennan scrutinizes Freud’s hypotheses on feminine masochism in order to 
disentangle how phantasy, the death drive and the sexual drive figure differently for 
feminine and masculine development. Freud had already proposed that both Eros 
(life drive) and Thanatos (death drive) are to ‘some degree fused in the sexual 
drives,’ but in the case of sublimation, when the sexual drive is ‘redirected away 
from the libidinal object to a “higher aim”, the possibility arises that the death drive 
will then become defused or detached from the libido.’256 This prompts Brennan to 
ask an obvious question: when the death drive detaches, where does it go? 
I return to the epigraph of this section where Brennan notes that “the idea that 
life tends towards death is based on a mistake about direction.” Brennan proposes 
that during sublimation, in the practice of creativity and “higher aims,” the death 
drive is redirected and the life drive takes on a more forceful presence. She draws 
this conclusion from the idea that ‘sublimation has an aim which is ongoing, an aim 
whose fulfilment rests in movement rather than the possession of a fixed object, 
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phantasmatic or real’ – the latter being the effect of the death drive.257 Movement is 
in fact the basis of Brennan’s hypothesis, which relies in large part on the hypothesis 
that such mobility is also present in the distribution of affects. By providing an 
analysis of how affects can be projected, as much as they can be contained, Brennan 
elucidates how it is their circulation that leads to specific psychological dispositions 
(whether debilitating or life-affirming) as much as they contribute to the construction 
of identity, gender and sexuality.  
In the case of sublimation, this psychic activity which aims beyond the “love-
object” figures differently for the feminine than the masculine subject. The feminine 
subject’s libido regulates the sexual drives, while the latter transposes the libido from 
the object (of its desire) onto a higher aim. Brennan notes that for Freud phallic 
castration creates the conditions for identity to locate its ‘final spatio-temporal 
bearings’ as a sexed individual.258 But the effects of phallic castration arrive in an 
intermittent process where external social and cultural forces participate in 
developing sexed individuation into a fixed identity. Instead, Brennan examines the 
process of individuation and how it is secured through the creation of psychic spatial 
distinctness by drawing from an eclipsed narrative on affects. 
Brennan notes that in the case of masculine sexuality a transposition occurs 
from the sexual drive and the object it aims to possess (projective repression) into 
creative labour. In other words, if the external aim of sublimation is the sexual object 
then to sublimate means to replace the desire for the object with the desire for 
creative labour. Brennan combines two propositions on the affect of anxiety to 
formulate this hypothesis. Firstly, Klein’s idea that ‘anxiety derives from the death 
drive working within,’ with Freud’s question over why the affect of anxiety is 
                                                 
257 Brennan, Interpretation, 201(italics mine). 
258 Ibid., 213. 
 115 
reactive, productive and driven while other affects seem to ‘run counter to the 
movement of life.’259 As noted earlier, for Brennan the transposition of any 
(negative/positive) affect requires a certain movement. That is, it is not simply 
transposed; rather, it is ‘psychical energy directed’ outside the self in ‘an ongoing 
process.’260 Movement forges the distinction between repression (static energy) and 
sublimation (redirected energy) and how these figure differently in the case of sexual 
desire or “the higher aim.” Furthermore, for Brennan, repression does not interfere or 
obstruct the process of sublimation because while the fantasy of possessing the 
object is repressed, the concomitant affect that accompanies the fantasy is redirected. 
Simply said, to effectively repress a desire one must energetically project the anxiety 
that comes with it. Brennan’s term ‘projective repression’ to describe this movement 
provides some answers with regards ego formation, feminine/masculine development 
and the life and death drives. 
For the life drive to effectively work, it requires a movement that can be 
directed outwards, one such example being through creative outlets. Brennan notes 
that because the material conditions of creative labour have been ‘circumscribed 
economically and culturally’ for female sexed individuals, it is no surprise that it is 
men that generally consolidate their identity through means that are socially 
enabling.261 For this reason, Brennan argues that the psychic disposition of 
femininity, in both men and women, is more likely to concur with females. The 
disabling pathological aspects of femininity that Freud described in hysterical 
women (or feminine men) were specific to a class and social system that reinforced 
sociocultural conventions.262 As creativity was not exactly encouraged in women, 
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they were then not able to redirect the affect of anxiety into creative practice and as a 
result it would produce physically and mentally disabling effects such as inertia, 
inhibition and a reduced inclination towards curiosity.263 Brennan’s suggestion that 
Freud correctly assigned to femininity a pathological state (theorized as hysteria), 
inhabited by both women and men, can raise a number of issues with feminist 
psychoanalytic theorists that have made an alternative and more benign version of 
femininity, and its corollary hysteria, an intellectual pursuit.264 
However, stressing how affects work in the case of femininity and 
masculinity prior to their sociocultural bond, should not be underemphasized. It is 
here that a theory of affective transmission is fortified, and once taken seriously, will 
clarify why femininity is simultaneously a problem and a necessary part of psychic 
development. And, once this problem is addressed, we can overcome the self-
destructive states it accompanies.  
According to Freud’s revised theory of femininity, women also first desired 
their mother, but it is their transition to heterosexuality that produced the greatest 
psychical task. In a sense, repressing the desire for the (m)other requires an immense 
amount of energy, an energy which turns in on itself as it does not find any outlets. 
For Brennan, desire can be either an imprint (a synonym for an affect-laden symbolic 
image) or a phantasy. The first experience of desire (as phantasy) is unconscious (a 
repressed hallucination), and ‘subsequent conscious and unconscious phantasies are 
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the longing for an imprint.’265 In this respect, desire always returns to that initial state 
of longing which was first experienced through the imprint (image) of the (m)other:  
 
The desire of the other, in short, embodies an image [the longing for an 
imprint] and attention that can enhance or diminish one’s capacities (thus the 
complaint from Freud’s women’s patients that their mothers did not give 
them enough ‘milk’).266  
 
This notion feeds into Ettinger’s elaborations of the maternal bond being an 
“incestuous rapport,” which when foreclosed can lead to psychosis.267 The 
relationship between maternal foreclosure and sublimation, and how it relates to the 
feminine, has been developed by Ettinger into an alternative framework for feminine 
sublimation which she terms Matrixial Eros.268 And many of Brennan’s observations 
resonate with Ettinger’s endeavour to define processes of the life drive which are 
premised on a transsubjective269 (and intersubjective) mode of relating to aesthetics. 
In this way, Matrixial Eros can forge what Brennan defines as ‘energetic and 
affective connections between an individual, other people and the surrounding 
environment.’270 For Ettinger, the aesthetic sphere provides a space of interaction for 
these connections to flourish: 
 
Something – but not-all – of this act and its affects are transported into and 
conducted via the artwork, thus transforming the point of view of the viewer 
in difference from, yet in relation to, the nonconscious swerves and relations 
of the artist. The artist captures/produces/conducts ideas, traumas, and 
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phantasies only inasmuch as s/he is affected by the trauma of the m/Other, of 
others, and of the world.271 
 
 
By reading these two thinkers side by side we can map out alternative 
(physical and co-affective) ways of responding to aesthetics and how these responses 
inform an ethics of creative practice and subjectivity in adult life. Furthermore, they 
provide insight as to the role, or the absence, of physicality in psychic development. 
In this juxtaposition, the life-drive is drastically re-framed from the neutral other of a 
potent death-driven desire, to an equally important psychic activity responsible for 
counter-balancing destructive tendencies and sustaining relationality.  
By revisiting Freud’s thesis in the essay The Uncanny, Ettinger tackles deeply 
entrenched psychoanalytic ideas of the role of the intrauterine phantasy in the 
relationship between the unconscious and the sublime. While Freud holds that 
intrauterine phantasies are in a sense “proof” of his theorizations of the castration 
complex and concomitant theorisations of repression, Ettinger insists that there are 
two distinct psychic stratifications that make their way to the Symbolic. 
The first notion, developed by Freud, states that repression is the process by 
which affects that seem familiar but too overwhelming to endure are pushed into the 
unconscious (what Brennan calls the “longing for an imprint”). The second notion 
proposed by Ettinger, is a matrixial repression, which follows a maternal 
womb/intrauterine complex ‘is charged with anxiety only once, when the traces of 
the original experience leave the transgressive, transsubjective space of borderlinks 
and are transformed in order to be transferred to the unconscious.’272 Ettinger argues 
that while both complexes are linked to the affect of anxiety, what becomes 
repressed upon the return of the original phantasy is not exactly the phantasy, but the 
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affect. This hypothesis concurs with Brennan’s stipulation. As does Ettinger’s 
proposition that, prior to the affect of anxiety being repressed, the originary affect, 
the first affect that accompanied the experience of what was familiar in the 
unfamiliar (the Unheimlich in the heimisch) is the affect of pleasure or 
displeasure.273  
From this originary experience Ettinger draws productive parallelisms 
between the two complexes. One finds its basis in castration and repression, whilst 
the other leads Ettinger to formulate an ‘originary feminine difference.’274 To 
reiterate, the originary experience of the matrixial phantasy is ‘not frightening at the 
point of its original emergence, but becomes frightening when the experience is 
repressed.’275 Freud also notes that the intrauterine phantasy ‘had originally nothing 
terrifying about it at all, but was qualified by a certain lasciviousness.’276 
Paradoxically, Freud states that a number of terrifying phantasies, such as being 
buried alive or drowning, are simply a modification of the original intrauterine 
phantasy. Paradoxical are also Freud’s analyses of a number of literary works that 
draw a direct correlation between an uncanny experience and the fear of castration. 
Dreams of dismemberment, having one’s eyes gouged out, or returning to the womb 
are all simply replacement narratives whose essence lies in the primary fear and 
anxiety of being castrated.277 This circular hypothesis can explain how the affect of 
anxiety is accompanied by repression, but it cannot explain why the intrauterine 
experience is posited as just another example of the uncanny, when the uncanny is 
clearly tied up to the castration complex. To clarify, according to Freud, the anxiety-
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inducing phantasy that has been repressed in the first instance will return as anxiety 
in the second instance. In contrast, through Ettinger’s and Brennan’s analyses, 
phantasies return accompanied by an anxiety produced by the act of repressing the 
first instance, an instance which was not necessarily associated with the affect of 
anxiety to begin with.  
Ettinger formulates this distinct yet parallel psychic activity to the death drive 
(Thanatos) which she terms compassionate Eros: the Matrixial equivalent of the life 
drive that runs parallel to the death drive. As for Ettinger a relationship to art is 
figured as an affective encounter rather than an object of study, the resulting 
aesthetic engagement is defined as co-poietic:  
 
Co-poietic transformational potentiality evolves along aesthetic and ethical 
unconscious paths: strings and threads, and produces a particular kind of 
knowledge. Unconscious transmission and reattunement as well as resonant 
copoietic knowledge don’t depend on verbal communication, intentional 
organization or inter-subjective relationships. Aesthetical and ethical 
processes are impregnated by matrixial copoiesis.278 
 
 
Thus, when compassionate Eros is effectuated, the drives, from a matrixial 
perspective, are no longer purely internal and autopoietic but they are activated 
through encounters that bring to the fore the interrelational and reciprocal dimension 
of the subject’s desire for connectivity.279 Ettinger argues that the process of 
artworking, which activates the above-mentioned psychic movements, cannot always 
be defined by Freud’s prototype of sublimation as ‘Compassionate Eros and sexual 
libido are different psychic instances. They might intermix, but they nurture different 
kinds of love.’280 This is in fact an observation also made by Brennan, where she 
argues that Freud problematically ‘assimilates the ego drives to the life drive even 
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when they are opposites.’281 Brennan maintains that drives are crucial to an 
understanding of affects. In fact, she figures the drive as the mechanism that ‘propels 
the affect’ but also ‘in large part the stuff out of which the affect is made.’282 Drives 
have the double function of seeking out an “object” while at the same time they are 
the ‘carriers of energy.’283 However, Brennan compartmentalizes the affect of love 
on the side of the life drive, while aggression and hate are on the side of the death 
drive. Each drive influences the way the seeking and the carrying are executed. In the 
case of how energies are carried Brennan notes that: 
 
If I am depressed, it may be because I have turned the affect of anger back 
against myself rather than directing it toward another. And in turning it back 
against myself, I automatically become more inert: my energy is less. In other 
words, it is the energetic dimension of the affects that reveals their partial 
origin in the drives most directly. This energetic dimension is not only 
evident in the negative affects. Just as the negative affects may deplete 
energy, so can the positive affects enhance it. If I receive another’s love, I 
receive their living attention; and this attention, logically, is a biological force 
in itself […].284 
 
 
 Receiving or responding with living attention is one way of saying that an 
activation happens in the drives that aims towards flourishing, making connections 
and perpetuating life itself. For Brennan, this leads to an understanding that the affect 
of love (and loving attention) is distinct from other affects in that it is inextricable 
from the life drive. In agreement with Freud’s hypothesis, Brennan states: 
 
The aim of the life drive “is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve 
them thus-in short, to bind together.” The death drive, on the contrary, aims 
“to undo connections and so to destroy things.” Freud allied the force of the 
death drive with the force of anxiety as the factor that undoes connections. It 
works against connective growth rather than for it. Demonstrably, anxiety, 
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envy, and aggression work against bodily well being through stress-related 
illness.285 
 
 
By bringing Brennan’s development of the life drive as directed living 
attention in dialogue with Ettinger’s conceptualization of “compassionate eros,” we 
can delineate a subjectivity that responds to aesthetic encounters through the 
mechanisms of the life drive. As Brennan argues, the inclination to, 
 
bind and bring together, to make things cohere, follows the logic of the life 
drive. Without it, the psyche is in pieces. This erotic and cohering energy is 
absent especially in psychosis, whose schizophrenic versions are marked by 
the inability to make logical connections and by lack of sexual affect and/or 
loving ties to others.286 
 
Bridging Brennan’s idea of living attention with Ettinger’s elaboration of the 
proto-ethical, non-sexual, yet libidinal dimension we can extrapolate how artwork 
carries the potential to transform ‘the amnesia of lone traumatic events into a 
memory that can only emerge in sharing with an-other.’287 As aesthetic copoietic 
encounters bypass both the conscious and unconscious regulation of the ego, during 
an aesthetic encounter the defensive ego’s ability to regulate and control is 
dismantled. This leaves the ego in a vulnerable state, nevertheless, a state which 
allows the conditions for connection to manifest and affects to be mobilized. In this 
way, Ettinger envisions a type of experience, described as a ‘sharing-in-difference,’ 
that maintains a ‘transconnectedness’ between self and other and which provides a 
link between trauma and phantasy.288 That is, either through the process of 
artworking, or, even more broadly, through an encounter with art, affective states 
such as awe, vulnerability, anxiety, whether on a conscious or nonconscious level, 
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can be understood through our co-affective origins. If artwork carries an ethical 
demand for living attention, we may begin to see how the desire for connection, 
compassion and co-affectivity are psychic dispositions stemming from the life drive 
and informed by an archaic recognition of our connective alterity. To this effect, this 
model of subjectivity can inform how auto/biographical narratives employ a ‘sharing 
with an-other’ to offer a personal and unique account of who one is becoming in 
relation to an encounter with a specific work. Or, as Ettinger proposes, a primordial 
ethics of the subject assumes relationality and transconnectedness as the foundations 
of subjectivity.289 
 However, my emphasis lies with how the subject’s desire manifests as the 
responsibility to narrate the other’s story. If Cavarero’s ethics of relationality figure 
the subject as oriented towards the disclosure of their life-story to a “worthy” 
narrator, it only follows that the storyteller should do a certain justice (even though 
violence may be produced instead) to the subject’s desire to hear who they are. As 
Cavarero often highlights, it is through an ethics of relating that ‘both the poet and 
the historian, […] appeal to the unrepeatability of the unique, not to the universal and 
the general.’290 I have termed this specific approach that appeals to uniqueness rather 
than universality, to a life-driven, co-affective aesthetic encounter in a specific 
spatiotemporal moment, that takes the form of a response in auto/biographical art-
writing: erotic responsiveness.  
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Erotic Responsiveness 
 
 
 
Contrary to the symptom, artworking cannot be replaced by the 
Symbolic. Contrary to jouissance, artwork does not exhaust its erotic 
potential.  
– Bracha Ettinger291 
 
 
An erotic response is produced by an encounter with a work of art. Such ethico-
aesthetic experience follows a different order from reason and knowledge even 
though it may employ these faculties. Erotic responsiveness is a framework for 
discerning a unique psychophysical experience parallel to the exercise of knowledge. 
It is informed by an affective impact prior to cognitive processes, but can effectuate 
an understanding of the self as inextricably connected and shaped through co-
affective encounters with multiple others. 
Through an attempt to conceptualise a theoretical framework for 
auto/biographical art-writing, I seek out narratives that employ a reflective practice 
of living attention and attunement that are not rooted in a dualistic view of reality 
where a subject reflects on an object. Rather, the practice of living attention, 
connectivity and reattunement is a process whereby the uniqueness between two or 
more entities during an encounter-event are maintained in their relation. Ettinger 
defines this process as ‘co-emergence in differentiation,’ which coheres with Teresa 
Brennan’s conceptualization of subjectivity as relationally informed through 
affective transmission and connective alterity. 
I suggest that the practice of auto/biographical art-writing may offer the 
possibility to consciously process the impact of co-affective experience on our 
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‘fleshy memory.’292 During an aesthetic encounter, the subject may also activate the 
mechanics of identity, politics and ethics. What matters in this account of 
subjectivity, is the unique story that unfolds in relation to a specific aesthetic 
encounter. I stress the importance of lived experience, personal history and bodily 
sensuality as methodological tools for discussing and investigating aesthetics and 
problematizing their accompanying discourses. As an encounter with artwork is 
firstly an impact on the nonconscious and co-affective registers of the subject, I 
figure a psychic impact that follows an ethics of relationality as an erotic response. I 
employ the term erotic responsiveness to mean that there is a non-sexual yet libidinal 
agitation of the subject’s psyche that generates an acknowledgement of the self and 
other through aesthetic encounters. Auto/biographical art-writing is one such 
instance of experiencing the self in its connective alterity. On the level of drives and 
libido, erotic responsiveness actualizes its potentiality through the life drive.  
Brennan’s stipulation that affects are transmitted energies that can physically 
impact others can support an investigation of art-writing that branches out into two 
distinct ideas. Firstly, to reinforce how bodily experience can unravel accounts that 
attend to the psychic and physical dimension in the treatment of aesthetics. It is a 
framework that takes into consideration how the viewer, reader, recipient of affect is 
impressed and motivated by an external force which does not originate in the self 
even though the feelings felt during this experience are the subject’s own feelings. I 
maintain, following Brennan, that affects are physical imprints of understanding. I 
contend that they may provide analytic tools for discussing the relationship between 
aesthetics and subjectivity when they are given conscious attention through the 
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practice of auto/biographical art-writing. In other words, that an erotic response to an 
affective encounter requires ‘an active deployment of psychophysical energy.’293 
Secondly, in proposing a relational approach to storytelling, it is important to 
understand the relationship between self and other as conditioned by affective 
exchange. This is not to propose an egalitarian and harmonious exchange, or a 
protocol for morality. Rather, by formulating auto/biographical art-writing as a 
response to an ethical demand, I maintain that such a demand calls for the subject’s 
conscious living/loving attention. In this sense, certain forms of art-writing adopt an 
altogether different methodology and thus require another set of tools for 
interpretation.294 The demand in the case of erotic responsiveness is not an 
authoritative request that dictates what one should feel or do. Rather, it is the idea 
that someone or something can make you feel a certain way through sensorial impact 
and affective transmission. In other words, to propose that the subject is not 
physically self-contained is to support the idea that subjectivity is decentered by 
affective and energetic transmission.295 
To this extent, auto/biography as critical methodology does not amplify or 
consolidate the writer’s ego. The auto/biographical narration of the erotically 
responsive art-writer holds the reflection of the other while it informs the self. This 
transaction is precisely the ethical demand of aesthetics prior to its relationship to 
broader socio-cultural discourses. It informs who one is becoming through the 
unfolding of an ontological relation to the specific encounter. Furthermore, and 
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following Brennan, it figures the idea of repression, ‘the attempt to expel what is 
painful while enhancing what is pleasurable,’ as a psychic phenomenon that may be 
processed and relinquished through the organizing activity of the life drive.296 The 
life drive strives for coherence, connection, organization and unification provided by 
the living attention it receives or directs outwards.297 I propose auto/biographical art-
writing as one such practice of an ‘embodied logic of the flesh’ expressed through 
the storyteller’s living attention towards the artwork.298 This process involves an 
active thinking and disclosure of the senses in visual and/or linguistic terms to free 
the drives from the symptoms of repression in order to formulate coherence and 
harmony through the unification of mind and body. As Brennan points out, ‘if the 
erotic energy, or the life drive, is composed of fleshly codes that parallel those of 
language, this could explain why it is that the body seems to do its own thinking.’299 
For this reason, erotic responsiveness will be partial to sensorial and corporeal 
experience and how it is communicated in language. 
 
*** 
 
Autobiographical and biographical narratives usually describe a life story where to 
some extent the author knows the beginning and conclusion of their text. 
Antithetically, auto/biographical art-writing is determined by a specific sense-
making process of a particular encounter without a pre-determined conclusion. Such 
methodology resembles diary writing, which Philip Lejeune describes as 
confessional, processual and a technique of self-care and self-reflection where 
‘before becoming a text, the private diary is a practice. The text itself is a mere by-
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product, a residue.’300 However, Lejeune’s definition of diary writing also states that 
the writing is addressed to a future self, which can therefore become a way of 
displaying an identity in process. Auto/biographical art-writing does not follow this 
protocol as it is a practice that aims to display the exchange in process, or a process 
of temporary individuation by a specific relational experience effectuated by 
someone (human/animal/object/text). It is firstly a response to an external demand 
that does not incorporate or reject the other in order to individuate the self. It is an 
ethics of responding to the affective impact of an encounter external to the self which 
in turn may offer an account of oneself.  
Post-structuralist critiques of the author have shifted the focus from the writer 
to the reader as the generator of literary interpretation.301 This critique encompasses 
general ideas of authorship including the centrality of the viewer in contemporary art 
theory and the audience as indispensable part and participator in the experience of 
aesthetics.302 Erotic responsiveness places emphasis on the viewer’s experience but 
not at the sacrifice of the artwork’s authorship or at the necessity of the audience’s 
participation to create the work. Generated meaning is conditioned by the subject’s 
perception yet the encounter with artwork can co-affectively transform the subject 
and their conditioned perception. Therefore, artworks hold affective agency prior to 
cognitive auto/biographical assessments. Meaning is a co-generative process 
between the work and the viewer, folded within an extended network of memory, 
collectivity, geo-political situatedness and also discourse. Meaning may relate to a 
collective sphere yet it is singular in its receptivity and re-transmission in the form of 
                                                 
300 Philip Lejeune, On Diary, eds. Jeremy D. Popkin and Julie Rak, trans. Katherine Durnin 
(University of Hawaii Press, 2009), 31. 
301 Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in Image Music Text (London: Fontana Press, 1977), 
142-148. 
302 Nicholas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods with the 
participation of Mathieu Copeland (Paris: Les Presses du Reel, 2002).  
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auto/biographical art-writing. Hence, multiple meanings can be generated from a 
single artwork based on each individual encounter. 
Some of the challenges of working with auto/biographical art-writing involve 
the lack of theoretical work available on writing processes that involve corporeality 
and affect (notwithstanding the energetic transmission that they accompany) in 
narratives that unfold lived experience, personal history and how these relate to 
aesthetics. Furthermore, existing theoretical investigations on the methodology of 
autobiography and self-disclosure mainly support the idea that the practice or use of 
autobiography can inform the viewer/reader through representation and concomitant 
identification.303 This thesis does not follow such paradigms. Auto/biographical art-
writing is not offered as a narrative for identification even though it may generate 
such relating in the reader. The erotic response in the form of auto/biographical art-
writing is a singular, subjective instance of an encounter between the artwork and the 
writer. An instance that arouses the living attention of the writer towards the work, 
where living attention, following Brennan, ‘is the condition of reasoning and the 
embodiment of its connective ability.’304 
Writing about art is mainly oriented towards the formal, socio-political and 
theoretical framing and interpretation of work. If we are to follow through Brennan’s 
suggestion that at its most unified state the subject brings together mind and body by 
‘attending to and learning to work with sensation, learning how to realign word and 
                                                 
303 On the point of identification, Ettinger notes that an event which holds subjectivizing potential 
should not be confused with the process of identification because ‘the unconscious move here 
operates on a level of partial subjectivity that transgresses the individual boundaries and where 
activity and passivity, subject and object, and psychic past and future are transgressed and re-
transgressed.’ See Ettinger, “Fascinance,” 69. 
304 Brennan, Transmission, 41. 
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affect in the process,’ then most writing about art seems to work in the reverse 
order.305 
Affective impact from aesthetic analysis is generally omitted either due to a 
commitment to theoretical exemplification, aesthetic tradition or, if we take 
Brennan’s argument into consideration, the omission of affect is a result of 
psychological repression. In its most extreme version, we could say that to frame art 
as socio-political and theoretical illustration is to annihilate its aesthetic value, 
subjectivizing potential and affective ability, in favor of exercising reason without a 
corresponding embodiment.306 Following Ettinger’s elaborations of how aesthetic 
encounters can transform subjectivity and Brennan’s elaborations of how such 
transformation requires a deployment of psychophysical energy, we can deduce that 
encounters with aesthetics require an alternative interpretation of both the art-writing 
and the psychic mechanisms that are put into play during that process.  
Such an engagement can be made possible if Brennan’s proposition is taken 
into account, that in order to understand ‘the influences to which we are subject in 
terms of passions and emotions, as well as living attention, means lifting off the 
burden of the ego’s belief that it is self-contained in terms of the affects it 
experiences.’307  
 
                                                 
305 Brennan, Transmission, 159.  
306 Ibid., 41 & 158.  
307 Ibid., 95. 
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Writing with Art:  Subjectivity & Encounter 
 
 
 
Writing met art to write back to life those lives that had hitherto been without 
either art or writing, hence unknown, uninscribed, unvoiced.  
– Griselda Pollock308 
 
In being disturbed, we ask questions. In being moved, we seek answers. 
– Kathy O’Dell309 
 
Why do people write about art? The first idea I would like to divert from this 
examination is the idea that writing about art is a practice that can be studied, taught 
and exercised as a profession. It can also be that. But answering the question of why 
one becomes an art historian, critic, theorist or journalist is too subjective, particular 
and of no significant value to the central question. Another way to ask the central 
question would be: What is it about art that moves people to writing?  
Instead of seeking examples in the writing of art historians and critics, I turn 
to the less “professionalized” writers of art. By doing so, I aim to move away from 
the idea that writing about art is a practice, profession or vocation. Instead, I look to 
writers and poets, some of which have also made a profession out of their writing, or 
others who have written with no regard for where their writing might end up or fit 
into. Such forms of art-writing (forms that I have argued should be figured as writing 
with art) can only be viewed through an “alchemy” of theories to provide insight into 
specific psychic movements that have led to a writer’s response to an artwork.  
                                                 
308 Griselda Pollock, “Writing from the Heart,” in Writing Otherwise, eds. Jackie Stacey & Janet 
Wolff (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 31. 
309 Kathy O’Dell, Contract with the Skin: Masochism, Performance Art and the 1970s (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1998), xiv. 
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While there is no single way to look at an artwork, some artworks can be 
considered “magnetic” – they attract certain frameworks of interpretation more than 
others. The force of the pull lies in the artwork’s magnetic flux. That is, by 
calculating how many points in space and time an artwork represents historically 
(time) and figures symbolically (space), it becomes easier to determine the type of 
writing that will produce the greatest appeal or magnetic force.  
Of course, there are also ways to “demagnetize” a magnet. One way to do this 
is by “heating” it beyond its intrinsic temperature. Heating can be imagined as a 
transfer of energy to a specific point. We can make an artwork “hot” (popular, 
valuable, auratic) by transferring energy towards it. Simultaneously, if we transfer 
too much energy, that is, if we layer the work with too much meaning beyond its 
required temperature, we can “demagnetise” it. Such layering of meaning has had a 
long history of debate in questions of interpretation and criticism. For instance, in the 
context of American modernism and its turn towards Marxist and psychoanalytic 
theories of aesthetic analysis, the influential art critic Susan Sontag writes in the 
essay “On Style”: 
 
A work of art encountered as a work of art is an experience, not a statement 
or an answer to a question. Art is not only about something; it is something. 
A work of art is a thing in the world, not just a text or commentary on the 
world.310 
 
 
For the purpose of creating a productive analogy between magnets, questions 
and artworks, we will think of art as an experience; a meeting point of reflection. A 
hybrid combination of “thing” and question that we come across not just in museums 
but also in our everyday experience. As art has moved outside the confines of 
                                                 
310 Susan Sontag, “On Style,” in Against Interpretation and Other Essays (London: Penguin, 2009), 
19.   
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institutional walls and towards non-commercial venues such as occupied spaces, 
public parks and “underground” activity, we need a language of reflection that can 
capture the ephemeral quality of artistic acts and processes such as street 
interventions, community engaged practices and live art performance. 
The applicability of the word “encounter” to the way we think about art is 
hardly an original designation.311 Artist and theorist Simon O’Sullivan departs from 
the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari who described an encounter as ‘something in 
the world [that] forces us to think,’ in order to draw a distinction between art as 
representation and art as a ‘genuine encounter’ – an event that motivates us to ‘think 
otherwise,’ beyond representational habits and repetitions.312 Cultural critic and 
historian Griselda Pollock contends that ‘art practices generate encounters rather 
than (Kantian) objects.’313 Since the mid-1990s, psychoanalyst, theorist and artist 
Bracha L. Ettinger has been developing a definition of art as encounter that stresses 
its affective quality and the impact that it may have on subjectivity – a ‘subjectivity-
as-encounter’ between a specific I and a non-I.314 
                                                 
311 John Dewey’s major writing on aesthetics, Art as Experience (1934), details the significance of 
how art provides us with an experience. Although he does not use the word encounter, there are 
interesting similarities between his framing of an experience (distinct from the general flow of 
experience) and a number of thinkers who employ the word encounter to describe an experience of 
aesthetics. Furthermore, his ideas seem to define subjectivity in a manner that resonates with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of becoming as transformation (and differentiation) through contact with an 
other in an assemblage: ‘In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without seam and 
without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same time there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of 
the parts. A river, as distinct from a pond, flows. But its flow gives a definiteness and interest to its 
successive portions greater than exist in the homogenous portions of a pond. In an experience, flow is 
from something to something. As one part leads into another and as one part carries on what went 
before, each gains distinctness in itself. The enduring whole is diversified by successive phases that 
are emphases of its varied colors. Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical 
junctions, and dead centers when we have an experience. There are pauses, places of rest, but they 
punctuate and define the quality of movement.’ John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigee 
Books, 1980. First Published 1934), 36. 
312 Simon O’Sullivan, Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation 
(London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 1. 
313 Pollock, After-affects, 154. 
314 Instead of adopting the language of “self and other,” Ettinger provides a definition of relations 
between subjects and subjects, or subjects and objects as “I and non-I”. This linguistic reconfiguration 
resituates the (universal) “other,” and discourses of otherness, in proximity to the self through 
connective alterity. Simply said, the other is no longer conceived of as a fundamental opposite to the 
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For Ettinger, a “genuine” relationship to art occurs when a ‘transjective 
encounter-event’ is effectuated in the Matrixial transsubjective dimension.315 
Whether the ‘transjective’ takes the form of a painting, sculpture, photography, or 
any other artistic medium, the representational aspects of the artwork do not only 
produce a “force” that compels us to think as O’Sullivan notes, rather, they ‘inspire 
feel-knowledge’: a capacity to transform how we act in the world on an ethical and 
political level.316 Ettinger proposes that we consider art as ‘an aesthetics-in-action 
that produces protoethical moments as well as theory, by which the ethical sphere 
can, but not of necessity, be changed.’317 Similarly, Griselda Pollock notes that 
because artwork is in itself ‘a prolonged encounter with trauma, [it] can foster 
subjective openness that may become ethical and then, through conscious decision 
and commitment, can also be moved from this sphere into that of the [sic] political 
action.318 It is by figuring the practice of art as an ‘aesthetics-in-action,’ that Ettinger 
calls attention to the processual nature of art-making which entails a number of 
productive ‘moments’ rather than a single product whose end-point is an object in 
the world. Yet, art-making involves producing objects of art. How we relate to these 
objects, or in Ettinger’s terms ‘transjects,’ can entail a similar mode of ‘action’ if we 
begin to figure art as an encounter.  
                                                 
self, but is rather textually, metaphorically or relationally to some degree psychically embedded in the 
“I” as a “non-I”. In this sense, objects encountered during an aesthetic experience are redefined as 
“transjects” to indicate their ability to resonate within the subject and effectuate a psychic 
transformation that derives from a specific encounter.   
315 Ettinger draws a distinction between the intersubjective and transubjective in order to propose that 
subjectivity is structured through specific encounters with others. The prefix inter- succinctly 
describes the dimension between relations of subject to subject (self and other), while for Ettinger the 
prefix trans- presupposes that a relational model of subjectivity relates to an other ‘before and beyond 
any possible economy of inter-subjective exchange’ (italics mine). See Bracha Ettinger, “From Proto-
ethical Compassion to Responsibility: Besidedness, and the three Primal Mother-Phantasies of Not-
enoughness, Devouring and Abandonment,” in Athena: Philosophical Studies 2 (2006): 124-125.  
316 Ettinger describes ‘feel-knowing’ as a transgression of individual boundaries where we come to 
recognize ‘the other in the other with-in and with-out the self.’ See Ettinger, “Fragilization,” 4.  
317 Ettinger, “Fragilization,” 5-6. 
318 Pollock, After-affects, 19. 
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An encounter is a relationship, a reciprocal engagement, an exchange, a 
movement between two or more. Writing with art is the result of such an encounter. 
We usually say that we are moved when an artwork pushes our emotions to 
expression, stirs our experience past and present into a future utterance, or hooks an 
unflagging, taut string on a retired memory. Yet, such a movement is not always 
possible, as Ettinger reminds us. That is, not every artwork will evoke memories or 
urge us towards writing. As Pollock notes, such an encounter may not always take 
place since, 
 
it is contingent on the viewer’s openness to resonance with the artworking. 
Aesthetics are thus not therapeutic; they do not aim at a cure and are not 
about expression. But they can contribute to change by poignancy as opposed 
to puncture, and one that is not only intersubjective but is transsubjective 
across time and space, across differences of real incomprehensibility.319 
 
But if it does arise, that is, if one experiences a ‘transjective encounter-event,’ 
that experience is singular and unique in its manifestation. Stressing the affective 
impact of aesthetic encounters, O’Sullivan states that an exploration into how to 
make sense of this “incomprehensibility” can ‘only be written about […] from 
personal experience.’320 And it is through framing art as an encounter that we can 
understand the relationship between subjectivity and aesthetics as potentially 
transformative. A transformative encounter which, in O’Sullivan’s sense, can 
provide a meeting point for a subjective, personal and unrepeatable narrative to 
emerge with an other. A narrative that arises from a ‘genuine encounter’ or, a 
‘transjective encounter-event,’ is a story that reveals how encountering art requires a 
relational model of subjectivity. To return to Kate Love’s assertion from Part One of 
this thesis, in order to articulate an experience with art, we will need to think through 
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a model of subjectivity that recognizes itself ‘as entirely dependent on the “other” for 
any estimation of the “self”.’321  
While the relational dimension of subjectivity has found a stronger place in 
feminist philosophy, theories of sexual difference, psychoanalysis and 
autobiography, it has rarely fared as well in discussions about art and especially in 
how we write with art.322 Simultaneously, the conceptualisation of relationality (in its 
numerous variations) has often served as the backbone of community building, 
activism, the potential for social change and ‘feminist crimes against patriarchy’ as 
art historian Griselda Pollock is fond of labelling the subversive act of rewriting 
history to include marginalised voices.323 
There is an obvious difficulty, if not an evident contradiction, in thinking the 
relationship between art and writing through a relational model of subjectivity. 
Stressing the relationality of the writing process as an action produced by a subject 
interconnected and interdependent with the world can expose the subject’s 
vulnerability and their susceptibility to such events. Writer Yve Lomax’s book 
Sounding the Event: Escapades in Dialogue and Matters of Art, Nature and Time 
departs from ‘the question of what constitutes an event,’ to produce a response in 
cross-genre narrative that fuses different modes of speech, dialogue and writing with 
                                                 
321 Love, “Experience of Art,” 172. 
322 For intersubjective-relational psychoanalysis and motherhood see Nancy Chodorow, The 
Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley: University of 
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the voices of a number of thinkers.324 Lomax proposes that ‘meaning,’ ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘thought’ are not self-contained products of the subject, rather, that they are the 
processes of our engagement with the world. In Lomax’s words:    
 
I do not produce my life alone. It is always with. So often, however, this with 
becomes forgotten. Indeed, so often, far too often, this with becomes 
annihilated as the power of hatred pits us against the world. Yet it is with that 
furthers my becoming.325 
 
 
The difficulty in such relational approaches to the bond between ‘writing 
with’ and subjectivity is that they expose the illusion that the subject is energetically 
self-contained. In relation to writing about art, the subjectivity under siege is that of 
the critic. Viewed through a relational lens, it can be said that the critic or writer of 
aesthetics, is no longer the champion of knowledge responsible for bestowing 
linguistic sense to an otherwise mute artistic object under scrutiny. Instead, the 
object, or in Ettinger’s terms again ‘the transject,’ clearly has an affective agency 
which can potentially transform the subjectivity of its interlocutor.  
This psychic potentiality in Ettinger’s Matrixial theory reformulates the 
relationship between the subject and the other (subject/animal/object) as a non-
antagonistic encounter between two or more partners in a state of becoming. It is 
important to note that a Matrixial approach counters universal narratives and 
discourses on the construction of subjectivity by thinking about an encounter as a 
singular event with specific participants. Ettinger states that, ‘each actual 
transubjective and transjective web is not infinite but is limited, each time, to the few 
who are affectively inspired now.’326 Ettinger employs the term transubject here to 
                                                 
324 Yve Lomax, Sounding the Event: Escapades in Dialogue and Matters of Art, Nature and Time 
(London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), ix. 
325 Ibid., 6. 
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indicate a subject in the midst of a specific temporality and event that holds a 
potentiality for transformation. Secondly, transubjective encounters highlight the 
subject’s inherent co-affective ability. Thirdly, the relationship between self and 
other is reconfigured in a way that invokes an ethics of alterity, as proposed by the 
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas.327 And lastly, it proposes that subjectivity is 
relationally informed rather than self-contained. In fact, the relational aspect of a 
subject precedes their social formation which Ettinger describes as a proto-ethical 
potential. While Ettinger seems to merge the concepts of alterity and encounter to 
construct a discourse on subjectivity, it radically departs both from Levinas and 
Deleuze, especially when it meets the aesthetic sphere. I will briefly present some 
similarities and essential differences, with the prospect of laying out the ground for 
the relationship between subjectivity and encounter and how it relates to 
auto/biographical art-writing. 
 
 
 
 
Radically Other but Ontologically the Same? 
 
 
 
Levinas’s philosophy is especially relevant and in a sense representative of theories 
of intersubjective relations and their ethics. His work is characterized by an 
articulation of subjectivity as ‘responsibility for the other’ which finds an 
unparalleled expression when ‘face-to-face with the Other.’328 For Levinas alterity is 
absolute, at the origin of our existence, and informs ethical life through a primordial 
sense of responsibility. Levinas proposes two instances of human experience that 
                                                 
327 Emmanuel Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence, trans. Michael B. Smith (London: Athlone Press, 
1999). 
328 Emmanuel Levinas, “Time and the Other,” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford & 
Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 45. 
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absolutely defy our ability to inhabit them, thus, remaining radically other and 
beyond our understanding or control. The first of those is death. An experience that 
we can never come to fully comprehend and that we can only bear witness to in the 
death of other people. The second instance is the limit of our human ability to ever 
inhabit or experience an other person in their totality. This formulation might sound 
reminiscent of Lacan’s theory of “méconnaissance,”329 described in Part One of this 
thesis, where intersubjectivity is in a sense the impossibility of relating to one 
another. On the contrary, Levinas proposes that it is this radical alterity that is in a 
sense our common denominator, and from which our ethical responsibility to the 
other arises. We are all radically other to each other.  
 However, there is an impression in Levinasian ethics that the responsibility 
assumed by the subject is founded through a ‘relationship with mystery’ rather than 
also taking into account the shared attributes with the other.330 For Ettinger, this 
relationship is less mysterious, and draws from the idea that all humans come into 
the world through birth, having shared a physical space and having experienced a 
primordial understanding of interdependency, sharing and difference. In this sense, 
alterity for Ettinger is not absolute neither does it lead to a transcendental space 
defined by a sacrificial feminine as it does in Levinas’ work.331 Furthermore, the 
other and death are not conflated in Ettinger’s psychoanalytic concepts.332 Unlike our 
                                                 
329 See this thesis, pp. 82-88. 
330 Levinas, “Time and the Other,” 40. 
331 Levinas problematically conflates the feminine with woman while claiming that ‘woman is the 
category of future, the ecstasy of future.’ This quote is found in a dialogue between Levinas and 
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Emmanuel Levinas: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, Beyond Levinas: Volume IV, 
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332 Ettinger notes that the association between death and the feminine ‘underlies Freudian 
psychoanalysis in general and Lacanian theory in particular. Thus, the foreclosure of the feminine is 
vital for the phallic subject: it does indeed stand for the split from the death drive.’ Ettinger, 
““Weaving a Woman,” 177. 
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experience of the other, Ettinger makes strikingly clear that death is indeed radically 
other, an experience for which we have no reference point. For this reason, death has 
absolutely no psychic inscription and as such, cannot be theorized as an embodied 
experience that contributes to subject formation. 
On the other hand, and despite being beyond our conscious experience, birth 
does provide shared psychic inscriptions. The vulnerability of our human condition, 
of our primordial coming into the world as interdependent beings, lies at the core of 
an ethics of responsibility for the other, which is theorized through this commonality. 
Ettinger notes that this shared primordial psychic inscription informs our 
relationships to all others, while it opens up a space for trauma to be shared. 
However, to inhabit the space of sharing, the subject undergoes a process of self-
fragilisation, where one’s boundaries turn into thresholds of attunement, and from 
which an ethical engagement can come into being.  
This allusion to fragility and vulnerability is not to be confused with an ethics 
founded on a sacrifice of the self for the sake of the other (as for Levinas), rather, it 
is ‘a partial disappearing to allow jointness.’333 In other words, ethics may only be 
effectuated when the subject’s ego, and hence defence mechanisms, are resisted in 
order to facilitate the relational aspects of subjectivity.  
Reflecting on Ettinger’s notion of aesthetic wit(h)nessing as the modality by 
which we are affected by an encounter with a work of art, Griselda Pollock describes 
this ethicoaesthetic exchange as an ‘orientation towards the other’ which might not 
be driven by ‘conscious intention’ or ‘obligatory mourning and loss.’334 Rather, that 
the aesthetic encounter bears transformative potential which may be apprehended 
when it comes into contact with others; that it is the actual negotiation between the 
                                                 
333 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 145. 
334 Pollock, After-affects, 13. 
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self and other which creates the conditions for ethicality. In other words, while the 
other is indeed beyond my remit or control, the ethical responsibility towards an 
other arises during an encounter when radical differences and shared commonalities 
are in tension. This ethical sphere is not restricted to an interaction between humans, 
rather, it informs our relationship to all others: human, non-human and aesthetics. 
With particular attention to this ethical question, the philosopher Rosi 
Braidotti proposes that it is only through moving beyond the fantasy that ‘mutual 
recognition’ is possible that we can imagine a ‘mutual specification and mutual co-
dependence’ which can disrupt ‘Levinas’s tradition of making the anthropocentric 
Other into the privileged site and inescapable horizon of otherness.’335 Braidotti 
proposes an ethics ‘within a monistic ontology that sees subjects as modes of 
individuation within a common flow of zoe’ where ‘there is no self-other distinction 
in the traditional mode, but variations of intensities, assemblages set by affinities and 
complex synchronizations.’336 
In this sense, Ettinger’s theories provide a mutuality that can be traced back 
to our origins and which serves as the basis of thinking through a notion of the 
subject as interrelational and connected, yet not bound to a universal morality or 
ethically compelled by the demand for compulsory reciprocity. We can envision 
subjectivity in the matrixial sphere as relying on a state of becoming where 
differentiation between self and other does not rely on complete fusion or absolute 
rejection in order to consolidate the self.337 This different perspective of a relational 
                                                 
335 Rosi Braidotti, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 158. See in 
particular pp. 155-158 for Braidotti’s closer examination of the question of ‘containment of the other’ 
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336 Braidotti, Transpositions, 158.  
337 Discussing similar ideas of fusion and symbiosis that arise in the work of Lacan, Ettinger notes that 
there is a transgression taking place between the mother-child instead of a fusion, a relation instead of 
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ethics provided by Ettinger can inform our relationship to aesthetics (and to all 
others) and explain why encounters with art occur in a parallel sphere where the 
functions of ‘aestheticizing ethics or ethicizing aesthetics’ are rendered obsolete.338  
 
 
 
 
What is the Ontology of Becoming? 
 
 
 
Becoming is not the journey towards a state of being […] Being isn’t the state 
that one arrives at after the becoming, rather becoming is the movement of 
being. As for this movement, let me say that it is the movement that comes 
with time. 
– Yve Lomax339 
 
 
Is there a contradiction between self-resistance and becoming or does becoming 
necessitate a process of fragilising the self? In Ettinger’s matrixial theory self-
resistance is framed as the possibility of both becoming and differentiation. 
However, it is not a perpetual or endless state that borders on a complete dispersal of 
self, or an endless multiplicity as might be suggested by Deleuze and Guattari in 
their opus A Thousand Plateaus.340 Matrixial theory offers an examination of a 
relational ontology, where subjectivity is produced through a number of woven 
negotiations and encounters that can lead to an ethics of responsibility between the 
self and other. Such an ontological basis of becoming is echoed in Lomax’s 
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See, Ettinger, “Fascinance,” 78. 
338 Ettinger, “Fragilization,” 5. 
339 Lomax, Sounding the Event, 6-7. 
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investigation when she states that it would be a ‘mistake’ to think ‘that becoming has 
no being. Let’s not repeat the formula that prescribes: process is the course of 
becoming as opposed to being.’341 
In the conceptual and philosophical work of Deleuze and Guattari, the notion 
of becoming can afford a certain flexibility from models of analysis that frame the 
subject (and their desire) as a fixed category of socially-constructed existence which 
is produced, or locked into, systems of power relations. The lure of becoming in the 
practice of art-writing, is that it can unhinge thinking from the imperative to speak 
for an other or oneself as subjects with fixed identities or universal viewpoints. 
Subjectivity as becoming might also provide a way to avoid the trap of 
psychoanalytic cultural interpretations that can become prescriptions for how we are 
supposed to view a certain work of art.342 Moreover, as conventional psychoanalytic 
models can also define how we come to view the artist or their work through 
interpretations based on the self-directing or self-contained ego propounded by 
western individualism, the becoming subject resists the fixity presumed by self-
containment. However, there is also the fear that a continual process of becoming 
‘does away with the subject’ as theorist Claire Colebrook notes on the anxiety 
surrounding the use of Deleuze’s work by feminists.343 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s Immanent Ethics: Theory, Subjectivity and 
Duration, Tamsin Lorraine offers a productive antidote to the idea that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s post-identitarian politics are in conflict with a relational approach to 
subjectivity. Lorraine does not exactly use the term relationality as the conceptual 
                                                 
341 Lomax, Sounding the Event, 34.  
342 This point is addressed in Part Three, Whose Truth? Autobiographical Uses and Abuses in Writing 
about Louise Bourgeois’ Art. 
343 Claire Colebrook, introduction to Deleuze and Feminist Theory, eds. Claire Colebrook and Ian 
Buchanan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 10. 
 145 
basis of her work, but she does reframe Deleuze and Guattari’s questions around 
identity as characterized by ‘a subject who emerges from collective physiological 
and social processes,’ by reading through a number of feminist works that focus on 
the relational aspects of identity.344 Lorraine’s study highlights how ‘nomadic 
subjectivity as an alternative to oedipal subjectivity invites us to engage in a dynamic 
process of self-naming rather than reduce ourselves to static self-representations.’345  
Ettinger’s distinct notion of a becoming subject also provides an alternative 
to oedipal subjectivity, however, as far as human psychic development is concerned, 
both the matrixial and oedipal structures co-exist and work side by side. For the 
purposes of this thesis, it is the ethical dimension of the matrixial framework of 
analysis that is acutely relevant for examining how the subject is affected and 
compelled to respond to an aesthetic encounter. Ettinger’s matrixial subject enters a 
space of becoming through specific encounters that provide the affective force 
necessary for a psychic transformation to occur. In this way, these encounters are not 
exactly the habitual and banal processes we inhabit in the daily repetition we call 
life. Rather, they are unique encounters with equally unique and necessary others. 
Ettinger’s matrixial notion of ‘subjectivity-as-encounter’ can offer a lens for 
examining selfhood from the perspective of relationality, without foreclosing the 
necessary others that inform our multiple becomings. Rather, becoming is informed 
by a multiplicity of interactions and hence voices that feed into, influence and 
transform both the self and the auto/biographical art-writing. The matrixial 
framework configures subjectivity as porous, permeable and therefore prone to 
absorb and diffuse a multiplicity of interactions.  
                                                 
344 Tamsin E. Lorraine, Deleuze and Guattari's Immanent Ethics: Theory, Subjectivity, and Duration 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2011), 75. 
345 Ibid., 76. 
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In the next sections, I look to the practices of feminist movements that were 
the ground for working with and through questions of identity and self-determination 
in ways that hold difference at the basis of collectivity and political mobilization. 
These feminist encounters and models of interaction have provided the terrain from 
which much theoretical ground around relationality has been explored, with radical 
consequences for criticism, writing and the auto/biographical. For now, I turn to the 
struggle between criticism and theory to lay out the ground for a discussion on the 
materiality and politics of (art-)writing.  
 
 
 
 
“The finger pointing at the moon is not the moon”: Writing for the Other 
 
 
 
Now I am being told that philosophers are the ones who write literature, that 
authors are dead, irrelevant, mere vessels through which their narratives ooze, 
that they do not work nor have they the faintest idea what they are doing; 
rather they produce texts as disembodied as the angels.  
– Barbara Christian346 
 
 
In post-structuralist terms a relational ontology and the notion of becoming, can be 
thought of as ways to “de-center” the subject, and consequently, the authority and 
power constitutional to those who are either contingently or single-mindedly at the 
centre. The ongoing work of feminist and post-colonial writers has legitimated the 
militant practice of “de-centralization” and its direct link to power particularly 
through an examination of the relationship between the universal and the personal. 
Flourishing across work in epistemology, intersectionality and standpoint theory lies 
                                                 
346 Barbara Christian, “The Race for Theory,” Cultural Critique 6, The Nature and Context of 
Minority Discourse (Spring, 1987): 56. https://www.doi.org/10.2307/1354255. 
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the demand to consider how each individual’s experience and perspective is distinct 
and given shape through a multifaceted yet geopolitically situated specificity.347 To 
this extent, the personal narratives that ensue from an individual are unique, 
unrepeatable and carry inscriptions of an embodied textuality. In the field of literary 
studies, a number of pioneering feminist scholars and critics have taken the personal, 
the auto/biographical and the confessional as categories of thought and as genres in 
their own right.348 The US has yielded much of the output in this field, supported by 
the proliferation of women’s studies and departments institutionalising literary and 
cultural production across universities and within research departments focusing on 
the lives of women, the narratives of Black, Asian and Latina individuals, and the 
cultural production of LGBTQI communities, to name just a few. While this has 
been a significant shift from the invisibility of these contexts to a popular 
reclamation of histories and archives, what is of relevance to this research is how the 
auto/biographical has served as a strategy that moves beyond notions of equality, 
identification and self-representation in order to produce the theoretical context and 
concepts for more complex thinking around relationality to emerge.  
My framing of auto/biographical art-writing is informed by these collective 
efforts to re-orientate issues around identity and self-determination through tools that 
critically examine the politics of equality and a collective identity for woman by 
moving towards a politics of differentiation and uniqueness. For example, by 
examining how identity is created in relation and differentiation to other women in 
                                                 
347 Susan Stanford Friedman, “Women’s Autobiographical Selves: Theory and Practice,” in The 
Private Self: Theory and Practice of Women’s Autobiographical Writings, ed. Shari Benstock 
(London & New York: Routledge, 1988). Gloria Anzaldua, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New 
Mestiza (San Fransisco: Aunt Lute Book Company, 1986). bell hooks, Talking Back: Thinking 
Feminist, Thinking Black (New York & London: Routledge, 2015. First edition published by South 
End Press, 1989). 
348 Nancy K. Miller, Getting Personal: Feminist Occasions and Other Autobiographical Acts (London 
& New York: Routledge, 1991). Leigh Gilmore, Autobiographics: A Feminist Theory of Women’s 
Self-representation (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1994). 
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feminist movements, I am in a better position to understand how writing with art 
entails a specific relation which must of necessity be differentiated from universal 
viewpoints and all-encompassing categories of belonging, understanding and 
knowledge production. This line of thought feeds into how individual responses to 
affective encounters with art are produced through kindred tools, albeit in very 
different forms and contexts, but that resonate with a similar sense of urgency to 
ethically respond to an other while attempting to evaluate the position of a self in 
relation. Similarly, relational approaches necessitate a certain exposure and 
vulnerability of the self in order to encourage a dialogical engagement and make 
manifest an ethics of art-writing. In this sense, a relational subjectivity does not 
depart from the centre, nor does it find itself attracted or necessarily opposed to the 
“other” in order to constitute the self. As much as notions such as ‘becoming’ or 
relational ontologies can afford a certain “decentering,” it is not for the purpose of 
bringing the margins, peripheries and everyone else into the same melting-pot. There 
would be obvious problems of assimilation as well as a pattern of reproducing the 
same grand narratives or hegemonic structures that relationality and becoming seek 
to undo. 
The literary critic Barbara Christian notes in the often quoted polemical essay 
“The Race for Theory” that as critics our desire should be driven by the urgency to 
transform the ‘whole model’ of literary criticism rather than to canonize it.349 
Christian’s resistance to theory is an exemplary study because it clearly delineates 
two parallel trajectories for writing. In doing so, she provides distinct stylistic forms, 
as well as political purposes and epistemological reasons, to critically engage and 
reflect with an other’s creative expression.  
                                                 
349 Christian, “Race for Theory,” 61. 
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Written in 1987, Christian is caught in the midst of a take-over by the field of 
theory, and its ally post-structuralism, as the dominant methodological forms to 
analyze literary texts.350 A form that she finds ‘repulsive,’ ‘pallid,’ ‘laden with 
despair’ and ‘self-indulgent,’ particularly because of its alignment with phallocentric 
metaphysics. Such a language can only perpetuate prescriptive hegemonic discourses 
that create a split between the ‘abstract and emotional.’351 Christian’s contemptuous 
tone for theory and Western ideology has fuelled a number of critical responses that 
often reduce her arguments to a plea for anti-intellectualism. In an essay responding 
to Christian, literary critic Michael Awkward highlights what he feels is the most 
significant thread in her argument which is the urgency ‘to save the emerging, under-
appreciated Afro-American woman’s text from the types of critical marginality and 
canonical oblivion that had previously been the fate of early-and-mid-twentieth 
century products of black female imaginations.’352 However, for Awkward, it is 
through theoretical inflection that literary work ‘gain[s] the respect it doubtlessly 
deserves’ and in order to do so it is the duty of critics to ‘move beyond description 
and master the discourse of contemporary literary theory.’353 While this is certainly 
the case for most academic and institutional protocols, Awkward’s response attends 
to his own concerns without really responding to a number of questions raised in 
Christian’s manifesto. Notwithstanding that Awkward’s choice of language, with 
words such as “respect,” “master” and “discourse,” completely exemplifies the 
hegemonic form of patriarchal argumentation that Christian criticizes. Furthermore, 
                                                 
350 For a description (and defence) of the influence of theory in academic departments in the US see 
Lisa Duggan, “The Theory Wars, or, Who’s Afraid of Judith Butler?,” in Journal of Women’s History 
10, no 1 (Spring 1998): 9-19. https://doi.org/10.1353/jowh.2010.0547. 
351 Christian, “Race for Theory,” 61. 
352 Michael Awkward, “Appropriative Gestures. Theory and Afro-American Literary Criticism,” in 
African American Literary Theory: A Reader, ed. Winston Napier (New York & London: New York 
University Press, 2000), 332. 
353 Awkward, “Appropriative Gestures,” 335. 
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Awkward’s argument is centred on an antagonism between what he simplistically 
frames as “description” versus “theory,” where the latter is the preferred strategy to 
salvage the work of black female writers. 
Christian’s essay is far more complex and bears a number of intersecting 
arguments. For instance, how does one write in a way that is not burdened by 
whichever language the “canon” (the master’s discourse) has rooted at its centre? If 
literature offers ‘the possibility of the integration of feeling/knowledge, rather than 
the split between the abstract and the emotional in which Western philosophy 
inevitably indulged,’ then what are the dangers of framing black women’s writing in 
the very discourses that they seek to challenge?354 Furthermore, what form of 
language and methodology can respond to black female writers in a way that 
conserves the level of complexity and sensuality that their literary texts demand? By 
reflecting on the materiality of language and how knowledge is produced and 
disseminated, Christian’s pressing concern then becomes not only how we theorize 
or respond to literary works, but most significantly, who we do it for.  
The audience of theory is clearly not the same as the reader of literature, 
which means that Awkward’s claim that theory can distribute literature to a broader 
audience might not necessarily hold any ground, even if it can legitimize the reading 
of literary texts within the academic sphere. While visibility and reclamation are of 
utmost importance, Christian is not exactly denouncing the role of theory in literary 
criticism, rather, she is cautious that theory can overshadow the significance of 
‘activities such as teaching or writing one’s response to specific works of 
literature.’355 In this sense, what critical engagement means, or what a response to 
literature would entail, is not merely a matter of “description” as Awkward would 
                                                 
354 Christian, “Race for Theory,” 56. 
355 Ibid., 52. 
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attest. A closer examination of Christian’s text reveals that there is no fixed 
methodology that would simply replace one set of prescriptive tools to write about 
literary works with another. The point is to permit alternative forms to those that are 
hegemonic. If, for Christian, theory is the act of ‘fixing a constellation of ideas’ then 
is there an alternative process – one that would allow thoughts and emotions to flow 
with an openness to interpretation and that arises from how the reader has been 
affected on a psychophysical level? 
At this point I would like to return to the question posed at the beginning of 
this chapter: What is it about art that moves people to writing? On a political level, 
the histories of feminist art criticism and queer theory have sought to resuscitate the 
practices of female and LGBTQI artists by critically engaging with their work in 
order to give them value by rendering them visible.356 The methodology and history 
of these struggles intersects with most, if not all, of the reasons that Christian 
highlights. However, my recourse to Christian over a number of feminist art critics 
that have so vigorously historicized and theorized for over half a century, is that 
while the courageous commitment of feminist critics and theorists successfully 
continues to resuscitate or sustain the work of female artists, I am more interested in 
feminist theorists that have questioned the very methods that such a rescue mission 
would entail.  
Feminist theory quickly and easily adopted the discourses of Western modes 
of theory and raced through a number of post-structuralist, psychoanalytic and 
philosophical questions that seemed unrelated to women’s lives or unable to account 
                                                 
356 The literature produced at these intersections is now vast. For an example at the intersections of 
feminism and art see Griselda Pollock and Rozsika Parker, eds., Old Mistresses: Women, Art and 
Ideology (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); At the intersections of queer subjects, performance and 
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for their concerns. These discourses rarely questioned the role of theory as the tool 
par excellence for writing about literature, art or lives trapped in a web of ideological 
and sociocultural dominance and oppression. In this sense, vast research has been 
affixed to questioning existing (phallocentric) theories rather than proposing to 
“transform the whole model,” as Christian demands, in a way that can conceptually 
and stylistically resonate with the audiences and artists embedded in the materiality 
and context of their practices and modes of viewing. By focusing on the 
incompetency of certain frameworks of analysis, feminist criticism has often been 
too pre-occupied with transforming the roots of phallocentric discourse, with little 
acknowledgment of the creative and socio-political obstacles that artists and activists 
face and occasionally overcome.357 Which runs the danger that Christian rightly 
highlights: ‘when Theory is not rooted in practice, it becomes prescriptive, exclusive, 
elitist.’358  
I would like to turn to the historical practices that have provided a platform 
for alternative narrative practices to materialize. While the difficulty of transforming 
the entire model of criticism remains, there continue to be textual effects and 
strategies that rupture the status quo of both criticism and theory. These occasions 
have created possibilities for new methodologies to emerge that can respond to the 
contexts that they emerge from. In turn, the processes of textual production move 
                                                 
357 Unsurprisingly the critique, and the desire for an alternative methodology, finds its strongest 
proponents from the side of black feminist critics who argue that it is practice that leads to literary and 
theoretical scholarship: Joy James, “Experience, Reflection, Judgement and Action: Teaching Theory, 
Talking Community,” in Radically Speaking Feminism Reclaimed, eds. Diane Bell and Renate Klein 
(North Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 1996. E-pub edition), 170-192; Audre Lorde, “The Master's Tools 
will never dismantle the Master’s House,” in Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde 
(California: The Crossing Press Feminist Series, 1984),110-113; Trinh T. Minh-ha, “Difference: ‘A 
Special Third World Women Issue’,” in Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and 
Feminism (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1989), 79-116. For white writers see, 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, “From Practice to Theory, or What is a White Woman Anyway?” in Yale 
Journal of Law & Feminism 4, no. 1, Article 3 (1991): 13-22.  
358 Christian, “Race for Theory,” 59. The disparity between feminist theory and practice is echoed also 
in Heidi Hartmann et al, “Bringing Together Feminist Theory and Practice: A Collective Interview,” 
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beyond their designated area of interaction and into the political sphere. To partially 
answer the question of why art moves us to writing, it seems that the primary reasons 
thus far are political. However, the political impetus is the after-effect, the result and 
not the process, the finger but not the moon. 
 
 
 
 
Life’s Work: An Ethics of Storytelling 
 
 
Ethics does not furnish recipes any more than do science and art. One can 
merely propose methods. 
– Simone De Beauvoir359 
 
Christian asserts that people of color have developed distinct ways of critically and 
analytically reflecting on the world. She describes this as an activity that seeks to 
illuminate, speculate about and express lived experience through ‘narrative forms, in 
the stories we create, in riddles and proverbs, in the play with language’ which is 
closer to the verb “theorizing” than the concept “theory.”360 For Christian this is a 
significant distinction because it frames analysis as a shared activity rather than a 
product. In doing so, she claims that for people outside the western and academic 
canon ‘literature is not an occasion for discourse among critics but is necessary 
nourishment for their people and one way by which they come to understand their 
lives better.’361 To this end, forms of “theorizing” should draw from everyday life if 
they are to be heard by the community that they seek to respond to.  
                                                 
359 Simone de Beauvoir, Ethics of Ambiguity, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Carol 
Communications, 1984. First published 1949 by Citadel Press), 134. 
360 Christian, “Race for Theory,” 52.  
361 Ibid., 53. A few years later, lawyer and feminist scholar Catherine MacKinnon remarks that ‘The 
postmodern version of the relation between theory and practice is discourse unto death. Theory begets 
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The influence of feminist practices and how they have shaped discourses, 
Christian’s included, on the relationship between storytelling and politics cannot be 
overemphasized. Across continents, the women’s movements during the 1970s and 
1980s were mobilized by consciousness-raising groups whose central practice 
consisted of giving voice to women’s concerns through an exchange of personal 
stories. In To the Narrative Turn and Back: The Political Impact of Storytelling in 
Feminism, Olivia Guaraldo examines the historical importance of narrative practices 
for second-wave feminism in Italy by tracing how explorations of identity through 
self-narration became a political tool.362 Drawing from the work of political theorist 
Hannah Arendt and already informed by her longstanding relationship with the 
Italian philosopher and feminist thinker Adriana Cavarero, Guaraldo exposes how 
the practice of self-narration has served as the backbone to political agency. Arendt’s 
commitment to the idea that a subject’s freedom is conditional on their active 
participation in public life, provides the basis to think through a crucial question: if 
public, and hence political, life manifests through a patriarchal order where one’s 
appearance is conditional on one’s sex, how can women exhibit their uniqueness if 
such a space is foreclosed to them? 
Guaraldo notes that Arendt’s under-examined stress on storytelling can 
provide a way to think of freedom as the action of revealing one’s individuality, a 
praxis where ‘disclosure is at the heart […] of politics, […] shaped by the ancient 
model of the Greek polis as a space of appearance and freedom.’363 That is, through 
the act of storytelling one can actively represent their experience of, and in, public 
                                                 
no practice, only more text. It proceeds as if you can deconstruct power relations by shifting their 
markers around in your head.’ See MacKinnon, “From Practice to Theory,” 14. 
362 Olivia Guaraldo, “To the Narrative Turn and Back: The Political Impact of Storytelling in 
Feminism,” in The Travelling Concepts of Narrative, eds. Matti Hyvärinen, Mari Hatavara, and Lars-
Christer Hydén (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2013), 63-81. 
363 Guaraldo, “Narrative Turn,” 64. 
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life. As I have already examined in the section Auto/biography in Part One of this 
thesis, a large part of Arendt’s political thesis proposes that each life is a singular and 
unrepeatable existence which manifests itself through the narration of ‘who’ one is 
rather than a set of labels that define ‘what’ one is.  
Taking this proposition a step further, Cavarero examines the mechanisms of 
desire in this longing to tell one’s story. Drawing from popular ancient Greek and 
more contemporary literary narratives, Cavarero advances Arendt’s thesis to suggest 
that not only does the narration of one’s life reveal its uniqueness, but the desire to 
hear one’s story told by an other in life, epitomizes the human need to have one’s 
existence acknowledged as meaningful. In this sense Cavarero comes to equate the 
auto/biographical act with political manifestation by stating the following: 
 
It is as if, contrary to Arendt’s theory, the narrated story that produces the 
reality of the self then regards, first of all, the revealing quality of political 
action, or regards the process of narrating this life-story as if it were already a 
political action. 
Surprisingly, it is.364  
 
With such a move, Cavarero radically reconfigures the idea of both the public 
realm and the manner of manifesting political agency for, as we will see, narrative 
practices can be politically mobilizing even when they do not make their appearance 
on what has always been a patriarchal public space. Guaraldo relates this political 
praxis of storytelling to the second-wave feminist movements in Italy where, prior to 
becoming an academic discipline, narrative practice ‘gave voice to new political 
subjects and their awareness, but also contributed to renewed notions of subjectivity, 
embodied self, the relations between self and other.’365  
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365 Guaraldo, “Narrative Turn,” 63. 
 156 
There were two significant and parallel practices that came to define the 
second-wave feminist movement in Italy. Firstly, a refusal to participate and become 
co-opted into the emancipatory grand narratives of the Left, and secondly, a 
separation from the dominant women’s groups that held public protests for equality. 
Separatist feminist groups were critical of the equality agenda that often advanced 
the cause of amending legislation but usually at the sacrifice of an overall 
liberation.366  
Secondly, the practice of autocoscienza became the preferred modality to 
carve out a political sphere within a private and separatist space. Autocoscienza has 
been compared to ‘consciousness-raising groups’ in the US but is more accurately 
translated as ‘self-consciousness.’367 This focus on the ‘self’ rather than a collective 
identity puts a double stress on the idea that political engagement and collective 
liberation from patriarchal oppression must necessarily have at its root a self-
                                                 
366 The main tenet of this activity being the pro-abortion campaign with two separate positions calling 
for on the one hand “legalisation” and on the other “decriminalisation”. A mass movement led by 
“Unione Donne Italiane” was originally part of the Communist Italian Party (PCI). But it only 
effectively resulted in legalising abortion when it disassociated itself from the PCI which at the time 
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and Sandra Kemp (eds) Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader,” review of Italian Feminist Thought: A 
Reader, by Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp, in European Journal of Women's Studies, May 1994 Vol.1: 
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definition examined through sexual difference. The separatist tactics of 
autocoscienza groups have been critiqued for purporting an essentialist stance. 
However, in comparison to the dominant women’s groups, separatist groups that 
practiced autocoscienza were far more cautious of identity politics and universal 
terms and instead sought to understand their sexed difference from men, but most 
significantly their differences as women relating to each other.  
This original mode of relating and narrative expression consolidated a 
number of political concerns that were then strategically aimed at the public through 
the production of texts published by the Rivolta Femminile Group.368 Most 
importantly, on a micro-level, it leaked desires and subjectivities into symbolic 
existence. The practice of sexual difference continues to be a strategy that 
distinguishes the concerns of women, collectively and individually, from the general 
struggle of dominant political movements. Furthermore, it proclaims the 
differentiation between women and the uniqueness of their lives as (her)stories worth 
repeating. Guaraldo captures this strategy succinctly as ‘rather than being freed from 
oppression, Italian feminists aimed at being free to practice sexual difference.’369 
Autocoscienza inaugurated the possibility of turning the everyday practice of 
storytelling into a political tool with which women could carve out their symbolic 
existence ‘outside the gaze of the other,’ simultaneously leading to an awareness of 
how identity is interpellated by social roles and imperatives.370  
This practice is captured in Cavarero’s project Relating Narratives: 
Storytelling and Selfhood in the chapter ‘On the Outskirts of Milan.’371 Cavarero 
                                                 
368 See for instance the essays in Marta Lonzi et al. È Già Politica (Milano: Scritti di Rivolta 
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revisits the encounter between two women, Emilia and Amalia, reported in what is 
considered a foundational book of Italian Feminism, Don’t Think You Have Any 
Rights (Non credere di avere dei diritti), assembled by the Milan Women’s 
Bookstore.372 Amalia, being more adept at writing, and having heard Emilia narrate 
her story numerous times, decides to write Emilia’s story. In her selfless act, the gift 
of a story becomes a gesture which simultaneously serves as a recognition of the 
‘ontological roots of this [Emilia’s] desire,’ and makes manifest in narrative form the 
unity of Emilia’s identity, the unrepeatable quality of ‘who’ she is.373 Amalia tells 
Emilia’s story to her, thus fulfilling Emilia’s desire to hear her story narrated back to 
her in life. Amalia also tells Emilia’s story for her, thus vigorously engaging in an act 
of loving attention, towards her precious and unique existence.  
By telling Emilia’s story to her and for her, Amalia transforms the banality of 
living – what Cavarero calls following Arendt ‘an intolerable sequence of events’ – 
into a life worthy of narration.374 But unity and identity are not to be conflated here. 
The unity provided by the story of one’s self is a temporary relief from a sequence of 
identities that one inhabits – the ‘what’ one is – whether self-defined or socially 
inscribed. That is, Cavarero makes no claim towards authenticity or the idea of a 
“true” self, where through the narration of one’s story, the self is unified and thus 
transcended. The quest for one’s story is not a quest for a fixed identity. Rather, the 
motivation for one’s story stems from a desire to appear to others, to be seen for 
‘who’ one is in their uniqueness, and in order to do so one ‘needs first of all a plural 
– and therefore political – space of interaction.’375  
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University Press, 1990). 
373 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 56. 
374 Ibid. 
375 Ibid., 58. 
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It is in this sense that subjectivity can be thought of as more closely aligned 
to the concept of becoming as a post-identitarian method for thinking through the 
subject. In a similar vein to Cavarero’s storytelling between women, Bracha L. 
Ettinger reflects on psychic processes of differentiation and how they can be 
activated through the aesthetic sphere: 
 
Femininity, in Freud’s conception, is femininity in or for men – men who 
project what the feminine should be for women. When the artist, for example 
James Joyce (for Lacan) or Leonardo da Vinci (for Freud), 
materializes/realizes “woman,” his creation is a poetic writing or a painting. 
He exposes/creates a symbolic relation the likes of which was hitherto 
unknown. What if a woman artist orients questions on/of/from the feminine 
toward an Other-woman and realizes/incarnates “woman” in writing or in 
painting?376  
 
Such a process of subjectivisation is produced through contact with someone 
– unique and unrepeatable – whereby the contact itself generates a transformed unity. 
It is also where the practice of autocoscienza and Cavarero’s notion of a narratable 
self become politically and ethically aligned. The radical feminist thinker Carla 
Lonzi has come to define the practice of autocoscienza and, in a sense, undo its 
affinities with identification in a series of texts published by the Rivolta Femminile 
group, including the following concise definition: 
 
this is what I call autocoscienza: a mode of action where the speaker becomes 
conscious of both finding and recognising the self through their expression. 
That no truth exists outside this adherence or in the use of interpretative tools. 
Of course it is not easy – often it seems hopeless – but who said that it would 
be easy and not hopeless?377 
 
(E questo chiamo autocoscienza: fare in modo che chi parla prenda 
coscienza che trovare se stesso è riconoscersi nell’espressione di sé, che non 
esiste verità al di fuori nell’adesione o nell’uso di chiavi interpretative. Certo 
                                                 
376 Ettinger, “With-In-Visible Screen,” 119-120. 
377 Carla Lonzi, “Mito Della Proposta Culturale,” in La Presenza Dell’Uomo nel Femminismo 
(Milano: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1978), 147. Unless otherwise stated, all translations of Carla 
Lonzi’s work are mine in collaboration with Giulia Casalini.  
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non è facile, spesso è disperante, ma chi ha detto che sarebbe stato facile e 
non disperante?) 
 
 
The concept of the narratable self reveals how identity does not follow 
identification. That is, our relationship with others is not based on a need to find 
commonalities and therefore mirror our selves on others. Rather, relation is the 
condition by which we come to experience our lives as valuable, unique, different 
from and transformed by others. This idea foregrounds our understanding of the self 
as first and foremost a relational entity. Cavarero compactly remarks that: 
 
The self – to the extent to which a who is not reducible to a what – has a 
totally external and relational reality. Both the exhibitive, acting self and the 
narratable self are utterly given over [consegnati] to others. In this total 
giving over, there is therefore no identity that reserves for itself protected 
spaces or a private room of impenetrable refuge for self-contemplation. There 
is no interiority that can imagine itself [autofabularsi] to be an inexpressible 
value. What is more, since the scene of action is contextual and mutable, the 
reality of the self is necessarily intermittent and fragmentary. The story that 
results therefore does not have at its center a compact and coherent identity. 
Rather, it has at its center an unstable and insubstantial unity, longed for by a 
desire that evokes the figure – or rather, the unmasterable design – of a life 
whose story only others can recount.378 
 
 
In relation to auto/biographical art-writing, another way to envision the 
intersection between relationality and the auto/biographical would be through its 
practice. That is, to think of the narrative form as an act that unfolds from a space of 
relationality. In this sense, narrative practices are not simply occasions for self-
reflection, identification or validation by an other. They necessitate the unique other 
in order to materialize the relational and reciprocal mode – a modality that can 
challenge aspects of one’s identity. As Guaraldo notes, the practice of sharing stories 
                                                 
378 Cavarero, Relating Narratives, 63. 
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becomes an occasion for differentiation which reveals that ‘identity is not trapped in 
empathic or mirroring [but is] instead located in a relational practice.’379 
It is such an activity that came to define the practice of Autocoscienza and the 
self-actualization it offered to the numerous women that participated in the Rivolta 
Femminile group and the ongoing work of the Milan Bookstore. But while this 
practice cemented ideas of how the self is relational and in opposition to the myth of 
the universal (self-contained) subject, it also reconfigured the idea of political agency 
as having to exist in a predefined public and patriarchal space. Taken to its extreme 
form, the private, the personal and the relational created what may be considered as 
one of the most radical manifestations of art criticism produced by the writer and 
feminist Carla Lonzi.  
 
 
 
 
From the Politics of Self-determination to the Politics of “Deculturalization”380 
 
 
 
P. – You won’t even accept that an artwork should be exhibited in a gallery. 
C. – It’s different in the case of art. An artwork does not come into 
contradiction with itself. 
P. – However there is the gallerist who is in contradiction and the visitor who 
is in contradiction. 
C. – From your point of view, no. Because they are all in the service of art 
which is… 
P. – But you, when you write a book, do you not want that service for your 
book? Do you not want someone to read a page?... 
                                                 
379 Guaraldo, “Narrative Turn,” 78. 
380 See Carla Lonzi, “Let’s Spit on Hegel,” in Sputiamo su Hegel. La Donna Clitoridea e la Donna 
Vaginale (Milano: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1974), 47. In this provocative manifesto Lonzi coins 
the word deculturazione, translated here as “deculturalization”, to describe the process and necessity 
to exit the cultural sphere as it is created for and produced by patriarchal ideology. Lonzi claims that 
this process does not bring about ‘a cultural revolution which follows and integrates a structural 
revolution, nor is it based on the validation on the levels of an ideology; rather, it affirms the absence 
of any need for ideology at all.’  
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C. – I want someone to read this page, but I do not want that they place 
themselves in a servile condition in light of my page. Furthermore, this type 
of page does not evoke one’s servility because it would make them feel stupid 
in front of me. Once they have read who I am, do you really imagine that they 
will want to create a ceremony to celebrate me? They would not even consider 
it. 
 
– Carla Lonzi in dialogue with her lover and artist Pietro Consagra381 
 
 
Carla Lonzi could have not been more mistaken about the numerous celebrations that 
have taken place in memory of her life and work following her passing away in 
1982. While the majority of her work has yet to be officially and comprehensively 
published in English, there have been a number of conferences, events and 
gatherings both in Italy and abroad that have taken the legacy of her thought as a 
departure point.382 Yet, there is still much work to be done in order to reactivate and 
recognize her revolutionary contributions to both criticism and feminism with ideas 
that are as pertinent as ever in contemporary discussions of culture and ideology. 
Lonzi’s exasperation with the cultural system started to take shape through 
her own practice as a critic and intensified beyond reconciliation during her long-
term relationship with the artist Pietro Consagra. Unable to overcome the 
contradictions posed by the art realm’s inauthenticity and ideological frameworks, 
                                                 
381 Carla Lonzi, Vai Pure: Dialogo con Pietro Consagra, (Milano: et al. S.r.l., 2011. First published 
1980 by Scritti di Rivolta Femminile), 52. 
382 The most recent and larger scale events include the public programme Now You Can Go, London 
(The Showroom, the ICA, Space Studios and Raven Row), 1-13 December 2015 
(http://nowyoucango.tumblr.com/); the conference Carla Lonzi: Art Critic and Feminist, organised by 
the Travelling Feminism research group (http://travellingfeministe.org/blog) at Maison Rouge, Paris, 
11 January 2013, with contributions by Lucia Aspesi, Chiara Fumai, Elisabeth Lebovici, Griselda 
Pollock, Dora Stiefelmeier, Francesco Ventrella and Giovanna Zapperi; In Italy the conference Shut 
up, actually speak: Carla Lonzi and the art of feminism at Casa Internazionale delle Donne, Rome, 5-
7 March 2010. In 1993, Anne-Marie Sauzeau honored Lonzi’s contribution to art criticism during the 
Venice Biennale of the same year. Noted in the preface by Giovanna Zapperi of the French translation 
of Autoritratto: Carla Lonzi, Autoportrait, translated by Marie-Ange Maire-Vigueur, edited and 
prefaced by Giovanna Zapperi, (Paris-Zurich, JRP Ringier, 2012), 7-35. 
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Lonzi declared that the art system was simply reproducing the same patriarchal 
injustices found in relations between men and women, artists and lovers, genius and 
muse, public and private. Despaired by this restrictive and partisan function, and also 
finding herself complicit in it as a critic, Lonzi’s mission to extrapolate herself from 
this apparatus started with the provocative publication of Autoritratto (Self-Portrait).  
The book includes art, artists, their conversations, Lonzi’s poetry and her 
photographs, folded into a fragmented and non-linear assemblage of a story, as well 
as becoming an exemplification of her ideas on the intimate relations between the 
critic and the artists. Yet, her radical departure from art criticism which started with 
Autoritratto had such an enduring course that she found herself, almost a decade 
later, trying to repetitively explain her dilemma to Pietro Consagra in a four-day 
dialogue which she recorded. The opening epigraph is a snippet of their conversation 
which, following their break up, Lonzi transcribed and published under the caustic 
title Now You Can Go: Dialogue with Pietro Consagra (Vai Pure: Dialogo con 
Pietro Consagra). In their conversation, Lonzi explains that her mission is to 
produce and inhabit an alternative reality to the culture that causes her such despair. 
An alternative art world and sociality described as one which is: 
 
based on human relations, on reciprocal communication, on the proper 
demolition of the cultural myth of the protagonist. It is based on making 
visible how things happen always through dialogue, that truths are always in 
a condition of relation.383 
 
(si basa sul rapporto umano, sulla conoscenza reciproca, sulla demolizione 
proprio del mito culturale del protagonista. Si basa sul far vedere che le cose 
si svolgono sempre attraverso un dialogo, che le verità sono sempre in un 
rapporto.) 
 
                                                 
383 Lonzi, Vai Pure, 40. 
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Artists, we discover in her dialogue with Pietro Consagra, are also 
acquiescent pawns within the system of criticism and its attendant functions of value 
or exclusion. Their conversation reveals how art mainly functions as the object of 
criticism, but should instead be considered as a process-based activity that extends 
beyond the packaged myth of the “artist-hero-genius” and the auxiliary critic. In this 
way, Lonzi attempts to expose the necessarily interrelational dimension of both art 
and subjectivity. However, it might be best to use the word creativity when referring 
to Lonzi’s use of the positive aspects of art.384 With a series of actions, including her 
theoretical and political work that was starting to take shape with the feminist group 
Rivolta Femminile, it was nevertheless Autoritratto that initiated a defining process 
and resulting embodiment of her thoughts on art criticism. 
 Lonzi’s ultimate aim was to dismantle the role of the critic and in that move 
she inevitably dismantles the critic within herself. But, the book itself, calculated in 
its methodology, spills unto uncharted narrative territory and soaks the landscape of 
art criticism with a move that resembles Cavarero’s philosophical strategy of a 
“reciprocal communication of voices.”385 Arguing against the foundations of 
metaphysical claims, Cavarero’s main critique falls on the Artistotelian distinction 
between the political animal (zoon politikon) and the rational animal (zoon logon 
echon). The political animal is a creature which congregates and flourishes in the 
polis or community of other political animals, while the rational animal is that which 
possesses reason through recourse to speech [logos]. Cavarero’s critique is rather 
                                                 
384 The art historian Francesco Ventrella also highlights this distinction and notes that Lonzi continued 
to refer to ‘creativity as a mode of self-emancipation’, but by replacing the use of the word “art” or 
“aesthetics” with ‘creativity and making (il fare).’ See Francesco Ventrella, “Carla Lonzi’s Artwriting 
and the Resonance of Separatism,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 21, no. 3 (2014): 282–287, 
accessed March 18, 2015. 
385 Adriana Cavarero, For More Than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression, trans. 
Paul A. Kottman (California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 197. 
 165 
simple, and far from unique in this respect, as it exposes the logocentric focus that 
underlies discourses on political agency and subjectivity.386 
The rational animal requires language rather than simply a voice to make 
itself audible and hence to inhabit a political space. In this sense, Aristotle’s 
distinction relegates “the voice” and all non-human animals to an inferior position by 
advancing a logocentric notion of both reason and politics. To the contrary, Cavarero 
foregrounds the voice in an attempt to understand how the act of simply ‘speaking to 
one another, rather than language’ moves beyond signification and towards a 
communication of each being’s uniqueness.387 Whether polyvocal or a dialogue 
between two individuals, what comes to the fore of a voiced exchange is the 
embodied singularity of each participant regardless of what they are saying. A scene 
of spoken interaction then creates a space for politics, in the sense that the reciprocal 
communication (linguistic or otherwise) is in itself the political sphere where one 
appears to the other. By stressing the singularity of the speaker’s voice as that which 
is made possible through their unique appearance in the world, language and 
semantics take on a secondary role to the material effect of an embodied voice.  
This strategy must be kept in mind when thinking through the polyvocal 
textual collage of Lonzi’s Autoritratto. In this work, we are not only presented with a 
representation of polyvocality or a dialogue between artists, friends and critics. 
                                                 
386 In the appendix of For More than One Voice, Cavarero offers a lengthy critique of philosopher 
Jacques Derrida’s thesis on the metaphysics of phonocentrism while acknowledging that his 
‘speculation on the phone, not to mention on écriture, has oriented, unsettled, and challenged the 
entire course of my research.’ On the contradictions found in both Cavarero’s and Derrida’s 
arguments, independent scholar Jane Jones argues that Derrida and Cavarero are actually ‘in accord 
that ideality is principally produced by the hypostasising and delineating action of the eye, or by 
philosophy thought as contemplative theory.’ However, Cavarero’s critique leads Jones to agree that 
certain ambiguous passages by Derrida could be read as reproducing ‘the metaphysical determination 
of speech as diaphanous immateriality, and hence repeat[ing] the tradition’s tendency […] to reduce 
the meaning of voice to its semantic, ideal element, while flaying and discarding its sonorous excess 
as literal insignificance.’ See Jane Jones, “On the Subject of the Voice: Reading Cavarero, Reading 
Derrida,” unpublished paper delivered at the conference Giving Life to Politics: The Work of Adriana 
Cavarero. University of Brighton, 19-21 Jun 2017. 
387 Cavarero, For More Than One Voice, 197. 
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Lonzi’s action is not a benign new form of art criticism, but it can instead be thought 
of as a political manifestation of Cavarero’s point that:  
 
even those philosophies that value “dialogue” and “communication” remain 
imprisoned in a linguistic register that ignores the relationality already put in 
action by the simple reciprocal communication of voices.388 
 
As powerful as the book may be as an artifact or statement of Lonzi’s critical 
and political persuasions, the underlying rupture of any sense of “proper” 
communication, performed within the sphere of art criticism, makes Autoritratto 
irreducible to a book that can be read as a truly dialogical text. In her introduction to 
Autoritratto, Laura Iamurri optimistically remarks that Lonzi was trying to ‘make 
room for the authentic voice of the artist’ (lasciare spazio alla voce autentica 
dell’artista).389 However, the telling title of the book is ‘Self-Portrait’ (Autoritratto) 
and not ‘Self-Portraits’ (Autoritratti) which further consolidates ideas of singular 
authorship. Similarly, Giovanna Zapperi notes in her introduction to the French 
publication of Lonzi’s work: 
 
Following its title, Autoritratto places the ‘I’ of the author at its centre, but it 
does so through a horizontal and non-hierarchical relation which is woven 
with other voices – those of the artists – enmeshed in the book.390 
 
(Autoritratto met au centre, dès son titre, le moi de l’auteur, mais le fait à 
partir de la relation horizontale et non-hiérarchique qui se noue avec les 
autres voix – celles des artistes – impliquées dans le livre.) 
 
 
                                                 
388 Cavarero, For More Than One Voice, 16. 
389 Laura Iamurri, introduction to Autoritratto, by Carla Lonzi (Milano: et al. S.r.l., 2010. First 
published 1969 by De Donato), x. 
390 Giovanna Zapperi, ‘L’autoportrait d’une femme’, preface to Autoportrait, by Carla Lonzi, trans. 
Marie-Ange Maire-Vigueur (Paris-Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2012), 7-35. Translation to English mine in 
collaboration with Giulia Casalini. While Zapperi is right to note the centrality of the author, it is 
arguable whether Lonzi’s gesture was truly horizontal and non-hierarchical. I elaborate on this aspect 
shortly. 
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While Lonzi returns to ideas of truth and authenticity for women and artists, 
we should be careful to note that it is those that have no symbolic reference within 
patriarchal culture that are caught in a struggle to carve out an authentic symbolic 
space beyond or beside the existing patriarchal cultural landscape. Within is not an 
option for Lonzi, which also foretells her future political strategies.  
Shortly after Autoritratto, Lonzi departs from the sphere of art criticism and 
fully embraces autocoscienza and diary-writing as the proper means of discovering 
and disclosing one’s authenticity. In this sense, Lonzi’s defiant collage of recorded 
voices in Autoritratto is more of a testament to how a scene of reciprocal 
communication is played out, and here performed in textual form. Reminiscent of 
Cavarero’s strategy, Autoritratto urges us to examine how it is only through a 
‘corporeal communication of uniqueness’391 that we come to truly exercise our 
“voice” on a political level.  
The stylistic execution of this work also relies on having put in place a 
calculated action, a very serious joke and a creative exercise of a single 
author drilling into a space, to make space, for a particular politics to be enacted. To 
reiterate, for Lonzi it was necessary to create a space that could render “visible” how 
artists produce work through their engagement with the world and that all subjects 
exist, create and are transformed through “a condition of relation.” The space that 
Lonzi aims to discover is one that, unlike her personal sphere of art criticism, is at 
once impartial yet intimate. The artistic realm has long been hijacked by what Lonzi 
describes as the ‘false dichotomy: creativity-criticism’ (falsa dissociazione: 
creazione-critica) which can only survive within a particular ideological system.392 
A system that she compares to the Ecclesiastical apparatus that produces a utilitarian, 
                                                 
391 Cavarero, For More Than One Voice, 199. 
392 Lonzi, Autoritratto, 5. 
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value-based rationale for consumption and identification to be transacted 
(Consumare l’arte […] identificarsi come pubblico).393  
The operation here will again remind us of another of Cavarero’s strategies, 
namely, that of theft and betrayal. Cavarero steals female figures from the narratives 
of ancient Greek texts and re-writes them in a way that betrays their original 
purpose.394 Lonzi steals the narratives out of their primary function – as recordings 
between artist and critic that were initially for the sake of art criticism – and animates 
them as non-linear fractured dialogues (monologues, vocal pauses and interjections, 
images, poems) in a manner that puts the very methods of art criticism at stake. 
Through this modus operandi, Lonzi performs a textual strategy that ruptures both 
identification and consumption. The narratives and the voices are not in this case the 
object of analysis. Contrary to Zapperi’s assertion of a ‘horizontal and non-
hierarchical relation,’ I would argue that it does not matter what the artists have to 
say about art in Autoritratto. As Lonzi clearly states, ‘the dialogues where not 
generated as material for a book’ (I discorsi non sono nati come materiali di un 
libro).395 Nor is her tactic a way to really expose the authenticity or truth of the artist 
– this would simply fall into the trap of fetishizing the artist. Her strategy exemplifies 
how the book becomes a scene where Lonzi “performs” an operation of displacing 
both the critic and the artist by: 
resituating him in another relationship within society, one that negates the 
role, and therefore the power, of his repressive control over art and artists, 
especially since the ideology of art and of the artist, is well underway in our 
society. 
 
(richiamarlo in un altro rapporto con la societa, negando il ruolo, e percio il 
potere, del critico in quanto controllo repressivo sull’arte e gli aritisti, e 
                                                 
393 Lonzi, Autoritratto, 5.  
394 See Cavarero, Plato. See also, Chapter One of this thesis for an elaboration of Cavarero’s strategy. 
395 Lonzi, Autoritratto, 3. 
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soprattutto in quanto ideologia dell’arte e degli artisti in corso nella nostra 
societa).396  
 
In this sense, Lonzi reclaims what truly matters to her, to the extent that she 
renders her political ideas into a complete representation, both in textual form as a 
book as well as an embodiment with her departure from the sphere of criticism. What 
truly matters in Autoritratto is then Carla Lonzi’s own Autoritratto: the “self-
portrait” of a critic who has rejected her privileged role and auxiliary power by re-
situating herself within the fabric of artistic and other social and political relations.  
Lonzi’s radical move can place her readers in an ethical dilemma: how do we, 
as critics, theorists or readers, approach Autoritratto? How do we “read” it? Are we 
reading “it” or are we reading “Carla”? Are we supposed to conduct any critical 
reading at all when in doing so we can run the risk of rendering “it” into a “text,” a 
fetishized object and not a ‘relationship with society’ (rapporto con la societa)? It is 
this contradiction that I imagine Lonzi found herself lodged into when listening back 
to the voices of lovers, friends, allies, their breath, giggles and sighs; signs of the 
inextricable connection between creativity and life. And it is this predicament that 
glaringly revealed that the identity Carla “the critic” is irreconcilable with Carla the 
lover, friend, ally.  
As we have come to understand, Lonzi’s project does not aim to transform 
the forms of criticism by way of introducing the auto/biographical and cross-genre 
format into criticism, which she, nevertheless, executes with calculated finesse. It is 
not the book’s form or textual interplay that is of any political significance. It is what 
happens in our everyday communication with artists, their work, our lived and shared 
experiences and how they make their way into creative processes such as Carla’s 
                                                 
396 Lonzi, Autoritratto, 4. 
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book, Carla’s Self-Portrait and hence Carla’s life. Autoritratto seems to be Lonzi’s 
definitive shift towards feminist activism. However, I would like to suggest that it 
was also an occasion that unfolded a form of writing that replaces the methodology 
of art criticism with what would soon become for Lonzi the most profound relation 
to both politics and creativity: the diary. 
 
 
 
 
Writing the Self: A Creative and Political Act 
 
 
 
It is a tenet of feminist rhetoric that the personal is political, but who 
in the academy acts on this where language is concerned? We all speak the 
father tongue, which is impersonal, while decrying the fathers’ ideas.  
– Jane Tompkins397 
 
Lonzi argued that, conventionally, a book of criticism has the aim of exalting the 
artist, their work and the critic to the level of authoritative voice. With the 
publication of Autoritratto, Lonzi moved away from art criticism, towards a form of 
writing that simultaneously unfolded a political space parallel to, and not within, 
phallocentric culture. A recollection and collection of stories and herstories, poems 
and photographs, personal and professional, interwoven into textual form outside 
their original space and time. This form most closely resembles Lonzi’s diary, 
written between the years 1972-1977 and published in 1978.398 Both books are in a 
sense an ongoing attempt to reveal the uniqueness, embodiment and interrelation of 
an individual to equally unique others, while simultaneously forming the basis of a 
                                                 
397 Jane Tompkins, “Me and My Shadow,” in The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, ed. 
Vincent B. Leitch (London & New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 2135. 
398 Lonzi, Taci, Anzi Parla. Diario di una Femminista (Milano: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1978). 
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new politics. In her discussion with Consagra, Lonzi explicates the function of her 
diary: 
 
[it] makes visible all these moments in which a click of consciousness 
corresponds to a process that is not as prestigious as a conscious click. This 
non-prestigious moment is always hidden, and it is there that woman is 
present. The conscious leap is assumed by man who then leaps into a cultural 
shift, and so forth. 
 
(il mio diario fa vedere tutti questi momenti in cui a uno scatto di coscienza 
corrisponde un processo che non è prestigioso come lo scatto di coscienza. 
Questo momento non prestigioso viene sempre nascosto, ed è quello in cui la 
donna è presente. Il salto di coscienza viene assunto dall’uomo che ne fa poi 
un salto di cultura, e così via.)399 
 
Lonzi’s quest for authenticity, through the practice of diary writing, in the 
same stroke reveals that identity (and creativity) is not a given but an ongoing and 
transformative dialogical process in a condition of relation. Autoritratto is Lonzi’s 
artistic gesture and in its production replaces Carla the critic with Carla the writer. 
As she notes, ‘if art is not amongst my resources as creation, it certainly is as 
creativity, as a consciousness of art for the disposition of the good.’ (Se l’arte non e 
nelle mie risorse come creazione, lo e come creativita, come coscienza dell’arte 
nella disposizione al bene).400  
What can this relationship between creativity and a “click of consciousness” 
tell us about the practice of writing and how it informs subjectivity? As we have 
seen, for Lonzi, the role of the critic, or writing in the form of art criticism, poses a 
contradiction to how we should encounter a work of art and write about it. Therefore, 
how else could one respond to a work of art, or even Lonzi’s writing? Could it be 
perhaps that Lonzi would expect a response in the form of a creative gesture, one that 
defies systems of value, validation and consumption; one that does not seek to 
                                                 
399 Lonzi, Vai Pure, 41. 
400 Lonzi, Autoritratto, 5. 
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venerate the author even if, in our case, it happens to be Carla Lonzi. Perhaps in its 
most radical version we would also do away with the critic, the critic in ourselves, 
and relate to Lonzi’s creative act on an affective level, beyond the Ecclesiastics of 
theory and criticism. What would such an engagement look like? 
By turning our attention to the first person perspective of the diary form we 
can trace the ways in which writing informs both the self and in turn the political 
sphere. Lonzi’s diary writing does not come with sociocultural or professional 
pressures, and it is the lack of this pressure that makes writing for Lonzi a liberating 
and creative activity.401 
In the very short essay, The Myth of the Cultural Offer where Lonzi takes 
issue with how patriarchal ideology bolsters cultural capital, she states: 
 
To write is a public act. One writes in order to express and resonate with 
oneself, because an other could also express herself and offer resonance. 
Every other form of writing is a manifestation of cultural insertion. If a 
woman does not recognize herself in an other woman, then it is man who is 
acknowledged. This is how his culture becomes validated. 402 
 
[Scrivere è un atto pubblico. Si scrive per esprimersi e dare risonanza, perché 
un’altra possa esprimersi e dare risonanza. Ogni altro modo di scrivere è una 
manifestazione di inserimento culturale. Se non ci si riconosce l’una con 
l’altra chi è riconosciuto è l’uomo: viene coi avvalorata la sua cultura.]  
 
 
The art historian Francesco Ventrella elaborates on how the tactic of 
“resonance” [risonanza] offered the separatist feminist groups the possibility to 
employ creative means to explore forms of dialogue and selfhood that were in 
                                                 
401 Queer and feminist theorist Ann Cvetkovich provides a contemporary response to how external 
social forces (in this case neoliberal capitalism) exert pressure on the writer to produce conventional 
forms of writing. Noting the anxiety and resulting depression that academia produces for the writer, 
Cvetkovich argues that the polemical and memoir, as modes of writing and thinking, can produce new 
forms of theory, as well as adequately capture the ‘intersections of mind and body’ and ‘the embodied 
senses.’ See Ann Cvetkovich, Depression: A Public Feeling (Durham & London: Duke University 
Press, 2012), 24. 
402 Carla Lonzi, “Mito Della Proposta Culturale,” in La Presenza Dell’Uomo nel Femminismo 
(Milano: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1978), 137. 
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contrast to the methodologies offered by patriarchal culture.403 As Lonzi’s ideas of 
writing are inextricably linked to the practices of feminism, it is no surprise that the 
act of writing, her personal form of creativity, became a political tool. Or, to phrase it 
another way, the act of writing the self is in itself a political act. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
403 Ventrella, “Lonzi’s Artwriting,” 284. 
174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART THREE 
 
Reading Auto/biographical Art-writing 
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By returning to some of the arguments provided by feminist theoretical 
investigations in narrative practice, my aim was to critically reflect on what it means 
to write with art in a political sense. What can Lonzi’s radical departure from 
criticism mean for auto/biographical art-writing? What can be gleaned from 
Christian’s demand for a mode of writing that can capture the sensuality of 
language? Who is the writing for? What relationship to thinking does such writing 
have? What can it inadvertently promote in a capitalist context? How might the 
personal be implicated in the neoliberal climate? Can writing with offer a critique of 
hegemonic discourses? 
Art-writing might be the only documentation that survives an actual event, 
for instance, in the engagement with ephemeral practices such as live art 
performance, street interventions and work that insists on being not only 
undocumentable but also unrepresentable. Can and should auto/biographical art-
writing participate in such a rescue mission? Is the purpose of such writing to 
canonize the artwork and the textual method? Or, is it a process that can remain 
private, just like the diary form and still retain its political and psychic force? 
Furthermore, can it provide an alternative methodology for reading as well as writing 
with art? These are some of the questions that I confronted throughout the course of 
this thesis. Some of these questions will, at least temporarily, remain unanswered. If 
the previous literature has provided any sort of insight, it should be that such answers 
must come from practice and they should be context-specific.   
Part Three can then be considered the “practical” part of the thesis. In 
Chapter One, Whose Truth? Autobiographical Uses and Abuses in Writing about Art, 
I examine how autobiographical narratives have been employed to interpret Louise 
Bourgeois’ artwork in order to expose some of the problems that arise with this 
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methodology and to distinguish it from auto/biographical art-writing. With Chapter 
Two, “How to get inside a Star?” Death through Life Writing in the poetry of Anne 
Sexton, I make a tentative attempt at synthesizing the theoretical concepts that have 
been presented thus far in order to provide a reading of auto/biographical art-writing 
in the work of poet Anne Sexton. In Chapter Three, Love Is What You Fear: Reading 
Tracey Emin with Hélène Cixous, I present my own provisional (yet experienced as 
intensely psychophysical) erotic response to Emin’s artwork Why Be Afraid in 
auto/biographical art-writing format.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
Whose Truth? Autobiographical Uses and Abuses in Writing about Art 
 
 
As soon as the immortal works of the past became the object of social and 
individual refinement and the status accorded to it, they lost their most 
important and elemental quality, which is to grasp and move the reader or the 
spectator over the centuries. 
– Hannah Arendt404 
 
Gigantic and fragmented, enigmatic and suggestive, this sculpture or 
installation solicits, yet resists, a narrative approach. 
– Mieke Bal405 
                                                      
404 Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture,” in Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political 
Thought (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), 203. 
405 Mieke Bal, Louise Bourgeois’ Spider: The Architecture of Art-Writing (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2001), 5. 
 
Fig. 5 Louise Bourgeois, Janus Fleuri, 1968. 
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The discovery of Louise Bourgeois’ diaries and notebooks following her death in 
2010, contained psychoanalytical writings which had fueled a new frenzy of interest 
in the relationship between Bourgeois’ psychic and creative world.406 The fact that 
Bourgeois had a profound theoretical engagement with psychoanalysis, and also a 
therapeutic engagement with the analyst Dr. Henry Lowenfeld for over 30 years, 
seemed to provide further proof of how her work was a conveyor of childhood 
traumas. Bourgeois herself has been considered one of the first “confessional” artists, 
often relaying stories of her work and its relationship to her childhood, mother, father 
and father’s mistress. These confessions would take the shape of very intimate 
statements about her life, experiences and emotional states.407 Drawing similarities 
between her autobiography and her work, Bourgeois states in an interview from 
1971: ‘My sculpting world and my living world are one.’408 Renowned curator Hans 
Ulrich Obrist notes in the preface to Bourgeois’ writing and interviews, that her 
words ‘are less about the meaning of her art than about the emotional forces behind 
it: namely, her autobiography, past and present experience.’409 The relationship 
between an artwork’s meaning and an artist’s biography might seem indivisible, 
nevertheless, there are at least two distinct partners in that relationship. Often, 
Bourgeois described her practice as a different emotional process from the resulting 
artwork. However, as she did not shy away from layering her own work with 
                                                      
406 See the exhibition The Return of the Repressed held at the Freud Museum in London during May 
2012 (http://www.freud.org.uk/exhibitions/74492/louise-bourgeois-the-return-of-the-repressed). On 
the publication of Bourgeois’ diaries, Pollock notes that ‘not only does Bourgeois reveal more about 
her own shifting psychic life, anguish and struggle to master depression, food-loathing and anxieties 
about abandonment, but also she disallows projective speculation about her psychic life derived from 
biographically reductive reading of her sculptures as forms of psychic notation.’ See, Pollock, After-
affects, 89. 
407 Robert Pincus-Witten, Bourgeois Truth, Exhibition Catalogue (New York: Robert Miller, 1982) 
408 Louise Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father Reconstruction of the Father: Writings and Interviews 
1923-1997, eds. Marie-Laure Bernadac and Hans-Ulrich Obrist (London: Violette Editions, 1998), 96. 
409 Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father, 15. 
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psychological interpretations, her work is for the most part referred to as 
autobiographical or confessional. 
In an earlier interview from 1969 she is asked to talk about the reputable 
work Janus Fleuri (1968) [fig. 7]. Her lengthy response offers a rigorous description 
of the contrast in the formal characteristics of the work as well as a vocabulary that 
alludes to contradicting psychological states. Bourgeois notes the ‘permanence of 
bronze, although it was conceived in plaster,’ the way the sculpture hangs and how it 
is ‘simple in outline but elusive and ambivalent in its references.’410 She draws 
analogies between the symmetrical nature of the sculpture and the symmetry of the 
human body, saying that its physical form reveals ‘a double facial mask, two breasts, 
two knees.’411 She concludes her description by remarking that the sculpture is hung 
in a way that ‘indicates passivity, but its low slung mass expresses resistance and 
duration. It is perhaps a self-portrait – one of many.’412  
Bourgeois explicitly likens this specific sculpture to her self, a “self-portrait” 
that “expresses resistance and duration.” It is precisely these biographical statements 
that can be subsumed into narratives where object and subject (artwork as self-
portrait) are all too readily interpreted as one and the same. The danger of Bourgeois’ 
“confessions” are that they seem to provide aesthetic analysis with the license to 
collapse the artist and their biography unto the level of objecthood, creating an 
enduring story of a specific person that matches the work.  
The use of autobiographical material in art writing follows one of two routine 
operations. First, biographical or autobiographical material, related to the artist’s life, 
is used to support or create a theoretical framework that their artwork can fit into. 
                                                      
410 Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father, 90. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid. 
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Secondly, the material may offer a way to contextualise the work as a response to a 
series of geopolitical and historical events that occurred during the artist’s lifetime. 
The first routine is far more typical of scholarship in the field of traditional art theory 
and the second in the training of art history. Of course, there is ample overlap 
between these two forms of writing about art. However, in both instances, biography 
and autobiography are excavated as sources of “truth” about the artist’s emotional or 
mental state reflected in the artwork they produce. In this manner, the artist’s work is 
often considered as a representation of their “inner” state, or a response to an “outer” 
problem, event or situation.  
To avoid abstraction, I will follow with an example taken from Tate Modern 
Museum’s website that provides a description of the artist Louise Bourgeois’ 
sculpture Maman (1999) [fig. 6]: 
Fig. 6 Louise Bourgeois, Maman (1999). Sculpture installation on the north landscape of 
Tate Modern in 2007. 
 
  
181 
 
For Bourgeois making art is a way of fighting specific fears (Bernadac and 
Obrist, p.267), one of which is the ‘trauma of abandonment’ that she suffered 
not only through her untimely birth on Christmas Day (Bernadac and Obrist, 
p.246) but also on her mother’s death in 1932, when Louise was only twenty-
one […] Maman may be read as referring to more than one possible maternal 
figure: the artist, her mother, a mythological or archetypal mother and a 
symbol of motherhood. In a diary entry in March 1975, Bourgeois wrote: 
‘You need a mother. I understand but I refuse to be your mother because I 
need a mother myself.’ (Quoted in Bernadac and Obrist, p.72.) Encountering 
Maman always from the perspective of the child looking up from below, the 
viewer may experience the sculpture as an expression of anxiety about a 
mother who is universal – powerful and terrifying, beautiful and, without 
eyes to look or a head to think, curiously indifferent.413 
 
In the above narrative, the author uses Bourgeois’ diary entries and 
interviews, and the theorists’ interpretations, to argue that the artwork Maman is the 
result of Bourgeois’ “trauma of abandonment.” The author also predetermines that 
the encounter between audience and the work may entail “anxiety about a mother 
who is universal,” loosely and ambiguously drawn from Bourgeois’ account that she 
refuses to be anyone’s mother as she needs a mother herself. The leap from 
Bourgeois losing her mother to the idea that Maman, the sculpture, is a 
representation of a ‘universal mother’ – imbued with fantasies of power, terror, 
beauty and indifference – is a recurring theme of Western art historical and 
theoretical interpretation of symbolisations associated with the maternal.414 The 
author’s personal experience of the artwork is completely omitted from the narrative 
in order to reinforce the idea that the experience, reading or viewing of the work can, 
in fact, also be a universally experienced response.415 The author provides certain 
                                                      
413 Elizabeth Manchester, “Maman, Louise Bourgeois: Summary.” Tate, December 2009, accessed 
April 10, 2015, http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/bourgeois-maman-t12625/text-summary.  
414 For a recent examination of the relationship between matricide and subjectivity see Alison Stone, 
Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity (New York: Routledge, 2012) and on the 
foreclosure of the maternal see Amber Jacobs, On Matricide: Myth, Psychoanalysis and the Law of 
The Mother (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
415 For a critique of universalism under the spell of Kantian aesthetic judgment see Amelia Jones’ 
exposition of how art criticism and history rely on a ‘powerful apparatus of repression’ which 
enforces the omission of ‘the desiring, sensate body (of both artist and interpreter)’ from aesthetic 
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visual descriptions (and theoretical claims) that this terrifying figure of a 
spider/mother/female is “without eyes to look or a head to think,” to further reinforce 
the fear-inducing aspect of the work. We, the reader/viewer, are told that there is a 
‘universal’ story behind the work and that this is how we should perceive, look at 
and experience the work because of that story.  
Almost two years prior to this description, whilst the artist was still alive, a 
very different idea about the artwork was being put forward. During the acquisition 
of Bourgeois’ Maman in 2008 by the Tate Modern, the museum’s press release used 
the artist’s personal voice to describe the work as follows: 
 
The Spider is an ode to my mother. She was my best friend. Like a spider, my 
mother was a weaver. My family was in the business of tapestry restoration, 
and my mother was in charge of the workshop. Like spiders, my mother was 
very clever. Spiders are friendly presences that eat mosquitoes. We know that 
mosquitoes spread diseases and are therefore unwanted. So, spiders are 
helpful and protective, just like my mother.”416 
 
 
The press release in fact concurs that ‘this spectacular arachnid alludes to the 
strength of the mother with metaphors of spinning, weaving, nurture and 
protection.’417 This conclusion remains in stark contrast to the summary of the work 
that followed two years later. Bourgeois herself has made many references to the 
spider and its symbolic associations to the maternal, yet throughout most of her 
personal remarks, the spider is mainly figured as a symbol of reparation. She states 
that there is a sort of myth, ‘a bad reputation,’ that especially presents the female of 
this species as ‘a stinger’ or ‘a killer’– a myth that she seeks to rehabilitate.418 The 
                                                      
interpretation. See Amelia Jones, “Art History/Art Criticism: Performing Meaning,” in Performing the 
Body, Performing the Text, eds. Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 
2005), 37-51. 
416 “Tate Acquires Louise Bourgeois’s Giant Spider, Maman,” Tate, 11 January 2008, accessed April 
10, 2015, http://www.tate.org.uk/about/press-office/press-releases/tate-acquires-louise-bourgeoiss-
giant-spider-maman. 
417 Ibid. 
418 Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father, 217. 
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desire to repair and rehabilitate is a recurring expression in Bourgeois’ writings and 
interviews. There are parallelisms between her own process of artworking and in the 
symbolic figure of the mother-spider, where she identifies with and acknowledges all 
three figures (the spider, the artist and the mother) as a repairer. Repairing and 
reparation has been a quality and activity cultivated in her family’s business of 
tapestry repairing. In an interview from 1997, Bourgeois admits to having spent a 
considerable amount of time repairing things, and she confesses that ‘by extension I 
treated my mother and tried to repair her.’419 Yet, the popular idea of the spider and 
its symbolic association woman/mother as an internal fantasy of aggression, sadism, 
fear, repulsion externalized by Bourgeois in the form of sculpture has had numerous 
critics and theorists supporting it.420  
As much as Bourgeois’ diary entries and interviews have been dissected to 
provide new angles of looking, appreciating and understanding her work, her 
autobiographical writings and confessions have often fallen prey to both overuse and 
misuse.421 For instance, on a number of occasions Bourgeois would be questioned 
                                                      
419 “Louise Bourgeois Interview by Ingrid Sischy,” Procuniar Workshop, October 1997, accessed 
April 10, 2015, http://www.procuniarworkshop.com/art-reference/ingrid-sischy-interview-with-artist-
louise-bourgeois.html. 
420 Robert Pincus-Witten, Bourgeois Truth, Exhibition Catalogue (New York: Robert Miller, 1982). 
Mignon Nixon, Fantastic Reality: Louise Bourgeois and a Story of Modern Art (Massachusetts: The 
Mit Press, 2005). Jerry Gorovoy et al, Louise Bourgeois: Blue Days and Pink Days, Exhibition 
Catalogue (Milan: Fondazione Prada, 1997). In contrast, in the essay Seduction, mourning and 
invocation: The geometry of absence in work by Louise Bourgeois, Griselda Pollock interprets 
Bourgeois’ work through the prism of Matrixial theory, where maternal absence is figured as both a 
loss and a yearning for reconnection. 
421 Griselda Pollock has noted that ‘the reception of Louise Bourgeois’s work has been disfigured, 
however, by the ease with which the hungry interpreters consumed the life story that the artist had 
apparently flaunted in front of them, as if autobiographical memories provided the key to the 
interpretation of her work.’ See Griselda Pollock, “What if Art Desires to be Interpreted? Remodelling 
Interpretation after the ‘Encounter-Event’,” Tate Papers, Issue 15, 1 April 2011, accessed April 10, 
2015, http://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/what-if-art-desires-be-interpreted-
remodelling-interpretation. Similarly, Mieke Bal remarks that ‘art criticism wrongly props itself up 
against the artist’s statements and stories, producing biographical narratives that sidestep or even 
ignore what is most characteristic of the artist’s work: its visual nature.’ See Mieke Bal, 
‘Autotopography: Louise Bourgeois as Builder’ in Interfaces: Women, Autobiography, Image, 
Performance, eds. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson (University of Michigan Press, 2002), 163. 
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over the eroticism of her work. One example relates specifically to the sculpture 
Sleep II (1967) [fig. 7] where she responds:   
 
I am not particularly aware or interested in the erotic of my work, in spite of 
its supposed presence. Since I am exclusively concerned, at least consciously, 
with the formal perfection. I allow myself to follow blindly the images that 
suggest themselves to me. There is no conflict whatsoever between these two 
levels.422 
 
 
This is one example amongst many of Bourgeois’ reports where she is 
thought to deny the erotic evocations of her work. Not being aware or interested in 
the eroticism that an artwork may eventually evoke is not the same as alleging that 
Bourgeois, the individual, is frigid or uninterested in sex. Yet, such a contention 
seems to be a recurring assertion of distinguished art critic and professor Donald 
Kuspit’s presentation of Bourgeois the person, conflated with Bourgeois the artwork. 
His talk in 2008 at Witte de With Center for Contemporary Art in Rotterdam, 
encapsulates a controversial interpretation of her work that preys on her 
autobiography as ‘proof’ of certain psychoanalytic paradigms: 
 
Kuspit will illustrate the tensions presented between the phallic and the 
womanly and how this suggests Bourgeois’ uncertainty about the nature of 
the female body and the character of female selfhood. An uncertainty that 
Kuspit will trace to animosity towards men, rooted in childhood traumas, 
making her a feminist by default, even when she explicitly denies that she is 
one.423 
 
 
Such uses of autobiography are problematic as forms of art criticism for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, they invent theoretical frames that are supported by the 
artist’s life rather than the artist’s work. This tendency misconstrues the practice of 
                                                      
422 Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father, 86.  
423 Online announcement of Donald Kuspit’s lecture “The Phallic Woman: Conflict and 
Fragmentation in Bourgeois’ Conception of the Female Body,” accessed April 8, 2015, 
http://www.wdw.nl/event/donald-kuspit-on-louise-bourgeois/. Partial video recording of the lecture, 
accessed April 8, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozewms_glfu. 
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artworking as an effect of catharsis or cathexis at the expense of the work’s 
technique, form and conceptualization. Secondly, it hinders the possibility of 
multiple interpretations that can stem from each individual’s encounter with the work 
by indirectly framing art as independent from the context of its audience/reader. 
Thirdly, such autobiographical interpretations set up an ongoing (and usually 
unresolved) contest between the artist’s truth and the critic’s assumptions about the 
artist’s truth. For these reasons, the plurality of possible interpretations are relegated 
to an unproductive, antagonistic and confined debate.  
Fig. 7 Louise Bourgeois, Sleep II, 1967.  
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For example, Kuspit’s assertions can easily be contested by employing the 
same system of inquiry: using excerpts from Bourgeois’ autobiographical narratives. 
In an interview of 1971, Bourgeois does not sound as naïve or uncertain about 
female selfhood, men or other “feminist traumas” as Kuspit would suggest: 
 
- Do you consider art a man’s world? 
Yes. It is a world where both men and women are trying to please men in 
power. 
- How do you feel about other women artists? 
I react to their work, more than to them as women. 
- Do you think there is a specific style or aspect of a style which women 
artists share? 
Not yet. Before this takes place women will have to forget their desire to 
please the male power structure. 
- Is your painting world separated from your living world? 
My sculpting world and my living world are one. 
-Do you feel sexual satisfaction through your work? 
Yes.424 
 
 
By outlining the ambivalences in the deployment of Bourgeois’ 
autobiographical and biographical narratives in contemporary art criticism my aim is 
not to offer a corrective to the consumption of her life or art. To paraphrase 
Bourgeois from an interview regarding the erotic interpretation of her work: ‘who am 
I to tell you it was not so?’425 In a parallel move, my aim is to reconsider the 
relationship between the auto/biographical and art-writing in order to explore what 
other possibilities this relationship can unfold. I drew on the previous examples as 
starting points to reflect on how writing about art employs the autobiography of 
artists to make claims about an artist’s life, to imbue the work with value, or validate 
theoretical paradigms. With these examples it is my aim to reveal some of the 
contradictions in the use of autobiographical narratives for the purposes of art 
criticism. 
                                                      
424 Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father, 96 
425 Ibid., 76. 
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Amongst the most popular critiques of contemporary art criticism has been 
that of writer, critic and political activist Susan Sontag. In the essay “Against 
Interpretation” (1966), Sontag observes that the critic imbues meaning (and in a 
sense value) to the author’s intent, by altering and layering surplus signification onto 
the work.426 Sontag argues for a new approach to art criticism as a way to ‘recover 
our senses. So that we […] learn to see more, to hear more, to feel more.’427 Sontag 
is not arguing against interpretation. On the contrary, she presents us with the 
possibility of expanding the field of interpretation with an ‘erotics of art.’428 That is, 
to engage our physical senses in the encounter and to evaluate the work based on its 
material relation to our senses. To this end, the function of art would reside in its 
affective capacity prior to its intellectual investment. 
But that does not mean that there is nothing to be gleaned from artists’ 
autobiographical statements about their work. As the makers of their own work, their 
narratives offer an insightful description of the sensuality and physicality that arises 
from the experience of artworking. For the artist, the practice of artworking is an 
entirely different encounter from the relationship of viewing their resulting artwork. 
It is worth quoting Bourgeois’ commentary as a way to think about artwork as a 
relationship that involves multiple moments, durations, encounters and sensations.  
 
Every time I am asked to talk about my work I desiccate. The only way 
which I can manage it is to go into my studio and walk back and forth and 
around a piece. Then the relations between the work and me snap alive again. 
At this point the how it was made is obviously of no importance or relevance. 
I made it the best I could, considering that the object became what it is, and 
this becoming was not completely under the control of conscious desire or 
premeditation. The fluctuation of possibilities can be minute, slow, rough, 
sudden, re-examinable or definite. Any way you slice it, there is always a 
                                                      
426 Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (London: Penguin, 2009), 6. 
427 Ibid., 14. 
428 Ibid. 
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battle to the finish between the artist and his material: sometimes with visible 
result, more often with experience gained but no result.429 
 
 
I am keen to point out that there are several and obvious distinctions between 
making art and viewing art, even for the maker. Nonetheless, I want to highlight the 
processual nature of this activity. While the resulting artwork remains an object, the 
process of experiencing the work takes on different meanings and responses with 
each encounter. As Mieke Bal notes, ‘viewing is by definition a process,’ and in 
Bourgeois’ case specifically, the work ‘enforce[s] a viewing that takes time, 
imposing an awareness of that temporality.’430 The temporality of experience is 
acutely significant here because it offers an alternative to methods of interpretation 
that rely on binary subject/object schemes.  
Artwork (the thing/object) is commonly framed as the invariable factor in the 
encounter with the viewer. This “fixity” of the work provides the interpreter with the 
frame to perform their analysis. The interpreter often fails to disclose the 
contingency of emotional states and the physical sensations or affective experience 
provided by the encounter. If we presume that subjectivity is generally in a state of 
flux and affected from without, then for interpretation to ensue we would have to 
conceive of subjectivity as, at least momentarily, suspended from the factors that 
unsettle it, namely: emotion and movement. Such a hypothesis might sound 
unrealistic as emotion is indispensable to the experience of art. Yet, through such 
forms of writing about art, it might just be the case that the writing follows from a 
subject that presumes that they are self-contained in the affects that they 
experience.431 By overlaying an artist’s autobiography over their art, the critic 
                                                      
429 Bourgeois, Destruction of the Father, 90. 
430 Bal, Louise Bourgeois’ Spider, 27. 
431 Art critic James Elkins contacted a number of art historians to ask them whether they had wept 
upon encountering a painting. The majority of them responded not only negatively, but declared 
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interprets the life story and not the work, thus excluding from the equation the 
unique and affective encounter with the work. Perhaps, as can also be the case, an 
encounter between the work and the narrator never physically took place and what 
we are left with is indeed a text with no affective trace.  
When Bourgeois highlights her relationship to her work from the position of 
artist, she simultaneously highlights that each encounter carries a different 
experience in her relationship to the work. In the same vein, each singular and unique 
viewer’s interaction (with every different encounter, installation, location) would 
bear a different or slightly nuanced exposure to the work. As Cavarero reminds us, it 
is through our mutual exposure in the public space of appearance that our uniqueness 
is revealed to one another. The uniqueness of an aesthetic experience can shift 
interpretation into the variable component to permits multiple interactions and 
interpretations between the viewer and the work. Simultaneously, it highlights the 
necessity to restore to aesthetics its affective (and also erotic) potential. 
I would like to suggest that the deployment of autobiography also reveals the 
very tension or even (im)possibility of truth. In the sense that fictions, 
mythobiographies and fantasies are essential to the process of creating artwork. This 
is especially relevant to artists that are concerned with imaginaries and processes that 
are yet to come or that defy realization in the traditional object-form sense.432 In the 
                                                      
Elkins’ research superfluous and the topic of crying ‘old-fashioned, romantic, and unfitted to 
twentieth-century art.’ See especially the chapter “The Ivory Tower of Tearlessness” in James Elkins, 
Pictures & Tears: A History of People Who Have Cried in Front of Paintings (Taylor & Francis e-
Library, 2005), 73. 
432 Testing the limits of personal testimony and art, the work of artist Aliza Shvarts is an excellent 
example of how an artist’s claim to authenticity and/or truth rarely guarantees that it will alter our 
perception of the work. Rather, that it is precisely the tension between fiction and reality that can open 
debate and challenge our idea of what counts as art and how we are affected by it. For her final degree 
project, Shvarts wanted to use abortifacient drugs to induce an abortion on a monthly basis for a 
duration of nine months. The project exists only through press reports as it is still open to question as 
to whether Shvarts performed it or even really meant to perform it. See, Diana Georgiou and Giulia 
Casalini, “Notes on Queer Feminist Aesthetics,” in Re-Materialising Feminism, eds. Rozsa Farkas, 
Giulia Smith and Alice Brooke (London: Arcadia Missa Publications, 2014), 89. 
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attempt to expose the “real meaning” or intention of the artist, autobiographical uses 
may supplant another universal interpretation for the viewer. Recourse to such uses 
of autobiography for writing about art can nevertheless provide useful and insightful 
information about the artist and the work. However, as we shall see, they are not the 
only modes or methods for writing, historically or currently. The work that I draw 
from contains alternative configurations of auto/biographical art writing. The most 
concise description I can offer to conjure this practice is a form of “writing with art.” 
And this with is precisely what makes all the difference to both the writing – a 
visibly and audibly different form or writing – and to, I will try to argue, the 
storyteller producing the writing.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
“How to get Inside a Star?” 
Death Through Life Writing in the poetry of Anne Sexton 
 
 
How to get inside a star, Van Gogh wondered? The fastest method of 
transportation is not the train, it’s death. 
– Hélène Cixous433 
 
In 1974, the poet Anne Sexton committed suicide at the age of 46. She locked herself 
in her garage, sat in her car and left the engine running until carbon monoxide filled 
her lungs and poisoned her to death.434 Between the 1950’s and 1970’s suicide 
became for a number of poets, including Sexton, Sylvia Plath, John Berryman and 
Randall Jarrell, the subject matter of their writing or even the sensationalised ending 
to their life.  
It is no exaggeration to say that Sexton’s writing career began and ended with 
suicide. In 1955, following an overdose of barbiturates, she was admitted to a 
psychiatric unit where she met Dr. Martin Orne who was to become her long-term 
therapist. During one of their sessions, Sexton remarked that suicide for her was an 
addiction and she described most of her days entailed ‘thinking about killing myself 
– or killing myself.’435  
A year later, following her psychologist’s advice, Sexton put fingers to 
typewriter and began tapping out her emotional states. She joined a writing group in 
Boston led by John Holmes with writing workshops that proved not only 
constructive but also life affirming. Her talent and remarkable progress as a student 
                                                      
433 Hélène Cixous, Stigmata: Escaping Texts (London: Routledge, 1998 / Taylor & Francis e-Library, 
2005), 5. 
434 “Anne Sexton Ruled Suicide,” New York Times, Oct. 9, 1974. 
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led her to the University of Boston to study with Robert Lowell alongside 
distinguished poets Sylvia Plath and George Starbuck. Soon enough literary circles 
became close friends, which also included life-long friend and fellow poet Maxine 
Kumin and W.D. Snodgrass, who Sexton claimed were the most influential figures in 
her life.436 Since then she spent the rest of her living days flirting with death, 
negotiating suicidal impulses and writing poetry about it that won her numerous 
awards including a Pulitzer prize. While Sexton wrote passionately about suicide and 
death she was also not shy of exposing even the most taboo and brutal aspects of life. 
Fifty years later, topics such as menstruation, abortion, mental health, sexuality, 
masturbation, addiction and incest are still approached with some caution. 
This style of writing that relied on autobiographical material, self-disclosure, 
emotions and difficult subject matter was soon termed “confessional.” Attributed to 
W.D. Snodgrass, the genre was a radical contrast to the anti-expressionistic, 
depersonalised principles that where common in the U.S. and propounded by the 
likes of literary critics and poets John Crowe Ransom and T.S. Eliott.437 In an 
interview from 1965, Sexton notes that coming across Snodgrass’ autobiographical 
work Heart’s Needle enabled her to gain confidence in her half-finished book To 
Bedlam and Part Way Back (1960) despite discouraging remarks.438 With material 
drawn from her own life, Sexton found a positive and liberating method to draw up 
her poems. In the foreword to the collected poems following her death, friend and 
poet Maxine Kumin observes that Sexton had a ‘deeply rooted conviction that poems 
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not only could, but had to be, made out of the detritus of her life.’439 Poetry became 
the alchemy of Sexton’s emotions, memories and obsessions that found a creative 
match in words. 
The use of autobiographical subject matter ignited fervent criticism with 
comments that attacked the style for its blatant rawness and direct mode of address. 
Seen as a shock tactic for emotional effect one critic described it as ‘excessive self-
dramatization, even spilling into undertones of self-pity.’440 In defence of 
confessional style, proponents tried to almost justify or fortify the genre, and 
especially Sexton’s work, through its ability to help people suffering from similar 
conditions. Paula M. Salvio notes that Sexton expressed her desire to ‘offer comfort 
and insight’ through her poetry.441 Even her therapist had initially proposed that she 
write poetry for the very reason that it would ‘help others.’442 Diane Middlebrook, 
speaking on behalf of Sexton, claims that ‘if suffering […] had any use, […] it was 
not to the sufferer. The only way that an individual’s pain gained meaning was 
through its communication to others.’443 
It was perhaps this form of communication that attracted such a large and 
diverse audience to her crowded public readings.444 She certainly moved audiences 
that shared the torment of addiction, people afflicted by depression, lovers that have 
had their share of heartache and loss, and women who confronted female experiences 
that were similar to “Her Kind,” as the eponymous poem goes. The widespread 
impact of confessional poetry, beyond the life narrative of the poet, is especially 
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influential when thinking of the specific conditions of its production. What it meant 
to speak about female experience during the 1960s, before the feminist movements 
of the 1970s, is very different from how experience is framed within post-millennial 
neoliberal societies and discourses. Poet Anne Stevenson remarks how she also 
‘suffered a good deal from the same syndrome of acute misery, unhappy in […] roles 
of daughter, wife, lover and mother,’ during a period when women poets were 
‘driven crazy’ by these prescribed roles.445 
Sexton gave voice to many aspects of women’s experiences and the 
accompanied struggles that came with domesticity, motherhood, femininity and 
sexuality. While Sexton was creating the conditions of her own reality and success as 
renowned poet, she simultaneously provided the tools for other women to either 
write out their own lives and the challenges they were facing, or to hear their own 
concerns lyrically framed in an other’s poetry. The poem “Her Kind” is emblematic 
of verse that conveys how women, incapable of aligning their lives to the roles that 
Stevenson mentioned, became ‘misunderstood,’ not ‘quite’ women and associated 
with the personification of a ‘witch.’446 The figure of the witch in the poem “Her 
Kind” becomes a metaphor for identification, a role that Sexton often returns to 
almost in redemptive and celebratory style. She concludes the third and last stanza by 
demonstrating how she “rides” social contradictions irreverently, waving her ‘nude 
arms at villages going by / learning the last bright routes, survivor.’ She resists and 
survives social afflictions despite the fact that they are ubiquitous like ‘flames’ that 
‘still bite’, while her ‘ribs crack where […] wheels wind.’447 
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The radical and martyr-like quality of Sexton achieving success with her 
poetry, despite society’s gender biases and an unexceptional educational background, 
was definitely serving as a powerful and affecting role model for women who were 
bound by the confines of postwar domesticity. This is especially relevant in light of 
Dr. Orne’s observation that Sexton’s first sessions were marked by a ‘profound lack 
of self-worth’ to the extent that she was completely incapable of uttering ‘any 
positive abilities or qualities within herself.’448 Sexton gained a stronger sense of self 
through the ownership of an activity that she crafted and polished to glowing 
proportions. An activity that she owned entirely, where through its repetition she 
managed to bring to surface an identity that was dormant.449 Writing became an 
occasion for contemplation and, specifically for Sexton’s poor memory and regular 
patterns of disassociation, it offered her a method of self-care, a sense of well-being, 
self-worth and an exploration of her traumas and fantasies through a structured yet 
often “unconscious” process. Diane Middlebrook’s biography of Sexton highlights 
how poetic images would be transferred onto paper so spontaneously that Sexton 
would not even remember that she had written a certain poem.450 Furthermore, 
Middlebrook notes that this writing process was not only partially conscious but it 
also ‘took Sexton out of herself, into what she felt was another identity.’451 
Just a few months after Sexton’s suicide, writer and friend Erica Jong describes 
this curious way of connecting and disconnecting from the process of writing and the 
self as follows:  
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With the process of writing the poem, there is a kind of connection which 
sustains one. Then the poem is done and one is alone again. Other people may 
enjoy the poem later, but the poet can hardly relate to it. The poet is happy only 
while writing the poem.452 
 
However, following her suicide and the vast biographical material left behind, 
her work remains favourably explored through the lens of two main themes. Firstly, 
a focus on the relationship between creativity and mental health is framed as a form 
of “art therapy” where the poems are explored for the way they forge connections to 
other fellow “sufferers.” This is mainly due to the biographical fact that Sexton’s 
relationship to poetry began with her therapist’s suggestion to write with the aim of 
“helping others.”  
Secondly, and following from the first point, Sexton’s repetitive suicide 
attempts invite interpretations that dissect every verse for traces of a reaffirmed drive 
towards death. Such uncomplicated readings are supported by Sexton’s explicit use 
of the dilemma that granted her the Pulitzer Prize for her book: Live or Die. The 
tension between living or dying seems to overshadow the literary value of Sexton’s 
work when it is framed as an activity that ‘kept Anne alive for the eighteen years of 
her creative endeavors.’453  
Writing in her memoirs following the suicide of Sylvia Plath, Sexton points out 
that ‘Suicide is, after all, the opposite of the poem.’454 However, the simplicity of 
most interpretations render Sexton’s poetry, the activity that keeps her alive, into the 
oppositional “other” to what would have otherwise been a “normal” life. In this way, 
Sexton’s poetry is reduced to an anomaly, a form of writing that simply subdues her 
“Awful Rowing Towards God,” or a style that revels in the personal battle between 
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living or dying, accelerated by Sexton’s addiction to the fantasy that suicide can 
guarantee relief.  
To write about fantasies of suicide, the envy of an other’s suicide and living 
with the closeness of death in everyday life, is certainly difficult subject matter. 
Nevertheless, it is still just subject matter – just as religion was to T. S. Eliot and 
nature to Ted Hughes – it is only one aspect of a poem. The process of crafting such 
matter into a form that the artist can respond to, be affected by, be taken into and 
come out of transformed is far more significant to the connection between 
autobiography and writing. By focusing on Sexton’s biographical facts, the material 
and stylistic qualities of her work, and often the very processes of production remain 
underexplored. Furthermore, the poems are read in a way that relegates them to a 
sociopolitical end (women’s issues, post-war generations, depression), omitting any 
purposeful materiality and textual specificity of the very process of writing. To 
repeat the previous point made, the claim by many authors that poetry kept Anne 
alive becomes an end point for literary discussion.  
 
 
 
 
“We are magic talking to itself, noisy and alone.” 
 
 
 
Does poetry, writing or any artistic process keep one alive? What pleasure, 
affirmation or affective quality does writing entail to sustain the well-being of an 
individual? Is the process of writing always “therapeutic”? That is, if creativity, as a 
processual return to a life-affirming activity, has the capacity to strike a certain 
balance in the lives of excessively emotional and sensitive beings, then how does it 
enhance that same ability in those that are otherwise a little more “thick-skinned”? 
  
198 
Furthermore, is it during the process of writing that a life-driven activity kicks in, or 
is it after the process, during reading and reflection that the writer recognizes a 
transformation? Considering that many creatives support that during times of acute 
stress, depression or anxiety, writing – or any creative process – comes to a halt or 
lacks the ‘control and perspective’ necessary for its production.455  
Instead of drawing conclusions based on analogies between the text and the 
author’s biography, what can Sexton’s poetry reveal about this psychic 
transformation that occurs in the many artists’ lives that employ autobiographical 
material in their work? Most significantly, what do these transformations have to say 
about subjectivity and authorship when both are in a sense transfigured (or put under 
question) by the process of writing? Finally, what can Sexton’s oeuvre, both as work 
and method, tell us about our relationship to art? By examining alternative forms of 
writing with art that employ personal narratives to inform both aesthetic analysis and 
the subjectivity of the writer, I explore how such forms of art-writing invite 
alternative ways of reading.  
Elizabeth Bergmann Loizeaux has conducted a similar investigation with 
specific attention to the relationship between poetry and aesthetics. Loizeaux’s focus 
on ekphrasis (a response to a work of art in the written form of poetry) aims to 
unfold the social dynamics of the practice and its impact and connection to ‘social 
engagements within and across the boundaries of the poem.’456 Loizeaux’s thesis 
stresses the ‘inherently dialogic’ relationship between three participants in what she 
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terms the “ekphrastic situation”: the artist, the work of art and the audience.457 By 
highlighting this dynamic exchange, Loizeaux simultaneously exposes the 
polyvocality of ekphrasis as well as the genre’s use of prosopopeia as devices that 
lead to ‘the collapse of subject and object.’458 Prosopopoeia is understood as the 
rhetorical technique whereby a writer conveys meaning, emotion, perspective or 
argumentation by speaking in an other’s voice. In the case of visual art and poetry, 
Loizeaux notes that ekphrastic prosopopeia creates a ‘double anchor’ for the poet 
where their ‘speaking voice is not only objectified, but also embodied (in the 
image).’459 For Loizeaux, this technique reveals an important ethical dilemma: 
‘Whether and how one can speak for others.’460 
While aspects of writing poetry might be keeping a reader and an “other” in 
mind, Sexton’s work was more closely related to a process that created a space for 
self-discovery and a particular stylistic mode of address when it referred to someone 
else. ‘You don’t write for an audience,’ Sexton said on a radio show in 1962, rather 
‘you write for some one who’ll understand.’461 However, Sexton’s poetry did speak 
to others in a manner that would bring her audience, but most importantly “the one”, 
closer to her own life. The “one” that Sexton seeks out is often easily identified in 
the work. In “Sylvia’s Death”, the poem is clearly addressed to the poet Sylvia Plath 
who had recently committed suicide. In poems with a more communal tone such as 
“Her Kind”, it is clear that “the one” is given shape through the figure of Sexton 
herself. Even though she addresses a judgemental society in the allegorical use of a 
“driver” (‘I have ridden in your cart, driver’) and calls out to any “woman like that” 
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who has had similar experiences, she remains the protagonist of the poem. Through a 
self-reflective process she gives form to a rebellious self by placing her condition as 
“woman” in dialogue with other women and society.  
In work such as “The Ballad of the Lonely Masturbator” the poem makes 
clear references to masturbation, yet it is also about unrequited love, where 
masturbation is Sexton’s only relief after ‘the end of the affair’ by some one who 
used to call her ‘my little plum.’ This “one” that Sexton returns to reveals that her 
technique often entails a mode of address that speaks to and with someone. Yet, 
many authors claim that Sexton’s poetry was a self-indulgent, self-referential, 
narcissistic exercise. Stevenson, despite her appreciation of some of Sexton’s earlier 
work, draws the following psychological assessment of Sexton the individual and the 
poet: 
 
That for eight years she chiefly corresponded with herself through thrice-
weekly visits to her psychotherapist means that she was miserably aware of 
her extreme self-centeredness and hated herself bitterly because of it. That 
polarized self-love and self-hatred, I suppose, was the sickness snarled at the 
centre of her.462 
 
Sexton’s approach to writing was indeed subjective, personal and 
autobiographical and while these were narrative and poetic tools, their association to 
self-centeredness and narcissism consigned the work to lower ranks of literary value. 
But her working methodology (personal, autobiographical or completely fictional) 
entailed an astute and professional work ethic that had little room for “polarized” 
sentiments. Her skills were hardly ever sharpened in isolation and she knew well the 
value of her verses when they were either worked out, heavily edited, rejected or 
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completely transformed following the critical assistance of other poets, including 
Kumin and Snodgrass.  
No matter how personal or centered on her life, the work was hardly ever 
developed as a way to communicate factual experience or as a way to convey 
Sexton’s morality. Another way to think of this method is in its reverse equation. It 
was the experience or the moral dilemma that permitted Sexton to look for a way to 
express the emotional and affective impact that accompanied lived experience, or to 
imagine new scenarios for events she struggled to understand and come to terms 
with. The poems would hardly ever provide a resolution or a moral, philosophical or 
political claim. Yet, the presence of Sexton’s personal experiences in the verses, 
loudly voice epistemic authority and delineate experience specific to an embodied 
standpoint. For this reason, they inevitably invite readings that examine the corporeal 
materiality of sexed difference in literary form.  
The poem “The Abortion” stands out as a good example of difficult subject 
matter, directly related to women’s experience, which examines the ambivalence of 
emotions and psychological states through rich imagery and a careful sensitivity in 
describing distressing circumstances. Sexton’s work comprises an extraordinary use 
of vivid imagery and metaphor, mathematically measured evocative repetitions, 
powerful rhythm and an innovative use of voice to communicate a range of tones 
from ‘pregnant pauses, husky whispers, pseudoshouts to calculated effect.’463 
Conflicting emotions are here presented in premeditated rhyme in an effort to 
represent and almost control emotional conflict through vividly pictorial and 
structured tercets.  
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Building on her personal experience, Sexton creates an emotional journey 
that escalates in tension. The morning starts with a hopeful description, ‘the earth 
puckered its mouth, each bud puffing out from its knot’ which simultaneously 
alludes to fecundity. The next tercet suggests sexual connotations, ‘Pennsylvania 
humps on endlessly,’ and almost as a recall of what created the current situation that 
Sexton finds herself in. The imagery transforms from sexual (humps) to a sinister 
tone ‘where, in truth, the ground cracks evilly.’ The sensation of “cracks” in the earth 
conjures a tremor, an aftershock following the “truth,” the realization of what is to 
follow, evoked in the line ‘a dark socket from which the coal has poured.’ The dark 
socket connotes a gashing from a wound and a dark womb in one stroke. 
Between three sets of tercets, the phrase ‘Somebody who should have been 
born / is gone’ is intercalated almost as a way for Sexton to expose the obsessive 
lamenting of an inner voice. For Sexton, the world of anxiety and anticipation is 
ridden with angular and sharp sensations. The roads are represented as ‘gray 
washboards’ and the surrounding nature is rendered with an edginess that expresses 
‘the grass as bristly and stout as chives.’ It is at this moment that Sexton wonders 
‘how anything fragile survives,’ which leads to the tension followed in the next 
tercet. Arriving at her destination, Sexton sets up a meeting with the allegorical 
figure of ‘Rumplestilstink’ who stands in for the doctor that is about to commit the 
act of what is perhaps the most delicately phrased sentence in the poem. The 
abortionist is described as the one who “took the fullness that love began.”  
While Sexton incorporated these highly sensitive topics into her poetry, a 
large amount of Sexton’s work was about or in praise of other people (lovers, 
friends, family, therapists, fellow poets). Therefore, it was not so much the subjective 
viewpoint that called for negative criticism, it was mainly the content of personal 
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dilemmas, mourning the death of others and suicidal impulses, that was a little too 
exhibitionistic, a little too “real” especially, I imagine, when Sexton would perform a 
public reading.  
Contrary to Sexton’s method, Stevenson’s personal relationship to poetry 
defines an approach that was commonly expected of writers at the time and can be 
said to represent much of what is traditionally accepted as good practice in any form 
of writing, even nowadays. Stevenson notes that her working method entails 
‘deflect[ing] the stream of my own troubles and write from an historical 
perspective.’464 For Stevenson, poetry, as an art form, had a main priority and that 
was to transform the personal into ‘memorably impersonal works.’465  
It is then no surprise that Sexton’s personal style glaringly stood out like a 
thorn in poetic tradition. On the other hand, the poet Allen Grossman remarked that 
he considered Sexton to be ‘the first major writer who was able to be heard as a 
voice not concerned with itself.’466 In a comparable remark, Paula M. Salvio notes 
that on numerous accounts, including her teaching documents, Sexton drew a 
distinction between the autobiographical “I” and the persona she employed to 
recreate a biographical ‘mask’ and ‘fiction.’467 With this technique, she would 
deliver personal statements that seemed to make the boundaries between personal 
reality and social fiction completely unified. Simultaneously, by giving an account of 
herself, Sexton reveals how a sense of self is inextricably linked to others. It was by 
adopting a mask or fiction that Sexton was able to indirectly address both personal 
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and communal issues such as female sexuality, gender stereotypes or cultural 
phenomena.  
Sexton’s use of women’s issues pre-dated the feminist slogan ‘the personal is 
political,’ yet her writing can be considered in line with much of the political debates 
that were taking place during the practice of consciousness-raising in the US 
women’s movements. Nancy Miller notes that feminist theory, ‘built out from the 
personal: the witnessing “I” of subjective experience,’ was key to critiquing the very 
way that dominant critical theory is conducted.468 In a sense, Sexton’s work can also 
be said to take ‘the personal as a category of thought,’469 in which we find ‘that 
language is a medium through which the self is at once composed and decentered.’470 
Returning to Loizeaux’s thesis, Sexton’s writing, and her identity, can be 
seen to reveal her interdependence on a plurality of authors and connections. 
Furthermore, she lends her voice to others through the act of writing from a 
subjective and specific geopolitical context that others can relate to. Yet Sexton’s 
work does not exactly fit neatly into narratives of identification and identity politics. 
There are conscious political overtones in poems such as “Her Kind” yet the same set 
of tools have little to say regarding a poem that reflects a painting. 
The praxis of self-disclosure and its route to self-realisation are put into play 
specifically for this narrator as a way to structure a sense of self. That is, the 
auto/biographical becomes a tool by which we may begin to think about subjectivity 
not only linked to others, but also capable of transforming, actualizing the self’s 
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potential despite the rigid parameters of sociocultural imperatives and hindrances. 
The personal is here another creative form of self-styling, often intersubjective, 
inscribed by sociocultural specificity and made to “work” in textual form. If we are 
to take the methods of self-disclosure, the personal and auto/biographical as 
categories of thought, then how do these methods make their way into 
auto/biographical art-writing?  
 
 
 
 
Metaphors and Aesthetic Encounters: Materialising the Nonconscious through 
Van Gogh’s Starry Night. 
 
 
 
 
 
That does not keep me from having a terrible 
need of—shall I say the word—religion. Then I go 
out at night to paint the stars. 
VINCENT VAN GOGH in a letter to his brother 
 
 
The town does not exist 
except where one black-haired tree slips 
up like a drowned woman into the hot sky. 
The town is silent. The night boils with eleven stars.    
Oh starry starry night! This is how 
I want to die. 
 
Fig. 8 Vincent Van Gogh, The Starry Night, 1889 
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It moves. They are all alive. 
Even the moon bulges in its orange irons    
to push children, like a god, from its eye. 
The old unseen serpent swallows up the stars.    
Oh starry starry night! This is how    
I want to die: 
 
into that rushing beast of the night,    
sucked up by that great dragon, to split    
from my life with no flag, 
no belly, 
no cry. 
 
– Anne Sexton, The Starry Night (1962) 471 
 
“The Starry Night” serves as an original example where Sexton’s skills appear in the 
form of auto/biographical art-writing. A poem that employs personal subject matter 
to respond to a work of art is an unorthodox way to write about art. Yet, both the 
personal and the auto/biographical respond to Van Gogh’s painting in poetic form. 
For the analysis of “The Starry Night,” it is useful to examine Sexton’s oeuvre for 
how it works against and beyond the expected narrative that was carved out for her 
life. Or, to think of how this practice maintains what Skorczewski claims was 
Sexton’s method ‘toward and away from self-disclosure.’472 Furthermore, how this 
practice reveals a politics of location, epistemology and embodiment over a language 
of abstraction – facilitated by the use of metaphors, emotions and auto/biographical 
material.  
This particular poem has been examined from the perspective of Sexton’s 
identification with the painter Vincent Van Gogh. Interpretations often figure the 
poem as an expression of Sexton’s affinity with Van Gogh’s personal battle with 
depression, melancholia, marginalisation and suicide. Both Sexton and Van Gogh 
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turned towards religion during the later part of their life and both committed suicide. 
Sexton’s poem opens up with an epigraph by Van Gogh addressed to his brother: 
 
That does not keep me from having a terrible need of—shall I say the word—
religion. Then I go out at night to paint the stars. 
 
 
This epigraph prompts Loizeaux to interpret the poem as an instance of 
ekphrastic prosopopoeia where Sexton speaks through and for Van Gogh, suggesting 
that Sexton’s poem becomes a description of Van Gogh’s tension with the stillness 
of the town and his desire to transcend into a whirling starry sky. Exploring the 
ekphrastic aspects of the poem, Loizeaux states that it is the specific detail of the 
night sky that provides Sexton with ‘an image of death as she wants it, sensuous and 
glorious.’473 We see, once again, that death is framed as the measure and idealization 
within Sexton’s poetic and life-sustaining activity. Sexton’s “obsessive desire” 
returns to reconstruct her suicidal impulses in Van Gogh’s painting. Loizeaux argues 
that such an impulse is reported to be a common practice of ‘many of her nineteenth-
century predecessors in ekphrasis’ who ‘conflate the image as present’ with ‘the 
image as eternal and transcendent.’474 Loizeaux’s argument presents Sexton’s work 
as an exercise in ekphrasis by comparing the stylistic elements of this specific poem 
with her ‘predecessors’ who had a ‘Romantic belief in the transcendence of the 
image married to a concatenation of genius, early death and suicide as a “dramatic 
gesture”.’475 
However, suicidal impulses were not exactly a “dramatic gesture” for Sexton. 
They were the lived experience of her battle with depression and a state of mental 
health that we would now describe as bipolar and/or borderline personality 
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disorder.476 Setting aside these biographical facts and the stylistic expressions of 
ekphrasis, there is still no clear reason why looking at Van Gogh’s Starry Night 
would prompt Sexton to write about suicide. In fact, there is very little about this 
poem that speaks through or for the artist Van Gogh.  
In my view, Sexton is here writing out the effect of her encounter with the 
painting in an instance of erotic responsiveness. She sees in the painting what she 
can only metaphorically assign as the “drowned woman,” instead of a tree, aiming 
towards the “hot sky.” This use of metaphor is a clear indication that the act of 
viewing and interpretation are bound to the standpoint and experience of the subject 
engaging in the encounter with an artwork. As far as I am aware, there is no other 
reference to female embodiment made by any other author contemplating Van 
Gogh’s Starry Night. Sexton is clearly employing the auto/biographical mode and 
relies heavily on metaphor to express the affective encounter.  
I would like to try and clarify two points at this stage of Sexton’s encounter 
and how it relates to the concept of erotic responsiveness. The first point concerns a 
clarification of the term nonconscious and how it relates both to the practice of 
writing and subjectivity. The second point has to do with metaphors. I will start with 
the second in order to clarify the first. Metaphors are the stylistic and poignant 
literary tools that writers employ to elucidate or display emotions, feelings, ideas that 
could not be described in ordinary language. However, I will argue that metaphors 
also have a deeper association to subjectivity in that they bring to surface what might 
otherwise be too difficult, too hidden or not entirely conscious for the writer. The 
first point regarding the nonconscious is inextricably connected to the second point 
on metaphors, in that the second point is dependent on the first to bring about its 
                                                      
476 Skorczewski, Accident of Hope, xxii. 
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existence. That is, metaphors can become the textual traces of a nonconscious 
affective encounter.  
Assessing the relationship between metaphors and feminist theory and 
criticism, Nancy Miller’s meditations are worth quoting at length: 
 
metaphors are to be taken very seriously, and they still appeal to me as an 
economical way both to theorize outside of systems dependent on a unitary 
signature (allowing you to combine things that usually don’t go together) and 
to imagine in the material of language what hasn’t yet come – what might not 
be able to come – into social being. Although I of course do not make the claim 
that the use of metaphor in critical theory is specifically (essentially) feminist, I 
do think that metaphor, which as a figure involves a movement (displacement, 
transfer) of meaning, has been particularly productive for feminist utopian 
thought. […] Perhaps what seems most “feminist” to me about the uses of both 
metaphor and narrative criticism is the self-consciousness these modes of 
analysis tend to display about their own processes of theorization; a self-
consciousness that points to the fictional strategies inherent in all theory.477 
 
 
 I would like to transpose from Miller’s text a few useful remarks to think 
about the relationship between language, embodiment and consciousness. Moreover, 
what effect this relationship might have on the discourse on subjectivity, when the 
self is here conjured as yearning a “utopian” existence, a self that is yet to come “into 
social being” as Miller remarks. What kind of subject do we have in mind when its 
author employs metaphors to transgress the confines of social conditioning? In this 
specific poem, Sexton’s verse “this is how I want to die,” locates the utopian in an 
afterlife. Is the suicidal impulse to be taken as a true desire, or is it another 
metaphorical expression for putting an end to a situation? 
I suggest that in this specific poem we can unfold another story that has slipped 
Loizeaux’s analysis, but which we can locate if the poem is considered as an 
auto/biographical art-writing response. The poem was written in May 1960 following 
                                                      
477 Miller, Getting Personal, xii 
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an abortion that Sexton undertook that same month. For a period of approximately 
three months, Sexton was very much preoccupied with this incident. The decision 
that led to an abortion was the result of a tough bargain that pivoted on whether 
Sexton’s husband was indeed the father of her child. Middlebrook’s biography 
indicates that she had communicated her distress to friend and poet Ruth Soter who 
tried to offer her spiritual guidance by sending her a small crucifix as a gift. This 
gesture from Ruth became the material for the poem “Mercy for the Greedy” which 
was also written in May 1960 along with “The Abortion.” Middlebrook notes how 
“Mercy for the Greedy” exemplifies Sexton’s relationship to religion: 
 
Sexton sets up two parallel kinds of “mercy”: the one available to Ruth through 
religious practices, and the one she herself achieves through writing poetry. 
Both derive their power from confession. Ruth’s practice has been codified: 
her rebirth, through the sacrament of baptism, assures that she can gain 
absolution from sin through the sacrament of confession, and reunite herself 
with Spirit through the sacrament of communion. This kind of mercy is not – 
or is not yet – available to Sexton: “I detest my sins and I try to believe/in The 
Cross. […] But I can’t. Need is not quite belief.”478 
 
I quote Middlebrook at length since the material of “Mercy for the Greedy” makes its 
way into “The Starry Night” in similar form. Structurally, both poems switch from 
‘statement to metaphor’ which for Middlebrook requires ‘quite a different method of 
reading to get at the meanings [..] It requires […] alertness to a multiplicity of 
connections latent in the signs on the page. Like Soter’s cross, Sexton’s metaphors 
are vehicles of Spirit.’479 However, it will not suffice to figure Sexton’s work 
through the lens of identification as such a process involves a very conscious way of 
perceiving one’s image as a reflection of someone else. While writing can eventually 
lead to such a state of consciousness, the desire to respond to a work of art 
                                                      
478 Middlebrook, Anne Sexton, 122-123. 
479 Ibid., 123. 
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necessitates that affective information reach the subject on a nonconscious level, 
created by a two-way communication between Sexton and the painting. The 
encounter with a work of art creates the conditions of an affective engagement that 
often entails recourse to images, memories, lived experiences, emotions, sensations, 
archaic inscriptions and metaphors to express the encounter.  
Loizeaux’s reading tests these metaphors under the lens of ekphrasis. She 
interprets Sexton’s verses “no flag,/no belly,/ no cry” as matching death to a state of 
transcendence where “no cry” is a metonymy for no pain, and “no flag” a metaphor 
for leaving no sign.480 The metaphor “no belly” is here left unattended. Sexton’s 
desire to split from her life with no trace, no mark of having lived (no flag) and no 
relationship to suffering (no cry) is clearly demonstrated. However, it is the metaphor 
of “no belly” that reveals the root of this desire. Sexton’s desire is not so much the 
desire for suicide, as Loizeaux suggests, but a desire to put an end to the torment that 
comes with abortion, an issue that Loizeaux circumvents.    
Literary critic Shoshana Felman remarks that traumatic experience can often be 
too difficult to recall and might require that ‘people tell their stories (which they do 
not know or cannot speak) through others’ stories.’481 Felman argues that writing 
which attempts to convey trauma ‘cannot be simply remembered, it cannot simply be 
“confessed”: it must be testified to, in a struggle shared between a speaker and a 
listener to recover something the speaking subject is not – and cannot be – in 
possession of.’ 482 The idea of testimony as a shared struggle resonates with Bracha 
L. Ettinger’s framing of aesthetic experience as an event that can offer the 
circumstances for trauma to be processed. Ettinger argues that ‘trauma’s transformed 
                                                      
480 Loizeaux, Poetry and the Visual Arts, 116. 
481 Shoshana Felman, What Does a Woman Want? Reading and Sexual Difference (Baltimore: The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 18. 
482 Ibid., 16. 
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affectability in wit(h)nessing in/by art,’ may provide ways to examine both 
transgenerational and personal trauma in ways that hold ‘ethical and even therapeutic 
consequences.’483 
Encountering an artwork can then provide the means for a creative response to 
arise and for traumatic experience to be shared. Ettinger provides a framework to 
envision ‘new possibilities for affective apprehending,’ possibilities that can also 
create ‘new artistic effects where aesthetics converges with ethics even beyond the 
artist’s intentions or conscious control.’484 Sexton’s poem should be considered as a 
distinct form of art-writing that provides an auto/biographical response, a 
“wit(h)nessing in/by art,” with further consequences both for the artwork’s trauma – 
captured through the testimony of words and metaphors – and the subject’s attempt 
to convey the psychophysical impact experienced during the encounter. Such a 
response to an encounter with a work of art activates nonconscious inscriptions, 
exposed in the methodology of disclosing the unique encounter with the work, 
through the practice of auto/biographical art-writing. Corporeal affective responses 
to an encounter with aesthetics weave psychophysical experience into narratives as a 
way to confront and negotiate trauma. As this process is not necessarily always a 
conscious mechanism, exploring metaphors and images within the work may lead to 
a reading that locates traces of the uniqueness of the subject narrating and the 
artwork being narrated. Perhaps, as Erica Jong hopes, Sexton’s poems ‘will be 
understood in time – not as “women’s poetry” or “confessional poetry” – but as 
myths that expand the human consciousness.’485 
 
                                                      
483 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 148. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Erica Jong, “Remembering Anne Sexton”. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Love Is What You Fear: 
Reading Tracey Emin with Hélène Cixous 
 
 
After the Movie 
 
My friend Michael and I are walking home arguing about the movie. 
He says that he believes a person can love someone 
and still be able to murder that person. 
 
I say, No, that’s not love. That’s attachment. 
Michael says, No, that’s love. You can love someone, then come to a 
day 
 
when you’re forced to think “it’s him or me” 
think “me” and kill him. 
 
I say, Then its not love anymore. 
Michael says, It was love up to then though. 
 
I say, Maybe we mean different things by the same word. 
Michael says, Humans are complicated: love can exist even in the 
murderous heart. 
 
I say that what he might mean by love is desire. 
Love is not a feeling, I say. And Michael says, Then what is it? 
 
We’re walking along West 16th Street — a clear unclouded night — 
and I hear my voice 
repeating what I used to say to my husband: Love is action, I used to 
say to him. 
 
Simone Weil says that when you really love you are able to look at 
someone you want to eat and not eat them. 
 
Janis Joplin says, take another little piece of my heart now baby. 
 
Meister Eckhart says that as long as we love images we are doomed 
to live in purgatory. 
 
 – Marie Howe, excerpt from the poem After the Movie.486 
 
 
 
                                                      
486 Mary Howe, The Kingdom Of Ordinary Time (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2008), 21-
22. 
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The catalogue of Tracey Emin’s first major retrospective Love Is What You Want sits 
on my shelf.487 It has been sitting quietly and beautifully patient in its ivory purity for 
a while now – coming up to three years soon – a long while. It forces me to reflect. I 
fear it. I fear her work, I fear the artist. The title confronts me like an omen. A 
supercilious prophecy that reads: love is what you want. The curse of a life, the 
unbearable knowledge of what living is often reduced to: Love. I hold it and I am 
held captive. When I am held I can open up. About half way through this mortal life, 
I realise that the more one lives, the more courage it takes to open up the past than it 
takes to unfold a future. There is no easy way to go about love and its loss. There is 
no carved out path of a promised journey. Per aspera ad astra. It’s through hardship 
that one gets to the stars. In the case of love, it is in retrospect, after the hardship, that 
one can experience the universe afresh. Emin’s catalogue holds a new experience, a 
retrospective encounter with the retrospective exhibition. There is a small, hastily 
scribbled inscription on the top-right corner of the first page. It reads:  
 
To a Happy New Year 
& New Associations. 
                     2011. 
 
 
 
The scribble looks upset. It resembles a medical prescription – frustrated, 
barely legible and rushed out with no trace of feeling. What emotionally depleted 
human could possibly inscribe such a detached, stiff and sterile sentence unto the 
page of a book soaked with emotions? Perhaps it’s a natural reaction, even a wise 
one. To balance out an excess of feelings one should react with no feelings at all.  
                                                      
487 Tracey Emin, Love Is What You Want, catalogue of exhibition at the Hayward Gallery, London, 18 
May – 29 August 2011 (London: Hayward Publishing, 2011).  
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As writers we were both trained to be unemotional in our criticism. We heard 
whispers of how certain texts were very “well-written” but not chiselled enough to 
be made employable in the ranks of com-man-ding theory. Emotions obscure and 
distort perception. Our criticism would be skewed or altogether hindered. Or, far 
worse, it would be weak.  
There is some truth in this equation but it all depends on what side of 
criticism you are. Critics that construe emotions as weakness employ the literary 
powers of distance and generalization. They find that emotional and personal 
approaches to criticism may be interpreted as judgments, statements of taste or 
personal accounts of the self in relation to the object, rather than accounts of how the 
object transforms the worlds it encounters. Yet, this world is varied and made up of 
distinct individuals, and so, when we looked at the work, he and I saw, felt and 
thought very different things. He liked to see patterns and repetitions and trace them 
back and forth from history to the present. To some extent, using these calculations, 
he was able to predict the future. A clairvoyance without criticality, a future 
reproductive of the past, a future that, in this respect, is rendered successful. It is this 
sort of fortune telling that contradicted what the founder of our department, Professor 
Irit Rogoff, was patiently and militantly trying to instil in all of us: the recognition of 
‘the limitations of one’s thought for one does not learn something new until one 
unlearns something old, otherwise one is simply adding information rather than 
rethinking a structure.’488 
Inevitably, the way we loved at the time, and the way we exercised our 
criticality were very similar. Every relationship we carried out followed the same 
pattern: desire to self-destruction. We learnt nothing new; we followed the same 
                                                      
488 Irit Rogoff, “What is a Theorist,” in The State of Art Criticism, Eds. Michael Newman and James 
Elkins (Taylor & Francis e-library, 2007), 99. 
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structure of what we knew both of love and criticism. We were both stuck because 
we didn’t know how to effectively risk all that we had learnt. Plus, there was the fear 
of failure. Fear is the main obstacle to any growth – be it thinking, feeling or loving. 
Following a structure might be easier, but it does not produce change. And it 
certainly does not undo the self, the self’s ability to love and to be critical.489  
I would tell him that criticism was an act of love. That in order to be critical 
one must love, and in order to love, one must abandon power. The problem was that 
we were both held locked in the delusion that power came with critical distance, and 
we locked our audiences in the illusions afforded by universal statements borrowed 
from other voices. We had sedated the ability to tap into our vulnerabilities, our 
fragility, our weaknesses and the complexity of our emotions. It’s what the structure 
demanded in order for us to effectively relate to that which is outside the self. A self 
that was lacking a personal voice, body, background or identity. A sort of relation 
without a self. This was all well and acceptable in terms of art criticism, but it didn’t 
fare so well when the self related to real people. We sensed that we were 
orchestrating a scam of some sort, that people would soon figure out that our 
statements were not our own but ideas borrowed and repeated in their fullest 
intensity. A performance. We never stopped believing that love was the very stuff of 
attentive and subjective criticism. Subjective criticism is not personal criticism, 
                                                      
489 This extract is inspired by Rogoff’s account of a theorist being “one who has been undone by 
theory”. Rogoff is here trying to establish a relation between loss, ‘giving up’, ‘moving away’, ‘being 
without’ as fundamental to the production of not only new knowledges but alternative configurations 
of engaging with culture that might altogether abandon critical analysis. The shift towards what 
Rogoff terms “criticality” bears an urgency and contemporary engagement with culture that 
occasionally finds itself at a loss for the right methodology. Rogoff hints at a certain type of 
‘theoretical articulation’ preliminarily described as ‘a “writing with” an artist’s work rather than 
writing about it, a dehierarchization of the question of whether the artist, the critic, or the historian, 
the advertising copy-writer or the commercial sponsor, the studio or the director, has the final word in 
determining the meaning of a work in visual culture.’ See Irit Rogoff, “What is a Theorist,” in The 
State of Art Criticism, eds. Michael Newman and James Elkins (Taylor & Francis e-library, 2007), 
104. 
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rather, it is a profound preoccupation with the experience of an artwork, an 
experience that can only be relayed from a unique mind-body unity and not an 
abstract universal objectivity. Unfortunately, by this point, there was no self left to 
execute such love.  
Critical love and attentive criticality are fleeting experiences that necessitate 
an exposure of one’s vulnerability to an affective encounter. The ability to surrender 
one’s power cannot endure the test of time without liquidating the monument of the 
self. It’s as if, for a few moments, vision is pure, senses alert, extracting, assessing, 
examining, steadily and patiently loving through a powerless process of 
understanding; not that which we can understand but that which is trying to make 
itself understood. Being in such a state of existence on a permanent basis can also 
lead to self-annihilation. The world is not a safe place. It is violent, vampiric and too 
vulgar for a state of permanent fragility. Art, on the other hand, demands our 
fragility. It demands our loving, living, critical attention; our sensorial and sensual 
faculties and an openness to affective engagement; it demands a response, be it 
laughter, feeling, contemplation, conversation, inspiration or writing. 
Yet, most writing about art is an exercise in hermeneutics: a dry logic of 
unemotional geometry. For this reason, I eventually came to condone the violation of 
his inscription. I recognised what an enormous challenge it must have been for him 
to write anything at all. I imagined the circles his thoughts wreathed to extract this 
succinct elegy. I remembered the long hours we spent patiently computing the 
impossible sides of his triangular affairs. By assessing his patterns of thought and 
(immaterialized) action, I reached a level of dry logic forgiveness. I forgave him, this 
friend that doesn’t add up, this friend minus the words. The man with whom I shared 
an entire year of excessive emotions, who is now sentencing me to a year of new 
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associations. I forgive him for having always carved out emotions into prescriptions. 
I am sure that he has forgiven me for being soaked with mine. 
 
* * * 
 
 Fig. 9 Tracey Emin, Why Be Afraid (2009). 
 
I know what I am looking for in this catalogue. I know because I have a desire to see 
– I am ready to look, to search, to unfold. I have imagined it, replayed the scene in 
the theatre of my mind innumerable times since she left.  
 We were standing in one of the large rooms of the top floor of the Hayward 
Gallery in London. A little pressed for time as her mother had to leave. A little 
pressed because I was meeting her mother. An hour late (why would I be late to such 
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a meeting?) I was introduced to Mummy. Not as a friend, not as an association, not 
as, rather just as, a baptismal name.  
“Mummy, this is Diana.” 
Standing under a larger-than-I frame, I cannot recall whether I had expressed 
my passion for this labor of quixotic promise that came in the form of a gentle cajole: 
why be afraid…[fig. 9] Three entire years have eclipsed since Tracey Emin weaved 
this question onto the fabric and into the lining of my mind. Just over two meters on 
each side, in a white thick wooden frame hangs a fabric embroidered with the textile 
of dreams. Calico cotton. Écru, brut, naturel. A meticulously sewed web of reverie – 
raw and unprocessed – the material of love locks you in a rhetorical seduction: why 
be afraid?  
I wanted to tell her that the future is adventurous. A future where intergalactic 
journeys await those who are unafraid. That the distance from hellish Mars to those 
bursting stars is a mere tilt of the head. Perception, they like to call it. I am looking, 
eyes transfixed onto the agile body of a wolf. A wolf sewn out of threads. Or is it a 
dog? What do you see when you see this figure with a crooked tail ascending a flight 
of faint steps? It must, undeniably, be a wolf. Only a wolf can carry a girl its own 
size on its back. Only a wolf would know the direction to the stars. Like the wolf, I 
howl and curse at the moon for snatching my passenger before our journey could 
begin. I wanted to tell her that it’s all right to be afraid. That the stitching on the 
calico love was a messily scribbled testament to Hélène Cixous’ philosophy that 
‘there is no love except where there is fear.’490 All love begins with fear. All love 
begins with the fearful end at its kernel. 
                                                      
490 Hélène Cixous, “Love of the Wolf,” in Stigmata (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 73. 
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The girl sits on the wolf, torso leaning over and arms extended into a brave 
and gentle grasp around the furry neck. Her hands intermingle with the overcoat of 
the wolf’s nape. It is difficult to discern where the girl ends and the wolf begins 
when they are stitched and folded into and unto eachother like an assemblage of 
ascending force. Who knows the direction to heaven? The girl or the wolf? For a 
long time, three years now, I believed that it was the wolf. I wanted to believe that it 
was the wolf. Perception, they call it. My perception at the time, led me to believe 
that it was the wolf that was howling: why be afraid? That this artwork involved an 
impassioned, stoic, protective and alert central figure of the lover (the wolf) whose 
main concern was the exaltation of the beloved (the girl). Blinded by my desire, I 
wanted so much to be that wolf, to persuasively announce: I will be the one who 
carries you to Heaven! That there is no need to be afraid because I will be the one 
who carries you to Heaven. But I never did. I never did because I never knew 
whether I could. I never knew, just like the wolf, where I ended, and where she 
began. Perception, they like to call it. Another word for perception is boundaries. 
 
 
I, Me, My, Mythob(I)ography 
 
The “I” of Tracey Emin’s work intentionally and regularly evokes the “you”. In the 
work Why be Afraid the woven text declares: ‘I will be the one.’ But who is “the 
one” in this work which depicts two figures. This is the one, and only, work of Emin 
that I have come across that contains two figures and a single “I”. Occasionally, there 
are a few works with other figures: Emin and a dog, Emin and a flower, Emin and 
her mum. All these works have clear-cut identities. Emin’s mum is clearly Emin’s 
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mum. The dog is clearly a dog even though it serves as a metaphor for a canine sort 
of relating. This was made especially clear in the drawing series Dog Brains. Over 
800 monoprints executed in a few seconds and drawn in reverse. Emin states that 
these are ‘a series of self-portraits about being drunk.’491 I guess being drunk really is 
being figured in reverse. 
Even though the “I versus You” motif is present throughout most of her 
work, it is usually apparent where Emin herself is located, both visually and textually 
in the representational or textual strategy of her artwork.492 The “I” is always Tracey. 
The “you” is the beloved, the enemy, society, the state, the art market. But to arrive 
at this binary setup, there ought to be an investigation (a story told) about where and 
how the “I” has been represented in her work as a single figure thus far.  
 
Fig. 10 Tracey Emin, Sometimes I Feel Beautiful, 2000. 
                                                      
491 http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2003/jun/21/artsfeatures5 
492 The “I versus You” motif can be considered as a mode of address and an artistic strategy 
frequently employed by feminist artists to expose power relations. See for instance work by the artist 
Barbara Kruger such as Untitled (You Construct Intricate Rituals), 1981 or Untitled (Your gaze hits 
the side of my face), 1981 where “you” signifies the male hero, patriarchy, the oppressor, while “I” or 
“my” is assigned to the female, the feminine or the objectified. Also, artist Jenny Holzer’s textual 
work that appears in print-based or LED panels. For instance, in the work Survival Series 1983-1985 
we read If you had behaved nicely the communists wouldn’t exist and also Men don’t protect you 
anymore, where “you” here signifies the fascist opposition or patriarchal nepotism. More recently, in 
the series Naked in Africa, 2014, artist Eca Eps addresses gender discrimination in Africa with 
photographic works that capture white text projected on a black naked female body that reads Your 
God is Not My God and I Did Not Come From Your Rib, You Came From My Vagina. 
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The protagonist is clearly represented in photographic self-portraits such as 
Sometimes I feel beautiful (2000) [fig. 10] and I’ve got it all (2000) [fig. 11]. Both 
are taken the same year and both capture Emin in powerful, carnal and sanguine 
states. In I’ve got it all, Emin is depicted with legs spread apart, sprinkled with 
banknotes and coins which she clutches and presses inwards onto her crotch and 
abdomen. I would suggest that the central themes of Emin’s work stem from these 
two creatively informed sites of the body: the crotch and the abdomen. Through a 
variety of media such as photographs, video, painting and embroidery, Emin is 
perpetually being informed by her experience as a female artist, a female lover, and a 
female who has consciously rejected her body’s procreative capacity. 
 
Fig. 11 Tracey Emin, I’ve Got It All, 2000. 
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Traditionally, this would explain why being female, or feminine for that 
matter, and simultaneously being an artist were cast as oppositions. Socially 
speaking, a “female” requires at least some degree of adherence to the expected 
stereotypes of femininity, and therefore at least some of the associations that this 
category conjures: passive, maternal, lady-like and so forth. The “female” then 
contradicts the commonly accepted representation of the active, rowdy and 
autonomous (male) artist. In this sense, Emin is a “better” artist than she is a female, 
if stereotypes are to be kept in mind.493 Yet, Emin works with what has been 
traditionally encoded as feminine in the arts – women’s crafts such as weaving or 
women’s issues such as abortion – and repositions these traditions and issues into the 
sphere of art. Working against the stereotype of gender expectations, she employs the 
tropes of “the artist” to deconstruct notions of femininity. A femininity that is not 
gender specific. It could be dog-like.  
Similarly, in Sometimes I Feel Beautiful, Emin sits in the narrow space of a 
foam-filled bathtub; thighs are again ajar, while this time she is being sprinkled with 
water descending from a showerhead. There are many associations one could make 
here: a baptism, a cleansing, a re-birth of a modern-day Venus in a tub. But my 
associations borrow from the culture I was raised in, one which is very much in a 
geographical proximity (and tension) to Emin’s background.494 Myth has it that when 
Cronus amputated Uranus’ testicles and threw them into the sea, the foam that 
                                                      
493 The art critic and theorist Jennifer Doyle notes that the public considers Emin as ‘a sort of wise 
female Keith Richards haloed by a mythology of debauchery, creative genius, and stamina.’ While 
these masculine characterisations seem to attract positive consensus, the “feminine” aspects of Emin’s 
work such as the confessional and the personal seem to gather more negative criticism. See Jennifer 
Doyle, Sex Objects: Art and the Dialectics of Desire (University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 97 and 
105-107. 
494 Emin is of Turkish-Cypriot descent while I am of mixed Greek-Cypriot and Polish parentage. The 
Republic of Cyprus is a Mediterranean island which was invaded in 1974 by Turkish military. Since 
then, the north-eastern part of the island remains under Turkish occupation, with continuous 
discussions towards a solution through reunification or the creation of a bi-communal federation. 
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resulted from this colossal splash gave rise to the goddess Aphrodite on a Cypriot 
shore. I wonder who paid the price for Tracey’s re-birth, for ‘having it all’ and for 
‘feeling beautiful.’ We all found out in the video Why I Never Became a Dancer 
(1995) that ‘Shane, Eddy, Tony, Doug and Richard’ were left feeling a little 
emasculated by Emin’s success.495 
In such work, the “I” of Tracey Emin is not only clearly depicted, it is 
forcefully projected. Emin also announces her presence with “me” and “my” which 
frequently serve as substitutes for the term “I”. What is significant about this 
observation is that “me”, “my” and “I” are always represented with a female figure. 
None of her other work contains symbols or metaphors for representing herself. The 
subject always appears as the figure, head, body, headless body of a woman and/or 
girl.  
On the other hand, dogs have provided Emin with the necessary allegorical 
means to create her work, specifically work about debauchery, dishevelled states and 
a simultaneous kind of eroticism and loyalty. But the dog also figures as the longed-
for lover, the longing to love and be loved faithfully. In this respect, the dog becomes 
a symbol of identification, as can be seen in the red neon installation that reads: Some 
Crazy Fucked Up Dog Like Hell That’s How it Feels to Live without Love (2009) 
                                                      
495 This video consists of footage of the town Margate which Emin grew up in. Through the use of a 
voice-over, Emin speaks about her sexual encounters with a number of men whilst growing up there: 
“I remember the first time someone asked me to grab their balls. I remember the power it gave me. 
But it wasn’t always like that. Sometimes they’d just cum. And then they’d leave me there, wherever I 
was, half-naked.” Emin continues the narrative with how she found dancing liberating and thought 
that winning a final local dance competition would be an opportunity to leave Margate behind and 
move to London. But, as she started to dance and people started to clap, a group of men she had slept 
with were shouting “Slag! Slag! Slag!” from the audience floor. Emin narrates how she left Margate 
anyhow, that she was “better than all of these men,” and that she felt free. The video concludes with 
Emin dancing in a large, empty luxury flat with what seems like a view of London – a clear indication 
of her wealth and success. In her final words before the video documents her dancing in the flat, she 
refers to the boys from Margate and says: ‘Shane, Eddy, Tony, Doug, Richard, this one’s for you!’ 
See the video, Tracey Emin, Why I Never Became a Dancer, 1995, here https://vimeo.com/79687251. 
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[fig. 12]. The neon text represents unrequited love as a dog-like infernal state, a state 
that Emin often alludes to in her work.  
 
Fig. 12 Tracey Emin, Some Crazy Fucked Up Dog Like Hell That’s How it Feels to Live 
without Love, 2009. 
However, in encountering the work Why be Afraid, there seems to be a 
confusion between the action represented in textual form and the figures of the dog 
and the girl conducting the action. We expect the “I” in the phrase Why be afraid 
when I will be the one to carry you to Heaven, to take the form of the girl, since it is 
how Emin usually depicts herself in her work. However, as it is the dog that carries 
the girl on its back, the boundaries between the girl and the dog become far more 
enmeshed than in other depictions, and the statement Why be afraid is not clearly 
consigned to either the dog or the girl. The confusion arises because we assume that 
the dog is the one steering the action, the one ascending the stairs, the one carrying 
the girl to Heaven. 
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Or, at least that was what I initially expected (interpreted) from the work. I 
wanted this ordinary dog to take on the exceptional mystical qualities of a wolf. To 
smell any potential threat arriving across miles of moonlit landscapes. To be fit, 
strong, unafraid and ready to take lovers to the heavens. To be feared and revered. 
After all, doesn’t everyone secretly love that which they fear? The writer Hélène 
Cixous has portrayed the allegorical figure of the wolf as a representation of desire, 
defined by a simultaneous fear and love, a proximity of pleasure with danger, or a 
form of pleasure that arises precisely because of the danger involved: 
 
We love the love of the wolf. We love the fear of the wolf. We’re afraid of 
the wolf: there is love in our fear. Fear is in love with the wolf. Fear loves. Or 
rather: we are afraid of the person we love. Love terrorizes us. Or else the 
person we love we call our wolf or our tiger, or our lamb in the manger. We 
are full of trembling and ready to wolf down.496 
 
 
What is it that we fear when confronted with love? That love or the lover will 
consume us? Is it that human desire strives for self-annihilation and in that process 
misconstrues (replaces?) the desire for obliteration with the love of the one who most 
vividly reminds us of our mortality? In Cixous’ passionate universe ‘one must almost 
die in order to take pleasure in being made of flesh.’497 In this curious tale of love 
and fear, Cixous concludes with a subversive portrayal of the wolf. A wolf that 
comes to be dominated by the lamb. A sort of animal-reversal that in its 
anthropomorphic sense becomes a gender-reversal. How is the flesh of gender 
differentiated in its proximity with fatal pleasure? Is it biological sex or the 
expression of the feminine and masculine in narratives of love and fear, domination 
and subordination, fragility and strength, that define our relations to each other as 
                                                      
496 Hélène Cixous, “Love of the Wolf,” in Stigmata: Escaping Texts (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 
2005), 73.  
497 Hélène Cixous, “What is it o’clock?,” in Stigmata: Escaping Texts (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 
2005), 52. 
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gendered?498 In the relation between the wolf and the lamb, Cixous argues that the 
lamb’s self-sacrifice overwhelms and transfigures the wolf:  
 
what the wolf loves in the lamb is its own goodness. It’s thanks to the lamb 
that the wolf accedes to the plane of love – the love that gives of itself 
without hope, without calculation, without response, but that nevertheless 
gives of itself, seeing itself give of itself.499  
 
 
By offering itself up as a sacrifice, the lamb evinces its devotion to the wolf 
and, precisely because of this act of exposure and vulnerability, their complete 
surrender to the other, the wolf comes to repudiate its own nature. The wolf 
renounces its savage ways, spares the lamb from being eaten, and in turn proves their 
love for the lamb. The story transmits the idea that love requires an act of self-
abandonment and a relinquishment of one’s power. Taken to an extreme 
manifestation, the protagonists not only contradict their nature, but they come to 
embody each other’s essences:  
 
The lamb loves its wolf. The wolf turns all white and starts quivering out of 
love of the lamb. The lamb loves the wolf’s fragility, and the wolf loves the 
frail one’s force. The wolf is now the lamb’s lamb and the lamb has tamed 
the wolf. Love blackens the lamb.500  
 
Emin’s work Why be afraid appears to capture a similar narrative. The story 
seemed to portray a resolution where the girl/artist is finally being transported to the 
heavens by her own tamed wolf. Three years after my initial experience of the work, 
I now read this artwork from a very different perspective. It has come to symbolize 
                                                      
498 Susan Sellers explains that Cixous ‘employs the terms masculine and feminine to distinguish 
between two different “economies” or modes of behavior. Whilst these economies are not dependent 
on anatomical sex, and can be found in varying degrees according to how the individual has 
negotiated their experience, Cixous suggests that because of the position women have been assigned 
within the socio-symbolic scheme, they are potentially closer to a feminine economy than men.’ See 
Hélène Cixous, The Hélène Cixous Reader, edited by Susan Sellers (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 
2003), 131. 
499 Cixous, “Wolf,” 81. 
500 Ibid., 2. 
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for me a figure of emancipation. Emin is both the wolf-dog and the girl in one stroke. 
As is clear from her previous work, Emin identifies with dogs or a dog-like nature, 
demonstrated in straighforward work such as the series of watercolour portraits of a 
dog which are entitled Reincarnation [fig. 13]. Why be afraid is then another 
allegorical self-portrait of the artist, a lamb and wolf in one stroke, a fear of love 
which has been overcome, transfigured from fear to love, lamb to wolf and vice 
versa.  
Is there another word that can capture our experience of giving up something 
of ourselves in the face of an other’s offering, or must it necessarily be that all love 
begins with fear? If all love begins with fear, does it end with indifference? Or, does 
it intensify and endure through the transfiguration of the lovers? Like artworks, 
stories will strike a different chord every time they are told. It is the nuanced details 
of the experience, as well as our lambish approach to the work, that can ignite 
alternative responses. Artworks can capture the living attention of the reader and, in 
their embrace, can transfigure both the perception of the work as well as the reader.  
 
Fig.13 Tracey Emin, Reincarnation V, 2005. 
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